Yugoslavia, 1971

Certain moments in the lives of peoples represent milestones in their centuries-long journeys. There were several such moments in the process of establishing the principles of self-managed socialist democracy in the multinational federal state of Jugoslavia.

At Jajce on November 29, 1943, the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Jugoslavia laid the foundations of the present Socialist Federal Republic. What was proclaimed at Jajce became the Magna Carta of the Federation, built on the ruins of the old unitary monarchy of Jugoslavia by virtue of the War of National Liberation and the idea of brotherhood and unity.

Another historic step was taken in 1950 when the Law on Workers Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations was enacted.[i] However, more than a dozen years passed before the principle of self-management became pervasive in all domains of Jugoslav activity. Only then could it be incorporated in the 1963 Constitution.

Now in 1971 has come another major milestone. On June 30 of this year the Federal Assembly adopted 23 amendments to the 1963 Constitution. They spell out the functions of the Federation, clarify the relationship between the Federation and the constituent Republics and extend the economic foundations of self-management. The Federal Assembly also announced the nature of the Presidency, which is to be a new collective incarnation of the Socialist Federal Republic, based on equal representation of the Republics and adequate representation of the Autonomous Provinces. These achievements will further the country's socioeconomic advance and provide unity and stability for socialism and nonalignment.

II

It may now be said without exaggeration that after 25 years the three main aims of the National Liberation War and the socialist revolution in Jugoslavia have, on the whole, been achieved. The country soon recovered from the devastation of the war, even though it had lost 1,700,000 of its 15,000,000 people as well as suffering tremendous material damage. It developed political structures to provide for increasingly direct participation of workers and citizens in the management of public affairs. Finally, Jugoslavia's steady nonaligned international position has protected her independent, self-managing socialist development and enabled her to contribute actively to the efforts of the international community for peace, security and the democratization of relations among nations.

The working people of Jugoslavia have acquired better living conditions as a result of rapid industrialization and general overall development. Profound transformations have taken place. In 1945, the rural population accounted for 74 percent of the total; by 1971 it had dropped to 46 percent. This is still a high percentage compared with about 20 percent in highly developed countries. However, our interest is primarily to achieve a certain pace of change in the social structure. France took some 70 years to reduce the percentage of her agricultural population from 75 to 55. By comparison, Jugoslavia achieved the same change in the social structure in 14 years and despite adverse international conditions.

It is not the intention here to list achievements in material development or standards of living, but rather to compare the pace of development in Jugoslavia in the prewar and the postwar periods. In prewar Jugoslavia, in the school year 1938-39, there were 11 students to each 10,000 inhabitants; in 1968-69, the number was 115, ten times more. In prewar Jugoslavia during the period 1923-1939, the gross national product increased 1.5 times (industrial 1.8, agricultural 1.45). In the same span of time (1953-1969) the gross national product in socialist Jugoslavia increased almost three- fold (industrial five-fold, agricultural 1.6 times). In other words, the total social product grew twice as fast in the new Jugoslavia. One should add that agriculture was practically at a standstill until 1959, because almost all the public accumulation of funds was spent to speed up industrialization and for national defense. In those years when outside pressure was at its peak, the defense budget needs accounted for from 11 to 20 percent of the national income.

This comparison corroborates the view that the socioeconomic and political system of postwar Jugoslavia does much more to stimulate the development of productive forces and the growth of national wealth than the society of prewar Jugoslavia could possibly have done, rent as it was by social, economic, class and national antagonisms, and in an international position of semi-colonial dependence.

Another comparison is significant. In a period of 25 years (1938-1963) Jugoslavia's per-capita national income improved by two-fifths compared with Western Europe, one-quarter compared with North America (the United States and Canada), and one-tenth compared with the countries of Central Europe.[ii] It is clear that Jugoslavia has succeeded in making faster progress than these more advanced nations. Jugoslavia's success proves that the widening of the gap between the industrially advanced countries and those that are developing may be avoided, provided the individual moral and material initiative of the working man is made the decisive element. Naturally, provided also that all the available resources of a country are mobilized, progressive socio-political transformations aimed at emancipating the people are carried out concurrently with the material advance, and, in addition to all this, there is adequate assistance from the international community.

Workers' self-management, introduced in Jugoslavia in 1950, is an instrument in the hands of the working class whereby the traditional domination of government over man yields increasingly to the management of man over things. It is a way for men who got rid of capitalist exploitation to avoid becoming hired laborers of the state. Moreover, ownership itself is transformed. Traditional state ownership of the means of production, primarily through nationalization, increasingly becomes social, i.e. anybody's and nobody's ownership. The right of self-management is guaranteed under the Constitution, the law and the statutes of working organizations, enterprises and institutions. It is based upon work performed, and it also constitutes the basis for the implementation of political and social rights.

Compared with the current phenomenon of participation in the world at large (which occurs not only as a demand of broad sections of people, especially the youth, but also in the practice of various social systems), self- management as practiced in Jugoslavia is different in two important regards, (a) Self-management is the worker's right to foil influence on decisions taken not only within his own organization but elsewhere as well, while participation, as a means of more or less intensive advisory participation in management, is limited largely to the spheres of personal income, welfare and standard of living.

(b) The other essential difference lies in the fact that while traditional economic democracy does not extend beyond the enterprise, workers' self- management in the Jugoslav practice refers to any kind of associated labor: from the factory to hospital, school and government administration. The right of self-management is exercised in every working place. It is institutionally and organizationally connected with self-management in the local community, commune or broader community. The decision-making is implemented either directly or through delegates to the workers' councils, whose members are elected by secret ballot, as well as through assemblies at the municipal, provincial, republic and federal levels. It increases the democratization of the nation's overall process of promoting social, economic and political cohesion.

It is sometimes alleged that decentralization is dangerous because it expands or even sets in motion centrifugal forces, makes coördination more difficult and debases work. For these reasons, it is said to be incompatible with high levels of organization and modern technology. These assumptions do not hold true. Decentralization as practiced in Jugoslavia is not a mechanical transfer of state power from central to local authorities or enterprises. It is a democratic devolution of authority.

Nor is decentralization an end in itself. It was necessary in order to break the monopoly of an increasingly powerful government apparatus and its methods of administrative centralization. As far as the problems of development are concerned, the entire experience of self-management in Jugoslavia indicates that the most formidable obstacle is precisely underdevelopment. This is only natural because under such conditions, the necessary concentration of capital leads inevitably to centralized control over allocation of the surplus product.

The self-managed Jugoslav society cannot be characterized as autarchic, closed in upon itself; coöperation and agreement among working people rather than bureaucratic commandeering are its basic characteristics. As such, this society is open to broad international coöperation.

Let me cite a few examples of Jugoslavia's openness toward her neighbors and the rest of the world. During the International Tourism Year (1967- 1968) she abolished entry visas for all foreign visitors. At present she has agreements abolishing all or some forms of visas with 36 countries. In 1970, a total of 30 million foreigners entered Jugoslavia, i.e. 50 percent more than the country's population. That year, a total of 17 million persons crossed the Jugoslav-Italian frontier under special arrangements regulating local frontier traffic. Also, Jugoslav citizens crossed their country's border on their way abroad 14 million times. This mobility of Jugoslav citizens results from a higher standard of living and from a feeling of freedom created by the system of self-management.

Naturally, travel of foreigners to Jugoslavia and of Jugoslav citizens abroad is only one aspect of the country's communication with the rest of the world. The relations of citizens, enterprises, institutions, communes and other elements with partners in other countries are much more important, involving varied forms of scientific, cultural, educational and technical coöperation, including joint ventures. The intensity of this coöperation represents the application in foreign policy not only of the principle of self-management at home but also of the principle of nonalignment which is the basis of Jugoslav foreign policy.

Just as self-management inside the country leads toward integration based on the individual and collective interests of the working people, so in international relations under conditions of modern technology Jugoslavia has found opportunities to stimulate national independence and to establish relations with the widest possible number of countries and links with other progressive and democratic forces throughout the world.

Of course, these aims cannot be achieved without difficulties.

On the level of self-management, a great obstacle is the country's relative underdevelopment. In addition there is a permanent contradiction between self-management, which paves the way toward the emancipation of labor on the one hand, and statist or technocratic bureaucratism on the other, both of which tend to deprive the working man of the results of his labor in the name of so-called higher goals of the State as higher efficiency.

Jugoslavia consists of several nations with long cultural and political traditions and with different levels of development. Under these conditions, various tendencies opposed to self-management can easily disguise themselves in chauvinistic, sectarian or nationalistic attire. Hence any problem of economic development in Jugoslavia has special political connotations; willy-nilly, it is viewed also (and sometimes primarily) from the angle of the equality of the nations which comprise it. This sometimes lends intensive political coloration to discussions of development, prices, taxes, or even of strictly economic matters. Internationally, the nonalignment policy clashes with the policy of blocs or other divisions of the world into spheres of influence. It also challenges various policies which, relying on the possession of force, are a source of world crises, threats to independence and security, and a great obstacle to the democratic integration of the world on the basis of equality, solidarity and mutual respect.

III

Jugoslavia, in less than three decades, has had four Constitutions, the last of which has already had 40 amendments. Compared to the fact that the Constitution of the United States, in the 200 years of its existence, has had only 20 amendments, the number of changes in Jugoslavia may appear exaggerated. These, however, reflect dynamic developments and help toward resolving social stresses. It is essential to encourage the trend, while adapting the social forms in which that trend is expressed. This was recognized in the Program of the League of Communists of Jugoslavia, adopted in 1958, which states: "Nothing that has been created must be so sacred for us that it cannot be surpassed and cede its place to what is still more progressive, more free, more human."

The most important points to be cleared up at this stage of the constitutional reform are the role of the Federation, the relationship between the Federation and the Republics and Autonomous Provinces, and the further strengthening of the socioeconomic status of the working man. Further elaboration in this field is being left for the next stage.

So far as the Federation's competence and organization are concerned, the solutions from the period of "administrative socialism" and the considerable degree of centralism inevitable in the initial period of development are now quite obviously inadequate. The system of self- management has permeated the entire social structure, and the Republics have transcended their formerly rather narrow framework. It has been necessary to link the entire federal structure more directly with the Republics.

The position of the individual worker using the means of production which he owns (farming, crafts, liberal professions, services, etc.) also had to be clarified constitutionally. The constitutional amendments guarantee freedom of the individual to engage in independent work, and those who do so are put on an equal socioeconomic plane with other workers, so as to reduce to a minimum the possibility of exploitation of hired labor by private entrepreneurs. Since as early as 1950, no one in a government or other office in Jugoslavia has been permitted to pick up the telephone and order what should be produced or how profit should be distributed. However, the development of the means whereby a working collective can dispose of the results of its work has been very slow. By 1968 enterprises were able to dispose independently of only 6 percent of the social product, with a tendency toward a further decrease. Particularly hard hit were resources for the expansion. The majority of these were allocated to the so-called extra-budgetary balances of the Federation and to the Republics or Autonomous Provinces for investment and for projects initiated by these bodies, while leading officials of business associations kept an eye on the balance left to the enterprises. Either procedure meant the separation of income from those who created it; improvements were needed to strengthen the autonomy of enterprises.

The following points should be made about the changes being brought about by the amendments:

(1) The Federation can be the protagonist only in those affairs where it should exercise jurisdiction in line with the principle of self-management and the autonomous position of the peoples and nationalities of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. This puts up a much stronger barrier to possible recurrences of centralism than was contained in previous constitutional clauses. However, it does not imply the establishment of some form of state polycentrism or substitution of republican and provincial statisms for federal statism. It means the further democratic evolution of the socio-political system on the basis of self-management.

Under the new conditions, competent organs in the Republics are rightly expected to rely on the self-managing structure when dealing with their own problems, and on agreement and association with other Republics on questions which can be settled successfully only in conjunction with others. Accordingly, the unity of the country may be expected to be strengthened.

(2) In addition to its own sources (such as duties, federal taxes and revenues), the Federation will also receive contributions from the Republics on the basis of uniform criteria. Federal budget outlays for national defense, security, foreign affairs, international contributions and other obligations of federal organs and administration will be shared proportionately by the Republics.

(3) The Federation is no longer an autonomous state structure, independent of the Republics. Its main organs are formed directly by the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. The Presidency of the Federal Republic is established in collective forms consisting of three representatives from each of the six Republics and two representatives from each Autonomous Province, among them the presidents of the assemblies of the Republics and Provinces as ex- officio members of the Presidency. The Federal Assembly merely promulgates the election and announces the composition of the Presidency, the members of which have been elected by the assemblies of the Republics and Provinces. This is not only an autonomous political organ of the Federation, but also the organ of the Republics and Provinces.

As the collective President of the Federation, the Presidency represents the Federation in dealing with foreign countries. It also is the supreme state organ for coördinating the interests of the Republics and Provinces, with the right of political and legislative initiative, although without touching the autonomous functions of the Federal Assembly (the parliament) and the Federal Executive Council (the cabinet). The Federal Assembly still retains its formal supreme position within the Constitution, and the Federal Executive Council is still responsible to the Assembly for the implementation of policy, federal laws and other decisions of the parliament. The Federal Executive Council reports to the Federal Assembly and informs the Presidency on the basis of its own initiative or upon the request of the Presidency on matters within its competence. In case of differences on essential questions, the Constitution provides a procedure for settling and reconciling them by democratic means, and it contains provisions for safeguarding the effectiveness and autonomy of any of the three supreme organs of the Jugoslav Federation within the framework of the Constitution.

(4) The Federal Executive Council remains the executive political organ of the Federal Assembly. The constitutional amendments increase the autonomy of the Council to pass regulations in regard to federal laws and other decisions of the Assembly. The members of the Council are nominated by the Federal Assembly. The government as a whole and its individual members can resign, and the Presidency and each of the chambers of the Federal Assembly, by a motion of at least ten deputies, can call for a vote of confidence in the Council.

(5) Organs of the Federation exercise power only in those affairs of common interest which have been transferred to them by the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. The Constitution specifies the questions on which the federal organs must previously obtain the agreement of those organs. To this end, so-called inter-Republic "parity committees," consisting of an equal number of representatives of the Republics and Provinces, have been formed within the Federal Executive Council.

(6) The decisions of the Federal Assembly will be coördinated with the competent organs of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces so as to carry out the Social Plan of Jugoslavia. Included will be the determination of the policies and laws regulating : the monetary system; the foreign- exchange system; foreign trade and credit relations with foreign countries; customs and public control of the prices of goods and services; credits for the more rapid development of economically underdeveloped Republics and Provinces; and in other strictly defined fields.

This means in effect that the direct participation of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces in the economic functions of the Federation concerns only those areas which are of vital importance to the whole Jugoslav community. The amendments to the Constitution have also set up a system of compensations to indemnify a Republic whose economy could suffer losses due to a federal decision.

(7) The amendments have also introduced important innovations in the sphere of foreign affairs. Specifically, the Republics and Autonomous Provinces have been given the possibility of initiative as well as relations with foreign partners within the framework of existing international agreements. In all international treaties and agreements made by Jugoslavia which set forth specific obligations for the Assemblies of the Republics and Provinces, the agreement of those bodies is obligatory. It should be added that one of the constitutional amendments requires that in international communications the principle of the equality of the languages of the peoples of Jugoslavia must be applied.

(8) Two regulations in the field of international economic relations are especially important. The first refers to the right of enterprises to invest capital abroad; and the second stipulates that the rights of foreigners to capital which they have invested in enterprises in Jugoslavia cannot, after the conclusion of a con tract, be reduced by law or other act.

(9) As regards national defense, the former constitutional pro visions denying anybody the right to sign or acknowledge any capitulation or occupation of Jugoslavia or any part thereof have been reaffirmed. Such acts are unconstitutional and punish able as high treason. Communes, Autonomous Provinces and Re publics have a right and duty to arrange and organize for national defense in accordance with the national defense system. In case of an attack on the country they are also to undertake popular resistance by means of armed territorial units. All organizations are included in the defense system of the country, in accordance with the laws and decisions of territorial communities; this implies providing funds for national defense. Thus, every citizen, either armed or otherwise participating in resistance against an invader, is a member of the armed forces of the Federal Republic.

(10) The amendments consolidate the position of the working man on the basis of self-management. Thus one amendment states precisely: "Income realized by any form of associated labor or means of production belongs entirely to the basic organization."

IV

Speculation as to whether Jugoslavia, following the adoption of the amendments, is a federation or a confederation is irrelevant. In fact, the multinational, self-managing, socialist Jugoslav community is neither a federation nor a confederation of the traditional type. It is something else again-a federal state and a federal self-managed community of equal peoples and nationalities. Its strength springs from its self-managing structure, which frees the initiative of the worker and of each citizen; from the equality of all its peoples and nationalities; and from its direct socialist democracy under the conditions of social ownership of the means of production; and from its association in general with democratic and progressive trends in the world.

Jugoslavia is vitally interested in friendly coöperation and association with all peace-loving forces in the world. And the world should be interested in Jugoslavia exactly as she is-independent, socialist and nonaligned.

The foundations of nonalignrnent are nonaffiliation with military-political blocs and other similar associations which might in any way restrict our country's autonomy in developing self-management or its independence of action in the international field.

What decided Jugoslavia in favor of a policy of nonalignrnent was, above all, her democratic and socialist orientation and her desire for overall international coöperation; she rejected a policy of man?uvring between the blocs or of trying to maintain equidistance between them, or of trying to rally the small, poor or dissatisfied for a confrontation with the rich and strong. Jugoslavia is not a priori against big and powerful countries; she is against a policy based on power, hegemony and suppression. Experience has proved that membership by a small country in a power bloc does not ensure its independence or unhampered development. The best guarantee of any country's security is its unity and prosperity and its active participation in international coöperation. These are, in fact, the fundamental conditions of a policy of nonalignment.

Consistent application of the policy of nonalignment enables Jugoslavia to have fruitful and open coöperation with her neighbors, based on the principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference and mutual understanding. On this basis it was possible to settle even some highly delicate questions inherited by the countries of southeast Europe from the empires which had ruled the region. The policy of nonalignment also gives Jugoslavia room for coöperation elsewhere in Europe, although there the policy has rather narrow scope owing to the division of the continent into antagonistic blocs. Thus, Jugoslavia has succeeded in developing better relations with practically all European countries, regardless of their social systems. As a less developed European country, Jugoslavia is particularly interested in utilizing the knowledge and technology of advanced European countries for her own development.

Nonalignment opens a road for Jugoslavia to reach even the remotest countries of other continents, especially those of the so-called third world. She has much in common with the peoples of these countries. Like her, they had to win freedom and independence at the cost of great sacrifices. And even now their place, like hers, is not secure. She has developed political, economic and technical coöperation with them, as part of the historic undertaking of the entire international community, to further the level of development, conscious that this is the responsibility of both the developed and underdeveloped, the rich and the poor.

The policy of nonalignment is the basis for Jugoslavia's independence within the changing balance of forces in the contemporary world and especially in her relations with the big powers. Jugoslavia stands by the principle that relations with one partner cannot be at the expense of those with any other partner; that new friendships cannot be to the detriment of existing friendships; that equitable coöperation with all without discrimination is in the interest of all. This is a reflection of both the strength of Jugoslavia's independent position and of the general ratio of power in the world; no one is so strong as to be entirely self-sufficient or to be able to impose one's will on others without harming oneself.

And finally, the nonaligned position enables Jugoslavia to coöperate fruitfully within the framework of the United Nations. She gives support to multilateral, joint or parallel actions for peace and security, disarmament, prevention of aggression, the strategy of development, a final liquidation of colonialism and defense of the rights of man. She sees as being especially significant the so-called new fields of U.N. activities, such as exploitation of the riches of the seabed, preservation of the environment, etc.

It has not been easy, and still is not easy today, to resist pressures for alignment. Nor is it simple to present an objective picture of the essence of nonalignment in Europe. Jugoslavia's position has been represented in some quarters as an obstacle to the relaxation of tension, as a "Trojan horse" for transmitting influences from one bloc or the other, as an impediment to world integration, or even as rampant nationalism. Nothing could be less correct. It is precisely the nonalignment policy that transcends bloc contradictions, opens up channels of mutual communication, narrows the possibilities of antagonistic confrontations and reduces nationalism and chauvinism to a minimum. True patriotism consists in the saying: "Respect others so that others may respect you."

Of course, what suits Jugoslavia may not be appropriate for other countries. After all, a characteristic feature of the policy of nonalignment is precisely that it takes realities into account. It is true, however, that whoever denies the fundamental principles of nonalignment- independence, peace, security, noninterference, observance of the right of any people to self-determination and free development, friendly coöperation among all peoples regardless of differences in social systems-cannot pursue a genuine policy of peace.

Nothing has changed the topical nature of these theses by reason of the fact that tension has of late diminished on the international scene and that negotiations between great powers have been stepped up. The lessening of tensions is taking place precisely because the above-mentioned principles are present to a greater extent in contemporary international practice.

It is certainly a positive development that the great powers negotiate on questions which concern their special responsibility for world peace and security. But peace and security can be stable only with the active contribution of all peoples. That is why participation of others in negotiations for settling the problems which threaten peace and security is essential. This is all the more important as the era of negotiations has failed to bring security to all and to eliminate many injustices.

In the era of negotiations, there is increased scope for the activities of the nonaligned. During the cold war, when open pressure was being exerted by the great powers for the smaller powers to align with them, this scope was very narrow. The main and most urgent thing then was how to prevent the cold war from turning into a general catastrophe, and how independent countries might wrench themselves out of the grip of forces which took the view that "he who is not with us is against us."

The main preoccupation at the time was how to avoid alignment with military blocs. However, the nonaligned strove then, as they still do, for independence, peace, security and democratic relations among states and peoples. That is why those who say that the "policy of nonalignment is not correct ideologically" because it allegedly has only a "no-program" are wrong.

Today, when it is clear even to those who urge bloc alignments, or alignments with the powerful, that the will for independence is a force which cannot be subdued for long, the policy of nonalignment is seen increasingly as a common movement for independence, peace, security arid development.

V

Experience shows that with the world's growing interdependence, peoples, nations and states are discovering an ever-larger field of common interest, and in it they seek new forms of coöperation. The constitutional amendments described here make it possible for the Jugoslav peoples to participate in these processes more and more directly.

The Jugoslav peoples are not linked solely through present economic and political interests. They are bound together by a considerable common history, by their ethnic similarities and, above all, by their common consciousness developed by the Revolution and the joint struggle for a self- managing democratic socialist society. Of course, sight should not be lost of the fact that there are also objectively differing interests among the peoples of the Republics. For instance, the interests of an advanced and of an underdeveloped Republic in Jugoslavia's single market are not always identical. Interests may also differ on programs of assistance to the less developed Republics and Provinces.

Existing contradictions cannot be settled by means of state enforcement or ideological formulae. We have chosen to deal with them in the following ways: (1) let the Federation settle only such questions as can obtain the best solutions by agreement with the Republics and Autonomous Provinces through the "parity committees;" (2) provide compensation in all cases in which a solution for the whole of Jugoslavia might adversely affect the economy of a particular Republic or Province; and (3) further consolidate, as a constitutional obligation of the entire community, the principle of financial assistance up to 1.9 percent of the G.N.P., to the less developed Republics and regions.

The real value and cohesive power of the amendments, however, will depend on the consistency with which they are implemented. The negative effect of outside factors can be of consequence only if the self-managing and democratic socialist course which is the basis of the amendments loses its clarity. That is why prophecies about the so-called disintegrating effect of the amendments and allegations that "Jugoslavia is slipping into uncertainty" are groundless. In the final analysis, outside dangers increase to the extent that internal forces to repel an attack become weaker. "Even wolves do not attack if they know that sharp teeth await them." The watchword of the National Liberation War was "Brotherhood and unity." It has sustained all postwar challenges and still remains a beacon for the Jugoslav ship of state.

There are two lasting postulates of the unity and firmness of contemporary Jugoslavia. First is the common interest of the peoples of Jugoslavia in self-management, creating the best possible conditions for an unhampered development of all the peoples and nationalities. Second is the legendary figure and legacy of President Tito, whose leadership in the National Liberation War, in developing the present self-managing socialist society and in evolving a broadly conceived foreign policy based firmly on independence and nonalignment has earned him a special and lasting place in the history of the Jugoslav peoples.

The first postulate is a lasting one. Its strength grows with the strengthening of Jugoslav socialist democracy and humanism. The second is as strong as the work of President Tito. But those admirers who see the unity of Jugoslavia only in Tito's figure and in his cohesive power do him a great wrong and diminish his historic achievement.

The Jugoslav self-managing socialist community, forged under Tito's leadership and bearing the imprint of his statesmanlike creativity, is strong and steadfast, for it rests on the common interests of the Jugoslav peoples and the emancipation of labor and man under the conditions of self- management.

[i] The terminology used in the Law on the "transfer of factories to workers" indicates that at that time ownership was still state ownership and the factories were still managed by state organs. Today, the entire field of social relations, from factories to hospitals and schools, is marked by social ownership and self-management.

[ii] Ekonomist, Belgrade, year XXI, p. 412.