The Treatment of Germany

THE governments of all the leading Powers are now faced with the problem of the postwar treatment of Germany, in all of its phases. The responsibility, moreover, is primarily a governmental one. Intelligent and comprehensive consideration of how this responsibility should be carried out requires detailed and timely factual information. This is in large part available only to governments and their personnel. While hostilities continued, secrecy was necessary with respect to some of this information; and the very mass of the relevant data makes it practically impossible for outsiders to accumulate and master it. The solutions to the problems which will arise must, moreover, be hammered out in negotiations among the United Nations. Differences will inevitably arise among them, and until these are reconciled the governments concerned will not think it wise either to permit their own positions to become frozen or to share fully with their publics the views they have reached. The answers must in the last analysis be worked out in discussions among governments.

The lay citizen, nevertheless, has an important role to play in the process of formulating policy in this field. He has a vital stake in the decisions. The nature of these decisions will reveal, soon if not at once, "the baby figure of the giant mass of things to come at large." The decisions, moreover, must be such as not to clash violently, now or later, with prevailing public opinion. It is urgent, therefore, that the public be made aware of some of the complexities of the issues involved, be prevented from acquiring fantastic notions as to what is possible or desirable, and especially be brought to realize that much more is involved than the decision as between a "hard" and a "soft" peace. Governments, as far as I know, have as yet done practically nothing in this direction, no doubt because until victory against the Axis Powers was definitive, and until they had reached substantial agreement among themselves, they were too hard pressed by other matters to have the time to give to this task, or were too doubtful as to its expediency to have the will to devote themselves actively to it. The public must give serious thought to these issues, but in the absence of governmental guidance it must for the time being do its thinking for itself. It is the purpose of this paper to make a minor contribution in this connection by attempting a presentation of the issues on which both peoples and governments must now make up their minds.

The major phases of the postwar treatment of Germany which require consideration, in the order in which they will be discussed here, are: the question of punishment of Germany; planning for security against a recurrence of the German menace; restitution of and reparation for war loot and war damage; and institutional and procedural arrangements for the execution of the program as a whole.

II

Ruthless aggression and brutality to prisoners and to conquered peoples unfortunately are not unprecedented. But where in recorded history can a parallel be found to the Nazi record of mass murders planned and executed in cold blood and with the apparatus and routines of large-scale factory production? It would be wrong not to burn with anger against such deeds. No mitigating circumstances can be involved. Many Germans, no doubt, acted as they did, or kept silent as they did, only under coercion. But millions can be coerced only by millions, and even those coerced into participation or into silence must at best be regarded as morally or mentally sick because of their memories of what they did or failed to do. There is, at least as yet, no evidence that any substantial section of the German people was guiltless either of active participation in evil or of abject submission to it. If, nevertheless, there is to be pity for the Germans, its justification must be sought not in the valid claims of Germans on our pity, but on whatever contribution its exercise may make to the moral welfare of those who exercise it and of mankind in general.

Many millions of Germans were full-fledged Nazis and many millions more lived unprotestingly under the Nazi régime, or confined their protests to questions of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. As far as we know, the overwhelming bulk of the Germans were at least as satisfied with the régime while it was victorious as peoples ever are with their governments. It is administratively impossible, however, to treat all of these individually as war criminals or as mentally sick persons, even if we regard them as such. Those who were already advanced in years when Hitler came into power and whose records are clean or neutral, young children, the survivors of Hitler's concentration camps, the uninformed, non-political, perhaps ignorant and isolated peasants—these can perhaps be regarded as free from the otherwise individual moral responsibility of all Germans for the evil that the German people has done. But that still leaves tens of millions of Nazis or of Nazi-tainted Germans.

Hitler in such a situation would have been at no loss as to what to do: mass murder of the dangerous and the useless, enslavement of the rest. But we are not Nazis, and we must not become such in our zeal to punish the Nazis for their sins. There is no lack of precedent in western civilization for holding groups to collective responsibility. So much of our social life is carried on through groups and organizations of one kind or another—corporations, trade unions, local governments—that if there were not collective responsibility for the acts done on behalf of groups by members or agents thereof, our society would long ago have disintegrated. It is a fundamental violation of a major element of our whole moral code, however, to apply directly to individuals physical penalties for wrongdoing for which they have only collective responsibility, and we must not succumb to Nazi principles at the very moment of our defeat of the Nazis themselves.

We owe it to ourselves, it seems to me, to our belief in the superiority of our moral code and to our loyalty to that code, to adhere steadfastly to the following simple principle: that no individual shall be executed and (except as part of the military routine and in temporary emergencies) no individual shall be imprisoned or subjected to forced labor except as the result of a formal procedure of a judicial character under which the individual has been given a fair trial according to our own standards and has been proved guilty of active complicity in Nazi misdeeds. This far toward direct punishment of individual Nazis we can go with a clear conscience; go further than this, and we do injustice to the principles we have been defending in resisting Nazi aggression.

The question is being widely discussed as to whether the plea that participation in atrocities was under orders should be accepted as adequate defense. It is a question on which a non-lawyer is perhaps not qualified to have opinions. But in municipal law, surely, many cases arise in which this plea is rejected unless the defendant was subjected to irresistible physical coercion. There does not appear to have been any serious deterioration of the traditional German capacity for administrative efficiency under the Nazi régime. Is it not likely that when the Nazis planned their atrocities, they generally chose for their execution persons with a special aptitude and special liking for such tasks? Is there any evidence that anyone was forced to join the Gestapo or the S.S.?

Aside from the demand for the punishment of individual war criminals, it is just to expect that the German people as a whole will receive punishment for its aggression against its neighbors and for the atrocities in which it permitted its government and military forces to engage, provided these penalties are applied to the group as such and not directly against individuals; and provided also that the penalties are limited to economic or political measures. But in so far as it is just and expedient that the German people shall suffer collective economic and political penalties as punishment for its sins, this will sufficiently result from the automatic consequences of total defeat in war and from the military, political and economic measures which the United Nations should take to secure themselves against the risk of recurrence of German peace-breaking.

III

A second phase of the question of the postwar treatment of Germany—and by far the most important—is how to provide security against the recurrence of German aggression. We must hope that defeat for a second time will of itself suffice to convince the Germans that aggression does not pay, or even to convert them to a positive belief in the desirability of peaceful relations with other peoples. We must not count on it, however. On each of the occasions in the past generation when Germany has launched an aggressive war, she came much closer to success than it is comforting for non-Germans to contemplate. The Germans may appreciate more the record of how near they came to winning than the record of their ultimate failure.

But Germany will emerge from the war militarily and economically prostrate, and without open friends. If a solid worldwide security organization emerges, there will be little obvious need for any special action against Germany on security grounds. As long, however, as any of the Great Powers insists on a single-veto power over the application by the world security organization of military or economic sanctions against an aggressor country, special protection against the menace of renewed German aggression will seem urgently necessary. Germany, of course, will not be a member of the Council of the world security organization (and so, it is almost needless to point out, will not have any veto power). But it will be possible for any country with veto power to exercise it on behalf of Germany, and the retention by Germany of any substantial military potential would create a constant danger that one of those countries might be enticed into partnership with her and engage in joint policies which would endanger the peace of the world—unchecked at an early stage by the Security Council.

The countries which have suffered from German aggression, then, will not be willing to depend solely on the security organization for their safety until, in the course of time, it has demonstrated its effectiveness. Meanwhile, they will insist upon additional safeguards against a recurrence of German aggression, not only by maintenance of their own armaments and by limited security pacts among themselves, but also by the application to Germany of special measures intended to limit her military potential.

That measures of this nature should be taken, and that they should be severe enough to have good prospects of being effective in keeping Germany powerless to resort once more to aggressive policies, should go without saying. But we must not let our anger, righteous though it be, lead us into actions which would involve the enforcing countries in administrative burdens or economic costs which would become intolerable to us when our emotions had cooled, or which by their provocative effect on German opinion would indefinitely prolong the period during which the Germans could not be trusted voluntarily to maintain the peace.

Certain general principles seem to be appropriate as guides to policy with respect to the special measures to be applied against Germany on security grounds. First, the measures must be adequate for their purpose, which is to keep Germany weak. Second, they must be such as the enforcing countries can be expected to be willing to apply as long as need for them appears to persist. Third, they must be such as will either work positively toward the diminution of German aggressiveness or will at least not hinder the effectiveness of the forces within Germany operating in this direction; they must be such, therefore, as will in time contribute to their own obsolescence. Fourth, they must be such as will be likely to yield the maximum of demilitarization in relationship to the administrative burden they entail and to the degree in which they impair German productive power. Fifth, they must be such as not to do violence to the standards of justice, legality and decency of the enforcing countries.

To fulfill these principles, we must plan on the assumption that German aggressiveness may not be an incurable disease, and that the strait jacket necessary at first will be loosened and finally removed altogether as, by their good behavior, the Germans convince us that it is reasonably safe to relax our controls. We must not expect this to happen very quickly, and especially we must not place any confidence in the generation which grew up under the Hitler régime. But we must hope, and in so far as possible plan, that the German children of today and of future generations will make a Germany with which all other peoples can live peacefully on equal terms. To make sure that Germany shall meanwhile not have the military strength to resort to aggression, a period of military, political and economic quarantine must be imposed upon her, with the understanding that the enforcing agencies can reduce or increase its severity according to the trend of German political behavior.

The German people must be deprived of all major facilities for military training. The general staff and its educational subsidiaries, and all but a minimum army for the preservation of internal order, should be disbanded. Military schools should be closed, and all military training of youths should be prohibited. The objection that this will leave Germany helpless to resist aggression against her should be met by granting her an international guarantee of the inviolability of her frontiers except by troops acting on behalf of the control authorities.

All ordnance and military aircraft should be surrendered or scrapped. All plants adapted for the manufacture of ordnance, all armor-plate mills, all plants for the manufacture of airplanes or parts, all underground plants and underground storage facilities should be dismantled or destroyed. The manufacture and export of ordnance, airplanes, armor-plate, warships should be prohibited. The manufacture of explosives should be limited to specified plants and specified non-military types. All coastal and frontier defenses of a permanent character should be destroyed. All stocks of purely military goods should be turned over to the occupying armies for destruction or disposal outside Germany.

The German governmental budgets should be open at all times to inspection by officials acting on behalf of the control authorities. German production, and also import and export statistics and the agencies compiling them, should be kept under constant supervision. The control authorities should also reserve the right to require that imports of strategically important materials not producible on a large scale in Germany shall be restricted, by quotas or otherwise, to the amounts which in their judgment suffice for the valid non-military requirements of the German economy. If Germany has a free-market, private-enterprise system, the control authorities should also be authorized to prescribe categories of imports that are of direct military importance in wartime, such as, for example, petroleum, rubber, aluminum ingots and magnesium; no import duties or other import restrictions should be permitted on such materials, in order to prevent the development or retention under tariff protection of industries of great strategic value.

All instances of German participation in international cartel agreements and in the control or management of industry abroad should be brought to light and examined for their military implications. Wherever it is found that such German participation could readily be used to restrict the production or distribution of strategic commodities outside Germany, to acquire for Germany knowledge of new processes of direct strategic value, to train German personnel for military purposes, or to finance and provide a cover for propaganda abroad, the control authorities should be empowered to require termination or modification of such participation. German financial holdings abroad should be sequestered, to be restored to their rightful owners if they had been acquired as war loot, and to be set off against reparations claims if they had been legitimately acquired. The holdings abroad of bona fide German refugees or anti-Nazis, however, should not be interfered with. German participation in air transportation facilities outside Germany should be prohibited, and Germany should be permitted to maintain air services within Germany only with foreign-made planes imported into Germany under license from the control authorities.

Economic strength is a major source of military strength; and since almost all production—especially heavy industries—can readily be made to serve military purposes, it may be objected that this program, severe though it is, is not drastic enough to ensure that Germany will be incapable of embarking almost at once on preparations for another war of aggression. Many persons, indeed, are of the opinion that nothing short of a substantial dein-dustrialization of Germany will provide sufficient protection against the recurrence of a German threat to world peace.

In my mind, however, a program much more severe than that sketched above seems unworkable, inacceptable to world opinion in the long run, and probably unnecessary even if practicable. Any economic burdens or disabilities imposed upon Germany should be only incidental to restrictions imposed for specific and weighty military reasons, such as those proposed above, or should be for purposes of restitution and reparations. There should be no impoverishment of the German people for the sake of punishment, or because general impoverishment produces military weakness as a by-product. The economic plight of the German people will be desperate for some time under any circumstances. Germany has lost millions of her best and most skilled workmen through military casualties and mass murders in the concentration camps. Her cities are largely levelled to the ground, her factories in disrepair or destroyed, her railway system without bridges, stations, rolling stock. For some time German economy will suffer from the handicap of inevitably inefficient foreign military supervision, and it may be many years before an efficient German administration can be reestablished. American capital will not be made available to speed up the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction, as in the period after the last war. Reparations will take a heavy toll of working inventories of materials and equipment. The population tide, which ran in favor of Germany after 1919, will for the next generation be strongly against her. For some time, in all probability, the outside world will be faced with the question whether the poverty and hunger of the German people should not on humanitarian grounds be relieved by aid from outside, rather than with the question whether Germany is not becoming too prosperous to be safe.

If, therefore, the will of the Allied nations to maintain a tight control over Germany's military potential is to persist until the patent strength and solidity of the world security organization (or the evaporation of the German will to aggression) makes it safe to remove it, the control will have to be kept within bounds. It must not involve starvation of innocent children, or feudal servitudes applied indiscriminately to adults. It must not include, in the guise of measures of military control, restraints on German industry the real or strongly-suspected objective of which is to remove the burden of German economic competition from one or more of the controlling Powers. Unless we are prepared to maintain indefinitely a control harsh enough to lower the standard of living of the German people below the minimum requisite for maintenance of health and vigor, which is unthinkable, the control must be mild enough to leave some chance that the German people will plan for peace instead of for a war of liberation from the foreign yoke. While we must try both coercion and cure, an overdose of the former will destroy the possibility that the latter can be effective.

Impairment of German productive capacity, moreover, means economic injury not only to Germans but to the rest of the world, and especially to those countries which in normal times find Germany an important export market or source of imports. Many persons have belatedly discovered that the industrialization of backward countries is generally to the economic interest of advanced industrial nations. On the same grounds, it is not to the outside world's advantage that Germany should be transformed from an industrially advanced country to a non-industrial one. Indeed, the reverse approach is more logical. The world has a surfeit of agricultural population as it is. Were Germany made dependent on other countries for a large proportion of her food, she thereby would not only contribute to world-wide prosperity but would be deprived of more military strength than would be the case if a large portion of her steel industry were forcibly transferred to neighboring countries. If, on the other hand, Germany were to be agrarianized, those countries responsible for that decision should also accept responsibility for providing substitute markets for the countries which have hitherto found Germany their best outlet for their agricultural surpluses.

If Germany could be placed completely on a free-trade basis in her foreign commerce—and still more if the whole world, or most of it, were on such a basis—Germany would indeed be so dependent on distant sources of supply for many strategic materials that even if she resorted to large-scale stockpiling the risks of venturing on a major war would be obviously too great for her to face. However, the enforcement of free trade on Germany alone would be regarded by the Germans as an intolerable grievance, and would intensify German competition in world markets to a degree that the rival industries in the enforcing countries would find unbearable. It would drive the Germans to state-operated industry, secret subsidies, and other evasive devices. A substantial approach to universal free trade would provide the world with the best kind of protection against the threat of a renewal of German military power and would be to the economic advantage of Germany as well as of the rest of the world. But for the present at least, this solution is as inacceptable almost everywhere as it is intrinsically desirable.

It is highly doubtful that the net result of the annexation by any of the Allied Powers of German territory inhabited predominantly by Germans would be to promote peace, even if such a step did involve some impairment of German economic and military strength. Modern history reveals no stimulus to aggravated nationalism so strong and persistent as the existence of unquestionable terra irredenta. If, for whatever reason, territory should be transferred from within the boundaries of pre-Nazi Germany, there should also be a transfer to Germany of the German inhabitants of such territory in order to prevent the development of new minority problems.

There seems every reason, however, to permit and even to foster separatist movements within Germany. The division of Prussia into several provinces, and the organization of Germany on a federal basis, with substantial autonomy for the provinces (and with none large enough to dominate the federation as a whole), should be encouraged and perhaps even demanded by the controlling Powers. Strong centralization in the formation of policy and in administration is conducive to militarization, whereas decentralization is an obstacle to it. As Germany is permitted to regain the right of self-government, her governmental institutions should meet the minimum requirements of political democracy: legislatures elected by adult suffrage and secret ballot, executives removable either by the legislature or by the electorate, freedom of press and of discussion, and an independent judiciary. There should be a period of disenfranchisement and of ineligibility for elective office for specified categories of persons with Nazi records.

It will never be wholly safe to relieve Germany of external servitudes unless the German people acquire more modest attitudes with respect to their rightful place in the world and more pacific views as to the propriety and expediency of the use of force as an instrument of national foreign policy. These new attitudes can come only through the reëducation of the German people—both through the formal machinery of the educational system and as the result of reflection on the subject of Germany's past experience and present plight. I am wholly skeptical of the administrative practicality or the effectiveness of extensive foreign intervention in the process of German reëducation. The Germans will have to learn for themselves the errors of their past ways. Any attempt to impose wisdom upon them will tend to cast a patriotic halo over the old doctrines. We can properly insist that the administrative and teaching personnel of the schools and universities be purged of all persons with Nazi records; we can base decisions as to the relaxation of external controls in part upon periodic appraisals of the political content of textbooks and other teaching materials used in the schools; and we can require that the German press be free from German censorship. But that is probably all that can profitably be attempted from outside.

IV

A third phase of the problem of the treatment of Germany is the question of restitution and reparations. There will be no dispute that, in principle, all German loot from occupied countries should wherever practicable be restored to its rightful owners. In some cases, as, for instance, where central bank gold reserves or treasures from museums and art galleries were appropriated by the Germans and carried to Germany, the application of the principle will encounter no difficulties. Other administrative problems, such as location of the loot and identification of the rightful owners, treatment of transfers of property to Germans where the transactions were—in fact or appearance—routine commercial transactions, disposal of assets where the rightful owners cannot be found, adjudication of rival claims from different Allied sources, etc., will in many cases present nice legal issues. More important as a possible source of dispute between claimants for restitution will be the question whether German articles shall be demanded to replace stolen things which cannot be located, or which have been damaged or destroyed. It would seem expedient that claims for restitution of equivalent articles should have priority over reparations claims. This may be objected to by the relatively poorer invaded countries, since the recoverable loot found in Germany will probably prove to be of disappointingly small dimensions and to consist mostly of booty from the richer invaded countries. A working compromise may be that restitution of the identical articles stolen shall constitute a claim prior to reparations proper, that second priority shall be given to restitution of equivalent articles, and that reparations for war-damage shall rank last.

I dealt with the problem of German reparations in an article in this review two years ago.^[i] There is nothing in that article which I would now want urgently to withdraw if the date of its writing were kept in mind, and I must refer readers to it for my general views on the subject. Since then, an Allied Reparations Commission has been set up, and it apparently has been agreed that cash reparations should not be demanded. Developments since 1943, however, have brought changed emphasis on the capacity of Germany to pay reparations even in kind. The havoc of war has been much greater in Germany than could then have been foreseen, and the political and social disintegration will be such as inevitably to delay the period when the German economy can again regain a high level of productivity. Given the general agreement that the process of reparations payments should not be long drawn out, there has resulted an increased emphasis on the possibility of substantial reparations payments in the form of German labor instead of in cash or commodities.

Since Germany will be sparsely provided with raw materials and much of her productive facilities will be in ruins, there will be surplus German labor. Some of the formerly occupied countries will have superior access to raw materials, through import and perhaps aid from abroad, and this will make it possible for them to use effectively large numbers of German laborers in reconstruction. There would incidentally be a benefit to Germany in the resultant lessening of her unemployment and food problems.

Rumors that German reparations labor may be conscripted and put to work under compulsion have properly given rise to serious misgivings. The struggle of labor through the centuries to escape from serfdom has made compulsory labor a symbol of degradation in the western world, and resort to it except in great and transitory emergencies should be repulsive to all who still find value in the great liberal tradition. There is a general belief, however, that it is Soviet Russia which is insisting upon compulsory labor of Germans. This leads some writers who no doubt make claim to the "liberal" label to tell us that compulsory labor is not evil if it is practised in non-capitalistic countries. "Words," we are told, "should not intimidate us. Compulsory labor is not always slave labor." ^[ii] But "slave" is not the only ugly word that can be associated with labor working under duress. "Compulsory labor" has an ugly enough sound of itself, to say nothing of "serfdom," the "corvée," or the "chain-gang." Even if we should succeed in finding pretty words for the ugly deed, how long would we remain content? The story is told of a good abbot who, tempted on a Friday by a nice slice of venison, solved the issue of conscience by saying: Je vous baptise carpe. But he probably had nervous indigestion next day.

For Germans fairly tried as war criminals and found guilty, compulsory labor as a penalty for crime errs, if at all, on the side of moderation. But if the rank-and-file of Germans are to provide the reparations labor, then either they must do it on a voluntary basis or the democratic countries at least should completely disassociate themselves from any participation in or sanction of the process. A strong case for compulsory labor cannot be made on any grounds. Such labor is notoriously inefficient, and the element of force tends to brutalize those exercising it as well as to degrade those subject to it. It cannot be claimed that no practicable alternative will be available. Living conditions in Germany will be hard and jobs scarce. If reasonable pay and decent working conditions are offered, and assurance is given to the laborers that, subject to reasonable limitations, they will upon request be returned to Germany, there should be no shortage of volunteers. The wages could be in part in German currency, to be paid by the German Government as part of its reparations bill; and the wage-rates could be adjusted by categories of workers so as to be effective in recruiting the various types of skills in the desired quantities. At the very least, the voluntary method is entitled to a fair trial before resort is made to compulsion.

V

The fourth and last phase of the problem of the postwar treatment of Germany to be dealt with here is the question of the institutional and procedural arrangements by which the policy of the Allied nations is to be made effective. Important agreements in this connection have already been reached by the major Powers. With respect to reparations—and presumably also restitution—the Allied Reparations Commission has already been established to consider the question of the extent and methods for collecting such reparations. This Commission will supposedly also be charged with the administration of the process of collection and with the allocation of reparations among the claimant countries. With respect to the administration of Germany itself, a four-power Allied Control Commission is to have central responsibility for all of Germany as soon as military government can be dispensed with; and it in turn will presumably act on policy instructions drawn up in the European Advisory Commission, which has been meeting for some time.

Obviously this setup is very elaborate, with abundant possibilities of overlapping; yet there are still other agencies to be created, and the relationships of all of these agencies to the overall security organization and its subordinate institutions also remain to be worked out. There surely is real danger that this administrative network will be overwhelmed by its own complexity. Harmony of interest and a will to collaborate on the part of the controlling Powers will be essential if the entire program is to succeed. But skill in framing the administrative design is likewise needed.

The administration of the affairs of a modern state by its own government is even in normal times a formidable task. The administration of a devastated and disorganized Germany by the improvised agencies of several foreign states is a task which will put the capacity for statecraft of the controlling Powers to a severe test. If the test is to be met successfully, the planning must proceed, not in terms of how many aspects of German life we can regulate, but of the minimum program of interference consistent with attainment of our major objectives. If we do not concentrate on essentials, limit ourselves to key controls with respect to these essentials, and give the agencies clear lines of policy and full authority to execute them, the whole program of Allied control of Germany may be strangled in multinational red tape.

The greatest danger of all, however—that the control of Germany will either collapse prematurely or will operate to no good purpose—arises out of the plan to divide Germany into three or four zones, each to be administered by a different Power. This, in my view, will inevitably result in greatly complicating the task of coördinating administration throughout Germany, and, what is worse, will aggravate the difficulty of harmonizing the policies of the Great Powers toward Germany. Each of the controlling Powers has different economic, political and territorial interests with respect to Germany. Each of them has different notions of legality, of administrative efficiency, and of the proper limits of state authority over the individual. These differences will tend to reveal themselves in the way the controls are applied in the respective zones, even if the instructions which are given to the administrators are identical for all the zones. The proposed zones, moreover, have no relationship to any German regional pattern of political or economic interest. They may promote—perhaps are intended to promote—a dismemberment of Germany, but they will obstruct rather than favor the voluntary federalization of Germany.

Condominia have notoriously bred inefficiency and friction in the past. The proposed zone arrangement in Germany may be even worse, for it provides for a condominium at the top and puts four nationally-distinct staffs in charge of four separate regions underneath. It thus calls for the maximum coördination of policy and sets up the weakest possible machinery for attaining it. It may be said that the Allies fought the war with much the same administrative arrangement, and that it worked. In warfare, however, the singleness of objective simplifies the task of formulating policy: everyone is aware of the immediate and unambiguous consequences of failure. No such constant stimulus to coördination of policy and administration is present in civil affairs.

Of course, none of the Powers involved wanted to make the task of controlling Germany difficult. Given failure to agree on policy, and on the delegation of authority to a joint agency, this complex machinery was presumably the only alternative. The need for agreement on policy is not removed thereby. But it is postponed, and this is at least better than open disagreement. While it would be easy to draw a picture of the possible results in the most somber colors, the fact remains that there are no international problems which are inherently incapable of solution through the wise exercise of statesmanship. We must pray that the supply of such statesmanship will be adequate to the need.

^[i] "German Reparations Once More," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1943.

^[ii] A. Yugow, "Shall German Labor Rebuild Europe?" in the New Republic, May 7, 1945.