What the Lebanese People Really Think of Hezbollah

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently declared that as his country’s military operations in Gaza wind down, Israel will turn its attention to its foe to the north: the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah. The two parties have a long history of conflict rooted in Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, its occupation of the southern portion of the country from 1985 to 2000, and a full-scale war the two sides fought in 2006. In recent years, Israel and Hezbollah have been carrying out low-scale cross-border attacks, but the frequency and scale of these increased following Hamas’s horrific attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza. In recent weeks, concerns have grown that another major war between the two parties could break out.

If it did, such a war would take place in a country that is already on the brink. Ever since experiencing a near-total collapse of Lebanon’s economy in 2019, ordinary Lebanese have faced immense challenges. The depth of their despair is clear from the results of a nationally representative survey that our organization, Arab Barometer, carried out between February and April 2024, which encompassed all areas of the country, including both urban and rural locations, and covered all the major sectarian communities.

Historically, Lebanon was one of the Arab region’s more affluent and developed non-oil-producing countries. But conditions there have deteriorated considerably, especially in recent years, fueling intense frustration and anger among ordinary Lebanese of all sects. Around 80 percent of citizens say the availability and the affordability of food is currently a problem. Sixty-eight percent reported sometimes or often running out of food before they could afford to buy more in the last month. Among the seven predominantly Arab countries where we have conducted surveys since September 2023, Lebanese respondents reported by far the lowest satisfaction in the region with the provision of water, electricity, Internet access, and health care. Lebanese respondents were also the most likely to say they have experienced weekly electricity outages: 92 percent did so, which is 43 points above the next-worst performer, the Palestinian territories, which were surveyed just prior to October 7. The same was true of weekly water shortages, which 65 percent of Lebanese respondents reported—17 points above the next-worst performer (again, the Palestinian territories).

There is also very little hope for the future. Only 13 percent of citizens think the situation will improve in the next two to three years. Among the Arab populations we surveyed, Lebanese respondents were the most likely to say that they are worse off than their parents (over 50 percent), and only 28 percent think their children will have a better quality of life than they do.

Even before October 7, Lebanon was a deeply factious country. It experienced a horrendous civil war, fought largely along sectarian lines, from 1975 to 1990, which ended with a tenuous peace accord guaranteeing the main confessional groups specific political rights. For example, the president of Lebanon is designated to be Christian, the prime minister Sunni, and the speaker of parliament Shiite.

But Hezbollah’s rise in the last three decades has fundamentally altered this balance of power. As the most heavily armed nonstate actor in the world, Hezbollah has been designated a terrorist organization by most Western countries. Within Lebanon, however, it operates as a legal political party and as a security force: the group effectively governs much of the country, particularly in the south and east. Hezbollah also provides basic services to those living in the areas it controls, which would normally be provided by the national government. In effect, the group operates as a state within a state. Neither the national government nor the Lebanese Armed Forces has the capacity to counter Hezbollah, meaning the group could effectively drag Lebanon into a war with Israel on its own.

The Arab Barometer survey makes clear that, despite being a driving force in Lebanese politics and enjoying high levels of support among the country’s Shiite population, which is concentrated in the south and east, Hezbollah does not command widespread support across the country. And yet many Lebanese favor some of Hezbollah’s basic positions. Lebanese overwhelmingly support the rights of Palestinians and condemn Israel for its actions in Gaza. Tellingly, the findings make clear that support for Hezbollah’s role in regional affairs has risen among non-Shiite Lebanese, almost assuredly because of the group’s resistance to Israel in the wake of the war in Gaza. And if Israel invades Lebanon to attack Hezbollah, support for the organization would likely rise further.

A MATTER OF TRUST

The Arab Barometer survey reveals that, despite Hezbollah’s significant influence in Lebanon, relatively few Lebanese support it. Just 30 percent say they have quite a lot or a great deal of trust in Hezbollah, whereas 55 percent say they have no trust at all. Levels of trust vary widely by sect. Among the Shiite population, 85 percent say they have a great deal or quite a lot of trust in Hezbollah. By comparison, just nine percent of Sunnis and Druze, respectively, and six percent of Christians say the same. Since Arab Barometer last surveyed Lebanon in 2022, trust in Hezbollah has risen among Shiites by seven points but has remained unchanged among Christians, Sunnis, and Druze.

There is also not broad support among Lebanese for Hezbollah’s role in regional politics. Only a third say that they agree or strongly agree that it is good for the Arab world that Hezbollah is involved in regional politics, whereas a plurality of 42 percent strongly disagree. Unsurprisingly, Lebanese Shiites are most likely to rate Hezbollah’s role in regional affairs as positive (78 percent), compared with only 13 percent of Sunnis, 12 percent of Christians, and 16 percent of Druze.

Nevertheless, the perception that Hezbollah’s role in regional politics is positive has increased by nine points since 2022—and, notably, this increase in support is not coming from Shiites, whose views on this question have remained unchanged over the last two years. Instead, the heightened support comes from members of other sects, with a ten-point increase among Druze, an eight-point increase among Sunnis, and a seven-point increase among Christians.

This increase likely points to sympathy for Hezbollah’s stance toward Israel rather than deep support for the group itself. Lebanese citizens of all sects are horrified by Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. From a list of seven terms ranging from “conflict” to “genocide,” the most common terms they use to describe the Israeli operations there are “genocide” (36 percent of respondents chose that term) and “massacre” (25 percent). Meanwhile, 78 percent of Lebanese say that Israel’s bombing of Gaza represents “a terrorist act” compared with only 11 percent who view Hezbollah’s attacks in Northern Israel as “terrorism.”

Hezbollah’s primary patron is Iran, so it is unsurprising that Lebanese views of Iran mirror their attitudes toward Hezbollah’s role in regional politics. Thirty-six percent of Lebanese hold a very favorable or somewhat favorable view of Iran, with the sectarian divide once again visible: 80 percent of Shiites do so, compared with only 26 percent of Druze, 15 percent of Sunnis, and 15 percent of Christians. Despite this low overall level of support, such positive views toward Iran have increased by eight percentage points since 2022, and the increase was driven primarily by changing views among non-Shiites. Iran’s image improved the most among Druze (nine points), followed by Christians (five points) and Sunnis (four points).

The shift toward Iran, particularly among non-Shiite sects in Lebanon, has been coupled with a collapse in support for the United States. In 2024, just 27 percent of Lebanese have a favorable view of the United States, down from 42 percent in 2022. Christians are the most positive toward America (49 percent), followed by Druze (32 percent), and Sunnis (25 percent). Among Shiites, the figure is extremely low: five percent. The change was most dramatic among the Druze population, where favorable views of the United States fell by 31 percentage points. Favorability fell by 13 points among Christians, 11 points among Sunnis, and eight points among Shiites.

There is little question that Hezbollah’s standing is shaped by how Lebanese view the situation in Gaza. Despite the group’s gains, however, its policies and actions have not resulted in much cross-sectarian support. At the national level, only 12 percent of citizens feel closest to Hezbollah as a political party. Shiites are the only Lebanese sect in which more than one percent of members say that, among all the country’s parties, they feel closest to Hezbollah. And even among Shiites, only 39 percent say they feel closest to Hezbollah, roughly the same percentage (37 percent) who say they do not feel close to any political party.

MY ENEMY’S ENEMY

Given the importance of the war in Gaza, one result from the survey is somewhat surprising. Alone among Arab populations in the seven countries Arab Barometer has surveyed since September 2023, Lebanese say the Biden administration should prioritize economic development in the Middle East over the Palestinian issue. This is striking, since most Lebanese feel a tremendous amount of empathy for Palestinians and harbor deep skepticism of Washington; the finding underscores just how desperate circumstances in Lebanon have become. Indeed, Lebanese respondents were generally receptive to the idea of help from foreign actors; 62 percent supported the deal the Lebanese government made with the International Monetary Fund in 2022 to bail out the country, even though some of its terms might prove unpopular.

Lebanese are turning to foreign actors because the ongoing political and financial crisis has destroyed citizens’ trust in their own government and faith in their religious leaders. Lebanese citizens express the lowest level of trust in political leaders and institutions of any country surveyed by Arab Barometer. Nine out of ten Lebanese respondents said they have not a lot or no trust in their government, the parliament, the president, or the prime minister. Ninety-four percent of Lebanese citizens say they are dissatisfied with the government’s performance. What is more, three out of four said they do not trust religious leaders; 65 percent say religious leaders are just as likely to be corrupt as nonreligious ones.

Tellingly, the one public institution that is seen as having any significant credibility is the Lebanese Armed Forces, which enjoys the trust of 85 percent of respondents—far higher than the level for Hezbollah or any other actor. Members of all sects express similar levels of trust in the LAF. This may have something to do with the fact that the LAF includes members of all of Lebanon’s sects and is the largest employer in the country, providing a crucial safety net to service members and their families.

As both Israel and Hezbollah contemplate the prospect of escalating their conflict, they should take into account the context in which a new war would take place: a period of intense precarity in Lebanon. Lebanese citizens in large part remain wary of Hezbollah (and Iran), but almost all have been horrified by Israel’s war in Gaza, and some have become increasingly approving of Hezbollah’s fight against Israel. That basic logic—my enemy’s enemy is my friend—would likely take firmer hold if Israel chose to launch a larger war against the group, and especially if Israeli forces invaded Lebanon. An Israeli military campaign in Lebanon would significantly magnify all the difficulties ordinary citizens already face, and many would come to see supporting Hezbollah as a pragmatic way to defend their homeland, making it harder for Israel to achieve its goals.

At the same time, if Hezbollah were to be seen as the party that caused the war to expand to Lebanon, it could lose the limited support it has gained since October 7 from Lebanon’s non-Shiite population. Ordinary Lebanese do not want a war in their homeland. If one breaks out and they blame Hezbollah, its popularity may drop. Given the extremely negative views the Lebanese have of Israel’s actions in Gaza, it seems unlikely a decline in the limited support for Hezbollah would result in any positive change in views of Israel. That would leave many Lebanese opposed to both main actors in a war that would make their already difficult circumstances even harder to bear.