What Russia Wants in the Middle East

Since Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, Russia has enjoyed watching the deteriorating situation in the Middle East preoccupy its main adversary, the United States. On April 13, however, Moscow grew concerned when, in retaliation for an attack on the Damascus consulate of Iran, its growing ally, Tehran launched more than 300 missiles and drones at Israel. Although that attack was effectively neutralized by antimissile defenses and coordinated support from the United States and Arab and Western partners, Israel responded six days later with a strike on an S-300 long-range air defense system in Isfahan, a city deep within Iran. When calibrating their actions, both Israel and Iran signaled that they were keen to avoid sliding into war. Yet by directly targeting each other on their own soil, the two longtime foes suggested that the unwritten rules of engagement between them have changed, making it harder for each to gauge the other’s actions and intentions and limit the risk of escalation. This has worried Russia, which has been walking a fine line between undermining U.S. strength in the region and not becoming overly committed and does not want to see a wider war in the Middle East.

Of course, mounting tensions between Iran and Israel could have advantages for Moscow. For one thing, further escalation in the Middle East would almost certainly divert Washington’s attention and supplies from Ukraine, where Russia is currently on the offensive. This dynamic was already apparent in the immediate aftermath of October 7, when the Biden administration sent additional Patriot batteries to the Middle East, drawing from a limited stock of systems that Kyiv was desperately seeking. In April, in anticipation of Iran’s retaliatory strike against Israel, the United States moved more military assets to the region to assist Israel’s defense. Then, in June, amid growing tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, Washington dispatched ships and U.S. Marines to the region. Further escalation would demand a commitment of additional U.S. resources, which the Kremlin can only welcome. Moreover, a Middle Eastern war would likely drive up oil prices, complicating the Biden administration’s efforts to tame fuel costs for the average American consumer months before the U.S. election. Russian President Vladimir Putin would surely rub his hands at President Joe Biden’s predicament.

Nonetheless, a wider war in the region would carry major risks for Moscow. If Israel began to fight Hezbollah or Iran, the Kremlin would have to contend with three dangerous outcomes: the entanglement of its ally Syria, a weakening of Iran’s capacity to supply Russia with weapons, and a complication of its relations with the Gulf Arab states and Iran. In a broader war, the United States should expect Moscow to give limited support to Israel’s adversaries and loudly blame Washington for the escalation, while avoiding direct military involvement. The United States should, therefore, use the diplomatic and military means at its disposal to ensure that tensions in the region do not spiral.

THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS

Even if Iran and Israel avoid direct confrontation, an escalation of Israel’s current conflict with Hezbollah would be risky for Russia. If Israel decides to invade Lebanon, it will likely result in widespread destruction, as well as an onslaught of Hezbollah missiles targeting Israel. Syria, where Russia maintains naval and air bases, could quickly become a secondary arena because the country is home to numerous Hezbollah positions and supply routes that Israel would strike. Along with its attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Israel has already mounted strikes on Syrian infrastructure, including ammunitions depots, checkpoints, and headquarters, that enables Iran to funnel weapons to Hezbollah and other partners. In early July, an Israeli drone strike in Syria killed two Hezbollah fighters, prompting the group to fire rockets into the Golan Heights. Recently, reports have circulated in the Israeli media that Israel has warned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad not to participate in the current Gaza war, even threatening to destroy his regime if further attacks are mounted from his country.

Israeli attacks on Syria would be likely to increase following the outbreak of a full-blown war with Hezbollah. Although the impact would be nowhere near as devastating as that which Lebanon can expect, it could still unnerve Russia. Ukraine may be a Russian foreign-policy priority in a class of its own, but Syria remains important to the Kremlin as an example of a conflict in which Russia came out on top, having stood by its ally. Syria is also of strategic value to Russia because it functions as a platform for projecting Moscow’s power into the eastern Mediterranean from a naval base in Tartus and an air base at Hmeymim that Russia upgraded and expanded before its invasion of Ukraine. The country is also a hub for transporting military resources to Libya and the Sahel in Africa, where Russia’s presence is expanding.

There are many possible Syrian targets. The Aleppo and Damascus airports are already in Israel’s cross hairs. But in the event of an Israeli war with Hezbollah, the Russian-operated Hmeymim air base in western Syria, which could be used as a transit point for Iranian weapons, could also become a target. Israel would probably alert Moscow before any such strikes since harming Russian personnel could escalate the conflict.

Still, Russia could see some of its assets hit. Moscow’s decision in January to step up its own air patrols along the disengagement line between Syria and the Golan Heights was probably meant as a warning to both Iran and Israel not to let Syria get swept into a regional maelstrom. In the event of increased Israeli attacks on Syria, Moscow would probably dial up its electronic jamming from Hmeymim to disrupt Israeli operations and allow the Syrians to use Russian air defense systems to engage Israeli fighter jets. Moscow would likely want to avoid creating the impression that its forces are directly fighting Israel, unless it believed its presence in Syria to be fundamentally threatened.

THE STOCKPILES MELT AWAY

If the Middle East explodes, Iran may also be drawn into the conflict. Before its retaliatory strike against Iran on April 19, Israel’s war cabinet reportedly mulled several options, including hits on strategic facilities including Revolutionary Guard bases or nuclear research facilities. Instead, Israel settled for a moderate response. Its leaders would surely be less restrained in the event of further escalation, and they have the capacity to inflict serious damage on Iran. This was shown when Israel targeted the facility in Isfahan, revealing the strength of Israeli intelligence assets and its ability to operate on Iranian soil. There can be little doubt that future attacks could be crippling.

Israeli strikes could conceivably target Iranian production facilities for drones in the Tehran and Isfahan regions, ballistic missiles in Tehran, Khojir, and Shahrud, or ammunition in Parchin and Isfahan. Facilities that produce critical components for weapons production, such as drone engines in Tehran and Qom and ballistic-missile solid rocket motors in Khojir and Shahrud, could also come under attack. Although such facilities are spread across the country, extensive strikes could, at least in the short term, affect Iranian weapons transfers to Russia in these categories.

A wider war in the Middle East would carry major risks for Moscow.

Depending on what Israel—or the United States, should it opt to join in—decided to attack in an escalated situation, Iran’s defense industry could come under serious strain. This would have consequences for Russia, which has relied on Iran for drones and other weaponry to fuel its war in Ukraine. Indeed, since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow and Tehran have considerably expanded their military-technical cooperation, with Russia receiving various types of Iranian combat drones, artillery shells, small arms ammunition and glide bombs. In recognition of this dependence, Russia has begun domestic production of Iranian Shahed drones and has secured additional military supplies from North Korea. Although those changes may have lessened Russia’s reliance on the transfer of Iranian weapons systems somewhat, Moscow surely does not wish to see its partner’s defense industry decimated. For as long as it is fighting Ukraine, Russia will want to ensure that Tehran can help replenish its stocks while also partnering with Moscow in developing new kinds of drones.

Iran’s entry into the war would cause other problems for Moscow. Should Israel choose to attack Iran, Tehran would need to mobilize all its military capacity to hit back. Lacking an effective air force or air defenses, Iran would have to rely on its fleet of missiles and drones, severely curtailing what it could deliver to Russia. Even if Middle Eastern escalation were limited to fierce fighting between Israel and Iranian proxies, Tehran would need to replenish its partners’ arsenals, again giving it less leeway to support Moscow.

An Israeli-led campaign against Iran could also pose reputational risks for Russia. With the war in Ukraine its top priority, Moscow has neither the bandwidth nor the desire to come to Iran’s aid in the event of serious military conflict. In fact, Russia has always wanted to avoid getting into a war with Israel, let alone U.S. forces, in the Middle East. Should tensions spiral, Russia would not emerge as Iran’s knight in shining armor. It would talk loudly about U.S. aggression and might even increase its military support for Iran in the aftermath of an attack, but it would avoid entanglement. This inaction could dent Russia’s own reputation in the region and beyond. Over the medium term, an Iranian-Israeli war may also push Tehran, once it has recovered, to obtain a nuclear weapon—an outcome that Russia will not want to see, because of the risks associated with such a development.

WALK THE LINE

Regional escalation might also complicate Russia’s relationships with Iran and the Gulf Arab states. In recent years, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have pursued a rapprochement with Iran, calculating that direct dialogue and economic ties are the best way to preserve regional stability. Although orchestrated without Russian input, this rapprochement has benefited Moscow. It has made it easier for the Kremlin to closely align itself with Iran and its partners and proxies, which are the region’s main anti-Western forces, while preserving its relations with the Arab states. Meanwhile, coordination with the Gulf states in OPEC+ has given Russia leverage over the oil market, and the UAE has emerged as a crucial conduit for Russian efforts to evade sanctions imposed in response to its invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s relationships with the Gulf Arab states and with Iran have helped Moscow make the case for broadening the membership of the BRICS, a bloc founded by Brazil, Russia, India, and China in 2009 that South Africa joined the following year. In 2023, the group was expanded to include Iran and the UAE along with Egypt and Ethiopia, furthering the Kremlin’s efforts to assemble a growing alignment of non-Western powers. It is much easier for Russia to maintain these relationships when the Persian Gulf is harmonious, rather than engage in a zero-sum game in which its dealings with one side in a conflict will irk the other. No wonder, then, that Russian diplomats were happy when the king of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, promised in May during a visit to Moscow that his country, long a Western-facing Gulf Arab state, would normalize relations with Iran.

Military escalation between Israel and Iran could complicate Russia’s plans. Although several Arab states helped Israel fend off Iran’s April 13 air attack, they played down their role and have signaled a clear interest in sustaining their rapprochement with Iran. They oppose any further Israeli offensive actions against Iran or its proxies, fearing that regional war would jeopardize their economic agendas and further outrage domestic constituencies that have denounced the devastation in Gaza. But as much as the Gulf Arab states do not wish to see their détente with Iran collapse, escalation between Israel and Iran or its proxies could bring strikes on their soil. Targets may include U.S. military facilities or strategic assets such as oil facilities, which the Houthis have previously targeted in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. No matter who fired the first shot, Gulf Arab states would likely blame Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government for any escalation. The resulting erosion of Israel’s recent rapprochement with the UAE and other Gulf governments would please the Kremlin, which has viewed with apprehension the formation of an anti-Iranian bloc uniting Israel and the Gulf Arab states under U.S. auspices. Still, regional escalation carries risks for the Arab-Iranian détente as well—and, by extension, for Russia.

TROUBLE

In April, Iran and Israel appeared to be stepping toward the brink but then managed to restrain themselves. If they go further next time—or should Israel decide that the moment is ripe to take on Hezbollah—the ensuing escalation would threaten all parties, including Moscow, which would be forced to decide whether to respond or to remain on the sidelines. Russia’s ability to shape outcomes, however, would be more limited than that of the United States. This is because Russia’s military capabilities are already stretched and its leverage over the belligerents is negligible. When push comes to shove, Russia is likely to support Iran or Hezbollah through electronic warfare or by funneling weapons to its partners that are not needed for the Ukraine campaign. Moscow is unlikely to directly engage militarily. It will undoubtedly blame Washington for any escalation. But in view of what Russia stands to lose in Syria, in Iran, and elsewhere in the region, it is far from guaranteed that Moscow would emerge triumphant from such a war. If the Middle East explodes, it will hurt Russia’s enemies—but it will hurt Russia, too.

Because Russia’s overarching priority is its global confrontation with the United States over Ukraine, Putin should have no interest in getting drawn into a full-blown Middle Eastern war that he cannot control. Tensions in the region help Russia in its drive to undermine global order, but only for as long as they can be managed. Moscow is benefiting from the current war in Gaza and is happy to see the United States’ reputation decline for what is widely perceived as unjust support for Israel. That is also why Russia has shown little interest in calming present tensions.

If the Middle East explodes, it will hurt Russia’s enemies—but it will hurt Russia, too.

During the past nine months—arguably the most consequential for the Middle East in decades—Russia has been on the diplomatic sidelines. Whereas the most senior U.S. officials have tirelessly shuttled between regional capitals, Russia has focused its efforts on the UN Security Council. There, Moscow has repeatedly criticized Washington for failing to support cease-fire resolutions. When the United States recently proposed its own resolution for a three-phase cease-fire, Russia abstained, citing a lack of details, but refrained from vetoing the text, which had received backing from the Arab world. Russia has enjoyed watching the United States contend with the twin predicament of being both the most hated player in the region and the one that many powers look to for salvation—a role that Washington cannot or will not perform. As long as U.S. policy remains mired in this mess, Russia has no reason to jeopardize its own interests by fueling more regional trouble.

If war breaks out between Israel and Hezbollah, Russia has two plausible options: it could do nothing, or it could increase its support for Israel’s adversaries while avoiding direct military entanglement. Sitting on the sidelines is not credible, which means that the likeliest outcome is that Moscow would support Iran’s proxies through a combination of weapons supplies and nonmilitary support. With its increasingly sophisticated capabilities, Russia could step up its electronic warfare from Syria by jamming the guidance systems of Israeli weaponry. It could also funnel more weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen, which would be consistent with its current strategy. In January, Hezbollah struck Israel’s Mount Meron air traffic control base with what appeared to be Russian-made guided antitank missiles; according to U.S. officials, Moscow recently considered transferring cruise missiles to the Houthis. Military constraints resulting from Russia’s Ukraine campaign and political prudence mandated by its relations with the Gulf Arab states should keep the Kremlin from getting too deeply involved with Iran’s proxies.

Washington should be clear-eyed about Russia’s outlook on a wider war in the Middle East. Moscow has no interest in U.S. diplomacy achieving calm and stability, but it also does not want a regional conflagration. Therefore, although Russia will not be a constructive force helping the United States defuse tensions, it will not egg on Iran or its proxies to wage full-blown war against Israel. If there is a war, Washington should expect limited support from Russia for Israel’s adversaries, and should work to undermine or neutralize it where it can. Warnings from Washington that Moscow should not involve itself are unlikely to succeed. Instead, the United States should encourage its Gulf Arab partners to exert quiet pressure on Russia not to transfer missiles and other weaponry to Iranian proxies, making clear the risks of doing so. The United States should also beef up its own defenses, encourage its Israeli partners to respect Russian redlines in Syria, and, above all, step up its diplomatic efforts to ensure that, should a Hezbollah-Israeli war break out, it can be quickly contained.