Waging the Wrong War in Yemen

The Iranian-backed Houthis are proving to be a stubborn problem for the United States and its allies. Ever since Hamas’s October 7 massacre and Israel’s subsequent offensive in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis, a Shiite rebel group that controls a substantial portion of Yemen after a nearly decadelong civil war, have lashed out at Israel and tried to use their perch on the Red Sea to disrupt business as usual. They have attacked commercial and military ships in the region, stirring a U.S.-led coalition to try to rein them in. But the best efforts of this coalition have failed to deter the Houthis. After a brief slowing in April and May, the pace of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea ratcheted up dramatically in June, posting the largest total since last December. July’s barrages have only underlined the tenacity of a group that does not seem ready to relent.

On July 19, the Houthis successfully struck Tel Aviv with an Iranian-manufactured drone, killing one person and injuring at least ten others. It was the first time the Houthis had been able to hit Israeli territory after months of trying to do so. The Houthis have also claimed responsibility for attacks on the port of Eilat in southern Israel. Shaken, Israel retaliated by targeting oil tanks and other infrastructure in the Yemeni port of Hodeidah, killing nine people and injuring dozens more. In previous months, U.S. and British forces have hit Houthi military targets in attacks meant to punish the militants and prevent them from launching attacks of their own.

Bombing the group into submission will not work: the Houthis can endure significant punishment and continue to launch attacks against Red Sea shipping and against Israel. Moreover, the Houthis are not all that worried about losing some of their military capabilities. In fact, they likely believe that they are winning—not necessarily the war on the ground, but the information war. Fighting against the United States and Israel is a key part of how the Houthis define themselves (their slogans include “Death to Israel, death to America!”), and their support for the Palestinian people resonates widely in Yemen and across the Middle East. The Houthis have therefore been able to successfully use violence to portray themselves as the defenders of the Palestinians, bolster their legitimacy at home and abroad, and demonstrate their importance as a key member of Iran’s “axis of resistance”—a network of largely Shiite state and nonstate military organizations that stretches from Iraq to Lebanon and that Tehran uses to spread its influence in the region.

Houthi leaders have calculated that they gain more adulation and support in the region by staging these attacks than they lose from having to absorb bombardments. They see their war as a public relations initiative, and so far, in their eyes, it has been worth every ounce of blood and treasure.

HEARTS AND MINDS

Since November 2023, the Houthis have targeted over 70 vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in attacks that have killed four sailors, sunk two ships, and involved the hijacking of a third. This uptick in violence has burnished the Houthis’ image as the champion of the Palestinians and as a courageous opponent to the West. The United States and its allies have not been able to stem the tide of attacks or check the group’s propaganda campaign.

The Houthis claim that their attacks are a response to Israel’s invasion of Gaza and have promised to continue until Israel and Hamas agree to a cease-fire and humanitarian aid can freely enter the devastated territory. The attacks have had substantial repercussions for international trade in the Red Sea—in the first three months of 2024, shipping traffic through the area declined by half. Commercial ships passing through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea handled an estimated 15 percent of global trade in 2023, including 25 to 30 percent of all container shipping. A U.S.-led multinational coalition has sought to protect ships in the Red Sea by shooting down Houthi missiles and drones and by striking Houthi military assets in Yemen. But these efforts have clearly been insufficient in protecting global commerce.

The problem for the United States is that it has focused too much on the military dimensions of the conflict. Before October 7, the Houthis were struggling to consolidate their authority over the territory they control and distract attention from their poor governance record. Their subsequent strikes against Israel and Red Sea shipping have significantly bolstered their legitimacy within Yemen and in the broader region. Thousands of Yemenis took to the streets in January in pro-Palestinian protests organized by the Houthis, highlighting the popularity of the cause and the Houthis’ role as its standard bearer. This vocal support for Palestinians has also put the Houthis’ domestic enemies—the already fractured anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen—on the defensive as they scramble to thread the needle of condemning Houthi actions while still echoing the Houthis’ rhetorical support for the Palestinians. And the Houthis insist that their striving on behalf of a besieged Gaza has swelled their ranks. They claim that they have recruited over 100,000 new fighters (a figure that may also include child soldiers) since October 7.

The Houthis believe their war has been worth every ounce of blood and treasure.

Houthi media, including Al Masirah, a digital Beirut-based media platform produced in English as well as Arabic, and the televised speeches of the group’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, provide a good sense of the spirit of this propaganda campaign. Houthi messaging has consistently framed the group’s attacks as part of a fight against Israel and a bid to force de-escalation in Gaza. They also claim to be targeting only ships that are linked to Israel, although many of the vessels they have attacked appear to have no connection to the country. The Houthis cast themselves as brave and intrepid champions of the Palestinian cause and one of the few actors in the Middle East willing to stand up to the West.

The Houthis have also emphasized their ties to Iran and other members of that country’s “axis of resistance.” They even claim to have carried out a joint military operation with an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq to target the Israeli port of Haifa. Houthi media outlets have also delighted in the praise the group has received from its partners in Tehran. In January, Iranian leaders lauded the Houthis for their “strong and authoritative position in support of the oppressed people of Palestine.”

The Houthis believe that the elevation of their profile in the region makes the costs of the U.S.-led campaign against them much easier to bear. In fact, they have embraced the idea that they are “under attack” from the United States and are facing down imperialism, a tried-and-true message deployed, often to great effect, by repressive authoritarian regimes. Indeed, their leader has insisted that it is “a great honor and blessing to be confronting America directly.”

To be clear, one does not need to be sympathetic to the Houthis’ aims to understand what the group is trying to accomplish with their information campaign. Houthi rule is violent and oppressive, and the Houthis have no legitimate claim to represent the Yemeni people. Indeed, their attacks on Red Sea shipping are making life even harder for the people of Yemen, who are already enduring the humanitarian fallout of a devastating war that has racked their country for a decade. But understanding what the Houthis are trying to achieve—and why they think they are winning—could help the United States develop an effective policy to counter them.

THE MESSAGE

Unfortunately, the United States has few good options when it comes to responding to the Houthis. So far, military strikes, sanctions targeting the Houthi leadership, and efforts to interdict weapons smuggling have all failed to stop attacks. Ratcheting up the scale and intensity of American-led strikes would not likely change the Houthis’ calculus or substantially alter the military dynamics of the conflict. Scaled-up military action could degrade the Houthis’ high-end military capabilities in the short term, but the Houthis would be able to replenish those capabilities with missiles smuggled from Iran. (So far, the U.S.-led coalition has not been able to halt the transit of these weapons into Yemen.) At the same time, the Houthis can use low-cost technology, including drones in the air and the sea. After decades of insurgent warfare, they are adept at moving and concealing their assets. Even if the American-sponsored coalition dropped bombs all over Houthi territory, such an offensive would not reduce the Houthis’ military capabilities to the point where the group could not launch its own attacks.

Even worse, an accelerated bombing campaign would increase the risk of escalation and miscalculation. U.S. strikes in Yemen have sought to minimize civilian casualties and humanitarian fallout by narrowly focusing on specific kinds of military infrastructure. An expansion of the airstrikes would in all likelihood end up killing more civilians and damaging civilian infrastructure, returning the United States to the same mess it faced when it supported a Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen in 2015. Many countries and international institutions condemned that intervention—and the U.S. role in enabling it—for its horrific toll of civilian casualties and the humanitarian disaster that followed. A more concerted U.S. bombing campaign now would not only hurt Yemenis and deepen their domestic crisis but also give the Houthis, their backers in Iran, and the Iranian axis of resistance a greater impetus to stage attacks against U.S. assets in the region. Washington does not want to invite such escalation.

The best chance the United States has to deter Houthi attacks is to find ways to conduct an information campaign of its own to counter Houthi messaging. As long as the Houthis believe they are winning the information war, they will likely continue their attacks. Neutralizing Houthi propaganda is the best way to deter the group’s attacks. The most straightforward way to blunt their message would be to reach a sustainable cease-fire in Gaza. Although there is no guarantee that the Houthis would end their attacks once a cease-fire was in place, it would greatly diminish the power of their messaging by eliminating a huge source of popular grievance and angst.

The Houthis are adept at moving and concealing their assets.

Other kinds of countermessaging could also blunt the impact of the Houthi attacks. The efforts of Captain Chris Hill, commander of the U.S.S. Eisenhower, provide a striking example that could become a model for broader campaigns. During a nine-month deployment of the aircraft carrier in the Red Sea, Hill launched a social media initiative whose messages were relentlessly upbeat, highlighting the men and women who serve on his ship and humanizing his crew. He proved particularly effective in combating Houthi disinformation. In June, false claims that the Houthis had struck or even sunk the Eisenhower proliferated on social media, amplified by pro-Russian and Chinese accounts. By simply serving as a trusted voice portraying everyday life on the Eisenhower, Hill demonstrated that the ship was just fine. Although his messages are no doubt intended for an American audience, they still circulate in the same social media environment that much of Houthi propaganda does. By rebutting the messages sent by the Houthis and by supporters, including Russia and China, such posts can play an important role in countering disinformation.

Social media messaging can also be effective in demonstrating the harm wreaked by Houthi attacks, highlighting a Houthi pattern of repression and hypocrisy and showing that the group is not helping people but harming them. Images of the Eisenhower carrier strike group coming to the aid of the multinational crew of the Tudor, a ship sunk by the Houthis, show how the Houthis are targeting not just commercial vessels but also the ordinary people from around the world who work on them. U.S. messaging could also relay how the Houthis arrested employees of the UN and nongovernmental organizations in June and in the process made life even harder for the many Yemeni families who rely on humanitarian assistance to survive.

Houthi attacks on commercial vessels are also driving up the cost of shipping, making essential goods like food and fuel more expensive for Yemenis. A Houthi attack in July on the Chios Lion, an oil tanker, led to a 125-mile oil slick along the Red Sea coast, with severe economic consequences for Yemenis in the fishing industry, a major source of employment and food security. Sharing information on social media about the harm done by the Houthis to ordinary Yemenis would help demonstrate the group’s hypocrisy.

Such attacks will continue as long as the Houthis believe that the campaign is benefiting them by spreading the messages they want to send to their domestic constituents, their partners in the Iranian axis of resistance, and the West. A U.S. counterinformation campaign could substantially reduce those benefits and make it less worthwhile for the Houthis to continue striking furiously around the region.