Why Is Violent Conflict Reaching Record Levels?

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

More than any time in the last 75 years, we’re living in a world at war. Conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine may dominate headlines—but that’s just part of it. Last year, Azerbaijan seized Nagorno-Karabakh. There’s a full-scale civil war in Myanmar. In Africa, there is war in Sudan, in Ethiopia, in Congo, and there have been seven coups since August 2020.

Comfort Ero, head of the International Crisis Group, has been tracking these conflicts as closely as anyone. She warns that without a major shift, war is likely to spread even further in the years ahead.

Comfort, thanks so much for joining me.

COMFORT ERO

Thank you for inviting me, Dan.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

I want to start at a very high level and get your sense of what is going on with these trends in global conflict that you’ve focused on. I noted that the Crisis Group’s global conflict tracker recorded 13 countries where conditions had deteriorated in February and zero where they had improved. You’ve noted in the past that more people died in fighting worldwide last year than in any year since the end of the Cold War, with the exception of 1994 when the Rwandan genocide occurred. You also see some more grim records in terms of mass displacement and civilian deaths and much else.

Is it right to characterize this as a kind of real systemic breakdown or breakdown in order? Or, to put it slightly differently, why are all these trend lines so negative? What forces are contributing to this breakdown that we’ve seen?

COMFORT ERO

Thanks for starting at that big picture, because I think everything else hangs on that. When I look at my time, when I first came to Crisis Group as West Africa project director, there was a sense in which despite the wars that were going on at the end of the Cold War era, despite the tragedy around Rwanda, the end of apartheid, there was a sense of “never again.”

But it seems as though that “never again” itself—and the norms and the principles that sort of shaped the sense that we were going to do things differently and that there was going to be a real push toward conflict resolution, mitigation—I think that started to unravel at the time of 9/11 and at the time of the war on terror. A number of those principles themselves came under a lot of stress. And then, fast forward, you had the Arab Spring, which I think dealt another death blow to a lot of those norms and principles, and to the robustness of the international system of multilateralism. For most of us, we tend to think of the UN as the bastion, as a pivotal body driving multilateralism as well.

I also think that what is more brittle this time is geopolitics, and the big tensions that we’re seeing—it’s not that it wasn’t there before, but the big tensions that we’re seeing with major powers today. I think that because the great powers, the major powers themselves, are head-butting more and more, you see sort of danger signs. And it’s becoming harder—even in conflicts where they don’t necessarily have the same kind of stakes, diplomacy itself has become harder to achieve. There’s no appetite to do the hard work of deal-making, of compromise, of trying to win that big peace agreement. I mean, we quite frankly haven’t seen a credible peace agreement, for example, since 2016, with Colombia, as well. So great power politics, I think, is one.

I think another one that keeps me worried at night is just the breakdown of trust. Nobody takes with credibility anymore this notion of an international rules-based order or international law in the way that we used to talk about as well. And, you know, there’s a lot of talk now, as a result of the fallout from Ukraine, of hypocrisy, double standards: “You can’t come and lecture us anymore about democracy because we’ve seen how you sold out on democracy in your own countries.” A lot of faith, credibility, lost in the midst of the way in which the international community or rich, advanced countries were unwilling to cooperate around vaccine distribution, also around climate financing. And then you had Ukraine, and then you have Gaza, and you add all this crescendo of crises, tensions between great powers, nobody trusting the system.

And alongside that, I think a number of countries—we normally call them middle powers, assertive middle powers—rising to also stamp their own authority on certain crises. We’ve emerged in this multipolar world where other states are beginning to realize that, “Well, we can no longer rely and trust the traditional actors. We’re going to sort of stick our oar in because this is also critical to our own national interests.” Quite frankly, the landscape looks more complicated, more challenging, and quite frankly, the wars are rising as I speak.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

You wrote a fantastic piece in Foreign Affairs last May called “Sudan and the New Age of Conflict,” which looks at Sudan, but looks at it as kind of representative of trends that you see driving this wave of conflict both more generally in sub-Saharan Africa but also globally. Before getting to those trends—I think because this is a conflict that gets much less attention, of course, than Gaza and Ukraine, some of the others—just getting your sense of where exactly things stand in Sudan, for those who have not followed it closely week to week or even month to month. What is going on, and why is that a cause of such concern, even if it’s not generating the same headlines?

COMFORT ERO

I mean, for Crisis Group, Sudan has been part of our 10 conflicts to watch, or sort of global watch list, for the European Union, and also for the African Union, because it sits in quite a pivotal part of the continent. It is both Africa, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Africa Arabist, Red Sea—and its reach and its strategic importance is why it ought not to be a conflict that is off the radar. You can see also just the sheer scale of tragedy that we have to do means that even conflicts like Ukraine get put down the pecking order, and Sudan therefore falls into that.

I mean, we have a conflict right now between two forces that would claim that they were the key to enabling the coup and the revolution of Omar al-Bashir, who had reigned over Sudan for 30-odd years in a very paramilitary manner. The irony is not lost on any of us who’ve been watching that the contest is between the two security forces that were crucial to Bashir’s demise, but also crucial to protecting him and enabling his stay in power. That’s the Rapid Support Force led by Hemedti. In fact, he was a coup-proofer.

One of the reasons why Bashir created the paramilitary force was because he had this policy of divide and rule: separate, scatter the security forces, build a paramilitary force that would protect him—like a Praetorian Guard—that would protect him and make sure he fends off the army. So the contest is between the Rapid Support Force and the Sudanese Armed Forces. That fighting has been going off. On that, we are a month away from the anniversary of the war between those two forces.

What makes this also very painful to talk about is that 20 years ago—so let’s go back into history, as we were doing—20 years ago, there was a fervent campaign called Save Darfur. Now, we’ve seen the return of genocidal-type atrocities back on the table. The sheer scale of the humanitarian conflict, the nature of the fighting—we’ve never seen this kind of fighting in Khartoum that we are seeing today. And the gravity and the scale and the lack of civilian protection—and the ability, also, of the RSF to continue its offensive into parts of the region that we haven’t witnessed for such a long time across places like the White Nile, the Blue Nile, places that will be familiar to people who are working on Sudan.

And I think what worries me as I think through Sudan is the potential that it could soon collapse and descend into a Somalia-type conflict, or even Libya-type conflict. I deliberately mention Libya because of the criss-cross mercenaries and how porous the borders are. The reason I say that also is the capacity for Sudan to suck in the entire region. I think as the conflict spreads and intensifies, we’re likely to see serious refugees’ displacement, and all the things that you’ll be familiar with in this kind of conflict.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

So, as if that were not enough, I think one of the things that is so distressing, as you go back and read that piece that you and Richard Atwood wrote in May, is the very persuasive way you show that the drivers of conflict in Sudan and some of these trends that are causing such instability and such humanitarian toll really apply much more broadly.

One of those is the kind of roots of this conflict. We’ve of course seen a wave of coups across sub-Saharan Africa, and not just Sudan, but Mali and Niger and Chad, and I know I’m forgetting some others. But you wrote, in another piece for Foreign Affairs last year called “The Crisis of African Democracy,” that the problem is not exactly the coups, it’s the underlying weakness of faith in democracy, of this kind of system’s ability to deliver economic outcomes, that really represents a kind of broader breakdown in political order—again, not just in Sudan, but much more broadly.

COMFORT ERO

I want to zoom in specifically into the Sahel because I think that’s the one that has really been very worrying, and the trend lines there are all going in the wrong direction. And if you were looking—I mean, hindsight is a great thing, but in this instance there were also clear warnings not just from Crisis Group but from others who had been watching the Sahel before. That while a security-first approach was vital to stop the corridor of the jihadists going any further, and then while it was important to make sure that you could deal with the jihadist ability to criss-cross three countries, there were important things that were said also about how to prevent this from spilling over into the region, how to keep Mali’s problem within Mali, how to make sure that you shore up and protect Burkina Faso, and how do you make sure that Niger also doesn’t face the same fate as Niger.

Going back, as I’m speaking, about the titles of certain reports that we put out in Crisis Group—averting Mali from spreading, protecting and shoring up Burkina Faso, asking whether Niger was the weak link—this heavy focus on a securitized approach to dealing with some deep governance issues in these countries partly explained why we are here today in the Sahel. Often, a real disconnect between the leadership and its people and its citizens. A real disconnect between the leadership, which is very focused on survival, and what external actors are seeking. And then a region itself that hasn’t caught up with realities in its own region as well. There’s both a national explanation, there’s a regional explanation, and there’s an international factor.

Then you’ve got the other challenge also, where governments themselves have not found a reasonable answer to the jihadi violence as well. That the militaries themselves pushed back against the failure of governments to be able to respond to that challenge.

And then I think the third one, which then allows us to bring in the Guineas and the Gabons, is this very forced attempt at elective democracy, where governments themselves will go through the motions every four to five years and still come out victorious, and their citizens are asking some basic, fundamental questions—that “You sold us this myth about what democracy is about, and yet we’ve still got corruption, we’ve still got violence, we’ve still got sort of an autocratic bend, we’ve still got injustice, we’ve still got the stark disconnect between what I gain as a citizen and what is actually happening with the state as well.”

All of this coalesces at a time where I think the international community itself—I mean, in a sense, Dan, the Sahel is a microcosm of a wider challenge we see with democracy, not just on the continent, but I could have the same conversation with you in Latin America; can also have the same conversation with you, quite frankly, with a number of rich, advanced societies in the West who are also going through similar stresses.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

One of the other complicating dynamics that you highlight in the case of Sudan, but also much more broadly, is the much more complicated set of outside actors that tend to meddle in these kinds of conflicts. It used to be that this was very much a kind of great-power game, especially during the Cold War, and it was mostly the United States and the Soviet Union that were the outside actors.

And you see now, as you’ve noted, a much wider range of often non-Western, smaller powers that have become much more—I think often there are conversations in which you know, multi-polarity and of American dominance is taken as a good thing when it comes to peace and equality. You in some ways see the more complicated set of outside actors as complicating efforts to build peace and end these wars. Is that a fair characterization?

COMFORT ERO

Yeah. The interesting thing, Dan, when we wrote the Sudan piece for you, we said that what was different this time around, and what we thought would allow for maybe a different reading of mediation in Sudan, was that one of the key sets of actors—the Gulf—were not going through the same upheaval. And that split that you saw between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—we thought that that itself would allow for a different environment for mediation. But quite frankly, the story is very different since we wrote that article for you. Even I have to admit that.

I think one of our key talking points now on Sudan is that Sudan is running out of time, partly because the various mediation efforts are veering off course, and how to sort of bring coherence. I’m not even talking about coordination. There are multiple mediation tracks, there are multiple interests at stake. And I think how we get either to a single unified track, or at least get an agreement on how we can get all these different tracks to be mutually reinforcing, is the challenge that we’re facing today.

One of the lessons I take away from Sierra Leone and Liberia particularly, Dan, is that when you have this body that forces everybody together despite their different views, you bring them together—whether you call it a contact grip, whatever you want to call it—bring them all together. The enablers, the drivers, the wider powers, you bring them all together, because in a sense, for so long as you leave one person out, you are never going to get to that peace process. You’re never going to get that substantial breakthrough moment that might lead to the signing of an agreement as well. And that is what’s lacking right now in Sudan.

Now, having said all of that, there’s a slight sense of optimism because one of the important things that we’ve been pushing for, for example at Crisis Group, is for the United States to upgrade its own diplomacy. The United States has now announced a new envoy in the form of Tom Perriello. At the same time, the UN Secretary General Guterres has announced a personal envoy, Ambassador [Ramtane] Lamamra, likely the key actors who may—or may not, I don’t know—get us to where we need to get to. I mean, the Arab side holds the leverage with all the belligerents, quite frankly. And we expect the African sides will also need to lead on the political front; by here, I mean the African Union, I mean Kenya, I mean Ethiopia; I mean, the whole of Africa writ large who has a lot at stake in this process. You can see a wide cast of characters, and even the classic mediators will tell you that it’s very hard to bring all that power to one table and get them all to be singing from the same chorus sheet. It’s going to be a challenge.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Let’s shift attention a bit north to the war in Gaza. This has of course consumed lots of focus, both I’m sure within your work but also much more broadly over the last four or five months. When you look at Gaza, when you bring this kind of broader context to your analysis of Gaza, do you see it as kind of sui generis, as its own kind of conflict, given its particular historical roots? Or does it bear some of the same characteristics and dynamics that you’ve been observing in conflicts more generally in recent years?

COMFORT ERO

Good question. Every country, every region always sees people, her conflict, as exceptional. And I think there are certain things that are exceptional and certain things that are not. I mean, I’m talking to you, Dan, and you are talking from the United States, and you’ve just seen the headlines yourself about the famine; this is also a hallmark of a number of conflicts, so this doesn’t make Gaza unique in that sense.

So it’s impossible to start the conversation without mentioning the famine assessment that came out I believe at the start of the week—Monday—which is, quite frankly, truly horrific. Another characteristic in terms of the trend lines that we’re seeing today—I think Gaza bears that all out in terms of hundreds of thousands of people in immediate danger of famine; 2017, you remember that Guterres talked about famine being man-made.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

This is UN Secretary General António Guterres. Yeah.

COMFORT ERO

And you remember he pinpointed a range of conflicts—Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, Nigeria—and here we have another man-made famine caused by man-made disaster. When you look at Gaza, you can see why famine experts say that famines are political crises that require political solutions. And Crisis Group said at the outset that trying to destroy—recognizing the need for Israel to defend its people against such a heinous crime that was committed—nonetheless, we said at the outset that trying to destroy Hamas as an objective would destroy Gaza. I take no pleasure in saying that, but that is the reality that we see in the famine assessment, I think, sharpens our own conviction and why we pushed very early on in the conflict that a ceasefire is both a moral and political imperative.

You asked about whether there was something exceptional about Gaza, or similar to other conflicts. There is the victor’s peace, but it’s clear that in all these conflicts that you can bomb your way up—it doesn’t divorce you from the realities of the political upheaval that you have to deal with as well. And that is why I don’t want to make this sound as though it’s exceptional.

So, one understands the trauma that Israel faces. But that hard political work is going to be key to also getting us to where I believe Israel wants to be, and how you begin to craft a “day after” for Gaza. But that day after very much is contingent on what is left behind in Gaza, which is why we’ve been very clear about the ceasefire as well.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Just focusing on perhaps the most urgent of those issues that you laid out, which is the risk of famine: What should the United States and the international system more broadly be doing to prevent famine that they’re not doing already? Obviously, a ceasefire would be a key part of that, but are there other policy options that you see that are not being embraced—or not with as much commitment as they should—that you think could make a difference? Or is it really just ceasefire or no ceasefire at this point?

COMFORT ERO

You know, the famine assessment sort of sharpened our conviction on two areas: the moral and the political. I mean, quite frankly, because either Israel or the world imports a prolonged ceasefire—you know, with the hostage prisoner exchange—and significantly boost the humanitarian aid entry and delivery into Gaza, or they effectively sanction a famine affecting hundreds of thousands of more people. It’s that simple.

It’s clear that Hamas is not going to be eliminated. Even its military won’t be eliminated; it will be broken. It is being broken. You heard Jake Sullivan announce the death of a third Hamas leader. So, it will be broken as a hierarchical, organized fighting force, but it will still be able to mount insurgency guerrilla attacks. And Hamas will therefore have to be dealt with on that basis. If there is not some kind of political solution, Israel is going to find itself in a forever war.

Now, I use the word deliberately—forever war—because what struck me: at the beginning, I was doubtful of his decision to fly into Tel Aviv, President Biden. But he referenced the mistakes that the United States—the lessons learned from 9/11 as well. And I thought that was instructive as a way in which to frame what Israel should try to avoid. Look, there’s no easy political answer. I think even in our early statements we saw that; but nonetheless we called for a ceasefire, for the parties to look for a negotiated way out of the impasse. I don’t think there is any other way to skirt around your question: that it’s not conceivable without a negotiated way out.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

We could, of course, linger on a lot of these topics when it comes to Gaza, but I want to make sure we talk about the other global conflict that has consumed so much attention the last couple of years, and that’s of course in Ukraine. You and I met for the first time in person in Kyiv before the war in Gaza had started. Even then, these arguments about hypocrisy that you heard from parts of what we now refer to as the global South were quite prominent—you know, this idea that leaders in the United States and western Europe and other rich countries were very focused on Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, but were much less attentive to other conflicts. You’ve, of course, heard this probably as much as anyone. How do you think of this question of hypocrisy, something you referenced earlier? But as you engage in those arguments and hear those arguments, what is your reaction then when you look at what is happening in Ukraine?

COMFORT ERO

You know, my colleague Richard Gowan wrote an interesting piece I think a couple of weeks ago about hypocrisy and double standards. And there was a particular line—and I can’t remember it, but the upshot was, in a sense, if you’re worried about double standards and hypocrisy, then you shouldn’t be in the business of international relations. And, you know, relations of states sort of evolves around double standards. The minute I accuse you of double standards, Dan, you’re going to find something to accuse me of as well. That’s one of the lessons that I’ve learned since the war in Ukraine.

But you also touch an important nerve, because I think the West was caught off guard as a result of the pushback and the fact that a number of countries did not immediately rally to their own tune. Sure, there were the UN General Assembly resolutions and what have you. But what has been quite revealing in the last 18 months or so is the way in which countries themselves crafted or sought to craft their own response. On the one hand, showing sympathy to Ukraine, especially when you couch it in the language of imperialism and colonization—I mean, that immediately is understood by the world outside the West.

But nonetheless, I think it was a wake-up call for a number of Western countries, the United States in particular, because a number of people we’re now referencing—Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya—and also suggesting that Ukraine was not exceptional or any different from a number of other crises happening in the world. In the year of the invasion by Russia into Ukraine, the other deadly conflict that wasn’t getting that maximum attention and the full weight of multilateralism behind it was Ethiopia, where we saw a very deadly, horrible, violent conflict in Tigray as well. And then you also had Yemen playing out and you had other—you know, we talked about the Sahel.

I think a number of countries were looking and asking, why is this more exceptional? Is it because you give more credence to a conflict that is happening in Europe? Is it because you give credence to a particular group of people and also that you are preaching to us about rules-based order? We are seeing, and I think the response was, “Don’t talk to us about the rules when you have also been the ones who have broken the rules.” So “the rule-makers are rule-breakers” was very much the message.

Also, this was coming at a time—so, the double standard hypocrisy is one side of the argument. The other side of the argument is that, “You are coming to me now to ask me to put my entire being into this crisis when you failed us at the moment where we needed support, on COVID. We saw that there was no room for cooperation, you put up walls, very nationalistic response, and there was no cooperation in terms of dealing with that.” Then the climate financing as well; and then not appreciating the fallout of what the maximalist approach to sanctions would mean to a number of these countries that are already facing a very precarious economic situation.

So, put all these things together, you get a crescendo of frustration, agitation, and annoyance with a number of rich, advanced countries that seem to put more weight into a conflict that was in their region as opposed to the rest of the world as well.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

That long shadow of COVID is such a fascinating point, and it probably applies to—we could apply it to our own lives and most social policy issues domestically as well. It’s a really fascinating point. Ukraine seems like another case where the prospects for peace and for real negotiation just look pretty dim at this point, given the stated objectives of the actors and the seeming willingness of both sides to continue fighting.

I know you’ve cited in the past a piece that Edward Luttwak wrote in Foreign Affairs in the late 1990s called “Give War a Chance,” where he argued that all the efforts at peacemaking and negotiation were just kind of prolonging settlements and making the suffering worse. The only thing you could really do was to let wars play out and let the stronger side win, that was the only real sustainable or stable peace. When you look at Ukraine, do you think that’s the right analysis? Or do you see a path to some kind of negotiation, some way of ending this war short of one side fighting to the point that the other decides to give up?

COMFORT ERO

As a conflict prevention organization, it would be very hard for me to make that case. So let me reframe the question a little bit in terms of, the prospect of a protracted conflict I think is real, the prospect of this dragging on is real, but the prospect of also Russia coming out of this also stronger—none of those things are off the table. I mean, Dan, you and I were both at the Munich Security Conference, and it was a very somber mood because I think it was very clear that leaders who were gathering two years into Russia’s all-out war on Ukraine understood that we were now entering into a period of what I would characterize as uncertainty and worry about both the war’s trajectory, given Russia’s recent battlefield gains at that time in February, and also the stalled American support and European security more broadly. Also, we were talking at a time where Trump and Putin—neither of them were at Munich, but both of them had made their presence felt, one in relation to the death of Navalny, but the other one in the form of Trump’s own position on encouraging or claiming that he would encourage Russia to attack NATO.

So, I think it’s in that framework that I look at Ukraine in 2024. To answer your question, I think Ukraine faces the greatest peril today since the invasion of 2022. I say that for two reasons. I think because the counter-offensive hasn’t worked in the way that Ukraine and its allies have projected from last year, and because Putin—and we are talking in the week of the elections—Putin has a confident stride about him as well. And I think partly because of those two factors, alarmed by this, the Biden administration—and, certainly, the European leaders, we all saw them in Munich—they’ve upped their own rhetoric warning against Russia’s potential ability to claim victory because of the advances that they’re making, but also about Ukraine’s ability to pull through.

So, how you avert Russia’s advance and how you tip the balance back in Ukraine’s favor over the long haul I think are the two conundrums that the Western allies face. I mean, we are where we are because Russia has put its economy on a war footing, ramping up its defense production. It’s securing more weapons from abroad and filling its ranks by drawing from the poor and people in prison; and the West and Ukraine are not doing this. And then overblown expectations, quite frankly, of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, I think is one thing that we need to state up front. And the magical thinking about Russia’s own ability or inability to continue to wage the war, and Europe’s reliance on Washington, has made, I would argue, for a very toxic cocktail that delayed essential long-term planning.

I don’t know if you were in the room, Dan, when J. D. Vance, the Republican senator from Ohio, was speaking, but that was a wake-up call. He was also essentially saying that even with our supplemental support, Ukraine has still got a long way to go. And, quite frankly, the bottom line is that Ukraine needs more well-trained, more well-armed troops. That is the message for Europe today, and it’s a very tough message that European leaders need to grapple with.

And again, I want to underline: I work for a conflict prevention organization. We have leaned in to the Western support for Ukraine, so I don’t say this lightly, but without a surge in Western military aid and a shift in Ukraine’s strategy in addition to mobilization and training; that means Ukraine building solid defense lines—its rear position was worsened—we are increasing the risk of battlefield breakthrough, and a tipping point for Russia. That could all come together in the summer, and you know what happens after the summer.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Let me attempt to end this conversation on if not an optimistic, at least a somewhat constructive note. A lot of the structural factors that are contributing to this wave of global conflict, and the seeming inability of the international institutions, the international community, to stop them, are probably not going to change in the coming years. U.S.-Chinese tensions and U.S.-Russian tensions are going to continue to be a factor in geopolitics. The kind of lack of faith in the UN system and in other institutions, I think, is probably not going to change in the near term. Is there anything that you see that you think is, if not a cause for hope, at least a kind of basis to build on constructively in the multilateral efforts to prevent conflict and end conflict?

COMFORT ERO

Out of every crisis, there’s always something that comes out of it that sort of sharpens minds and it gets everybody back to the drawing board. What I’ve also found interesting, despite all my own agitations around the global South and how that’s being projected, is that nonetheless, an interesting space has opened up to put certain things on the table and to force certain conversations—especially, for example, around the international financial institutions, and how to deal with representation, and making these more equitable, and reviewing who sits on the table, and putting issues like climate financing adaptation on the table.

Now, I’m not for one second naive that any of these things are going to materialize overnight. But it’s been interesting how a number of countries have been able to coalesce around certain issues and have given a wake-up call to a number of rich advanced countries to say that, “Even if we can’t reform or change you, we can constrain you or we can restrain you or we can call you to order. We can challenge you on double standards. We can challenge you on hypocrisy.”

The other thing that does keep me a little bit optimistic is that despite all the agitation and frustration and questions about the legitimacy of multilateralism, leaders still, every single year, carry themselves off to your town—New York—and come and do the big summitry. Even if they build other alliances, even if they’re forming other groups, whether it’s called the BRICS or whatever, even if they’re forming all those other groups, they still see multilateralism as a point of order and as a point in which to ultimately negotiate or find practical reasons to stick together at the UN, and even to get big powers at the UN. They will still put up their national positions, they will still put up their own interest, but, you know, the solidarity—when it suits them, suits them. But nonetheless, I still think there is something important about that.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Comfort, thanks for such a rich and wide-ranging conversation, and thank you for the fantastic pieces you’ve done for Foreign Affairs over the last several months. We’ll continue to look forward to publishing more of those in the months ahead. Thank you.

COMFORT ERO

Thank you very much, Dan. Thank you.