Why Arab States Must Lead on Gaza

When Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, it was 50 years and a day after the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. That conflict had also begun with a surprise attack, when forces from Egypt and Syria caught the Israeli military and intelligence services off-guard. Back then, the Arab world stood united against Israel, with Arab oil-producing countries using an oil embargo to gain leverage in postwar peace negotiations and Arab armies supporting Egypt and Syria’s military campaign by sending forces into Syria.

Today, the regional picture is much more complicated. The Arab world is not united against Israel. Instead, on the eve of October 7, each Arab state had a different relationship with Israel. Egypt and Jordan signed peace deals with Israel decades ago and continue to cooperate on security today. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) normalized its diplomatic relations with Israel more recently, signing the Abraham Accords in 2020. Before Hamas’s attack, Saudi Arabia and Israel, with the backing of Washington, were finalizing a deal to normalize ties. Qatar, adhering to its position of openness to communicating with all sides, kept its relationship with Israel informal while also hosting the political leadership of Hamas in Doha. Although these countries were frustrated with the growing tension between Israelis and Palestinians, none of them expected the situation to turn into war any time soon. Considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict contained, they focused on their own political and economic objectives, which often meant doing business with the Israeli government.

But Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip, which has killed some 15,000 people, according to health officials in Gaza, has altered these relationships overnight. It is driving Arab states toward a more unified public position on the Israel-Palestine conflict. By the time Israel struck the Jabalya refugee camp at the end of October, the response from Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had become almost uniform, with all strongly condemning the attack and calling for a cease-fire.

This seeming unity, however, hides the fact that each Arab country’s approach to the Israel-Hamas war is primarily driven by concerns over its own particular priorities. This is especially the case for the “Big Five” Arab powers: Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

As the war in Gaza continues, these countries are using their own diplomatic pressure points to shape the conflict to their advantage and to achieve individual priorities. If they could coordinate their approaches, however, they would have a better chance of obtaining an outcome to the conflict that would benefit them all: an Israeli-Palestinian peace process that they could help broker and a better strategy to counter Iran.

TIGHTROPE WALKING

There is anger about Gaza across the Arab world. Many Arab regimes now find themselves in the difficult position of keeping their publics calm while also protecting their economic and diplomatic ties with Israel. They are trying to position themselves as leaders for peace on the international stage partly to show their own populations that they are responsive when it comes to the Palestinians, thus heading off protests that could spiral out of control.

Although Egypt and Jordan have forged their own peace deals with Israel, they are anxious about what the Israel-Hamas war means for their own security and stability. Egypt and Jordan are particularly wary of a scenario in which thousands of Palestinians—including members of Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups—are pushed into their territories. Both countries have voiced their opposition to this prospect.

Jordan is also mindful of potential restiveness among its population, a majority of which is Palestinian in origin. To keep Jordan’s streets calm, Jordanian Queen Rania, herself Palestinian by descent, has spoken twice to CNN since the start of the war to underline international responsibility for the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. Jordan has withdrawn its ambassador to Israel and Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi has escalated his public criticism of Israel, saying that “all options” are on the table in response to Israel’s actions in Gaza.

The UAE, for its part, is not geographically close to Israel, nor does it have the demographic profile of Jordan. So it does not have the same security worries. But its neighbors include Iran—Hamas’s main backer—and Yemen, where the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels operate. These neighbors present their own security headaches. Although the UAE has signed the Abraham Accords with Israel, Hamas’s attack tested the aura of security that an alliance with Israel was supposed to bring, because Hamas exposed shortcomings in Israel’s security apparatus. In the wake of this security breach, the United States, which brokered the Abraham Accords, has offered the UAE and Israel additional security against Iran and its proxies, deploying aircraft carrier groups to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea as a deterrent to regional conflict. But this is not a long-term solution to Iran’s destabilizing role in the Middle East.

Qatar’s main point of leverage is its close relationship with Hamas.

Unlike the UAE, Qatar has shown no interest in signing a peace deal with Israel. Since the outbreak of war, it has been trying to walk a tightrope: justifying its hosting of Hamas’s leaders in Doha without antagonizing Israel, other Arab states, or the international community. Hamas’s political leadership has operated out of Doha since 2012, when the war in Syria forced the group to leave that country. According to Meshal bin Hamad al-Thani, Qatar’s ambassador to the United States, Hamas’s political office opened in Doha after Washington made a request to establish indirect lines of communication with the group. Qatar has tried to appease both sides by serving as an intermediary between Hamas and Israel. Qatar’s strategy is based on using its role as mediator to position itself as “a reliable international partner,” a phrase often repeated in official Qatari government communiqués. Qatar’s main concern is to maintain this political status when the Israel-Hamas war is over.

Saudi Arabia has its own set of concerns. Hamas’s attack stalled its normalization talks with Israel, which may have been one of the reasons Hamas launched its assault. According to the White House, Saudi Arabia has indicated it would like the talks to resume. As the custodian of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, the Arab League–endorsed plan for a two-state solution that would end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Saudi Arabia is mindful of regional popular expectations for how it responds to Israel’s actions. To counter any criticism against it, the Saudi regime has escalated its public criticism of Israel. The state-owned newspaper Arab News labeled the consequences of Israel’s aggression on Gaza “the second nakba,” referring to the term for the mass displacement of Palestinians that accompanied the 1948 establishment of Israel. Official statements by the Saudi Foreign Ministry have referred to the Israeli Defense Forces as the “Israeli occupation army” and insisted on the implementation of a two-state solution to resolve the conflict. Saudi Arabia is also at risk of attack from Iran and its regional proxies. As with the UAE, Saudi Arabia has increased its diplomatic engagement with Iran to de-escalate tension.

PRESSURE DROP

With their varied domestic concerns in mind, the Big Five are using whatever leverage they have to shape the actions of Hamas, Israel, and the United States. Concerned about domestic security, Egypt was the first in the Arab bloc to reject a U.S. proposal for a temporary Arab mandate over Gaza when the fighting stops. The Wall Street Journal reported that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi rejected CIA Director William Burns’s proposal for Egypt to manage postwar security in Gaza until the Palestinian Authority is ready to take control. Sisi said Egypt would not help eradicate Hamas because it needs Hamas to help secure the Rafah crossing. Even with Egypt’s surveillance of its side of the crossing, Hamas has been able to smuggle all kinds of goods into Gaza. The group’s presence in Gaza gives Egypt a useful tool it can use to pressure Israel; Egypt will not want to lose this card for as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues.

The only real card that Jordan can play is the West’s investment in it as an island of stability in the Middle East. Jordan is confident that it can push Israel without losing the support of the United States or the United Kingdom, because both need Jordan to help protect their respective security interests in the Middle East. With this in mind, Jordan is trying to influence Israel to agree to a cease-fire by refusing to sign a water-for-energy agreement that would have provided Israel with clean energy in return for Israel supplying Jordan with water. Both countries were supposed to ratify the deal last month.

Although the UAE will not pull out of the Abraham Accords, the agreement still gives the UAE some leverage. The UAE has warned Israel of “irreparable ramifications in the region” if the IDF carries out indiscriminate attacks against civilians, suggesting that such attacks would increase threats by Iran-backed groups. This statement intends to communicate that the Arab signatories to the Abraham Accords have not given Israel carte blanche, especially when Israel’s actions increase threats to their own security.

Qatar’s main point of leverage is its close relationship with Hamas, which it has managed to use to its advantage for now. Serving as the regional headquarters of the U.S. military’s Central Command, which oversees the Middle East, and being the United States’ go-to mediator with Hamas, Qatar enjoys the kind of U.S. protection that other Arab countries covet. Qatar has hosted talks between Burns and David Barnea, the head of Israel’s intelligence services, the Mossad, to agree on humanitarian pauses. Qatar will want to keep building on this mediation to help resurrect the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in which it could then play a larger diplomatic role.

Saudi Arabia’s leverage is centered on the potential normalization of ties with Israel and its role as the custodian of the Arab Peace Initiative. Saudi Arabia has flagged to the United States and Israel that it would lose credibility in the Arab and Islamic worlds were it to move ahead with normalization with Israel without a resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The outbreak of war in Gaza has fortified Saudi Arabia’s support for the two-state solution and given it an opportunity to assert itself as the leader of the Arab and Islamic worlds. Keeping in line with this objective, Saudi Arabia hosted a joint summit on Gaza with the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (a grouping of mostly Muslim-majority countries) in early November. It is also using its relationship with China to strengthen its international standing, leading a ministerial delegation to Beijing in November to signal to the United States that it can rally major countries to support its efforts to end the war. The Saudis have also invited Iran to attend the joint Arab League–OIC summit, easing tensions with Iran while also suggesting that they have the upper hand in the relationship.

COME TOGETHER

Although these separate efforts are promoting the interests of each country, much more could be accomplished if the Big Five pooled their resources, focusing on coordination rather than perfect alignment. The goal should be to jumpstart negotiations involving these countries plus Hamas, Israel, and the United States. The Big Five would be actively involved, but with a more equitable balance of power for themselves vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. They should insist on relaunching the peace process as a precondition for Israel’s normalization with Saudi Arabia so as to preserve Saudi Arabia’s credibility and status. And they should insist on a political rather than a military solution for containing Hamas. This means implementing the Saudi-led proposal that came out of the joint Arab League–OIC summit calling for the establishment of a Palestinian political coalition under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization. But this can only succeed if the United States agrees to cooperate with Saudi Arabia and the UAE on a long-term strategy for containing Iran’s regional interventions.

It has been Israel and the United States, not Saudi Arabia, pushing hardest for normalization. For years, the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia was conducted behind closed doors and fueled by mutual concern over Iran. Although Saudi Arabia is interested in bringing its relationship with Israel out into the open, it is not desperate for normalization. Instead, Israel has been most keen to upgrade the relationship. Although Saudi Arabia will benefit from the technology transfer and financial, security, and political incentives that improved ties with Israel would bring, normalization is not an indispensable ingredient in Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation plans. Saudi Arabia was never going to grant Israel normalization for free or for a cheap price. Saudi Arabia’s ultimate aim is to bolster its regional and international standing so that major economic and political powers in the world invest in Saudi Arabia. The Israel-Hamas war has only strengthened Saudi Arabia’s bargaining position. It can now use this new leverage to push for the resurrection of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process under new terms: a recognition that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be compartmentalized and must be resolved if the Middle East is going to achieve any real stability.

The war has only strengthened Saudi Arabia’s bargaining position.

For Egypt and Qatar, neither will want to sacrifice Hamas easily, since that would mean losing an important tool of influence. The UAE initially did not see eye to eye with Qatar on the war, with Qatar’s elevated status as mediator seemingly eclipsing that achieved by the UAE through the Abraham Accords. But the meeting of Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan in November shows that the UAE is recognizing the value of increased Arab cooperation to try to contain Hamas.

Targeted coordination strengthens the Big Five’s ability to shape the post-conflict space. With Saudi and Jordanian blessing, Qatar, the UAE, and Egypt have agreed on a scenario in which figures such as Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s Doha-based political leader, would play a role in a Palestinian coalition government proposed at the joint summit between the Arab League and the OIC.

The Big Five can also make the issue of Iran a more central part of talks with Israel and the United States. The aim would be to get the United States and Israel to accept the Arab countries’ call for a cease-fire, which could lead to the resurrection of the peace process. The longer the Israel-Hamas war continues, the greater the chance that Iran-backed groups in the region will escalate, which could prompt the United States to get involved to protect Israel. If Israel ignores the threats the war poses to the security of its Arab allies, it will put a strain on its relationships with them. Any big fissure in Israel’s relationship with Arab countries means added pressure on the United States to step back in to protect U.S. interests in the region.

This gives the Big Five an advantage in their relationships with the United States. Their position is in contrast to Israel, which, under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, appears recklessly willing to accept regional escalation. The ongoing war is an opportunity for Arab countries to go beyond pragmatic de-escalation with Iran and to push for the United States to develop a strategy that addresses Iran’s destabilization of the Middle East. Such a strategy would require more than the imposition of sanctions and targeted retaliatory attacks on Iranian assets in places such as Iraq and Syria. Instead, Arab countries would need to take part in setting the agenda for a long-term plan that would undermine Iran’s political and military influence. If the Big Five could see where their interests intersect, they could amplify the diplomatic gains for their individual countries while seizing a chance to stabilize the region.