The Right Way for America to Counter Russia in Africa

The Kremlin is on a roll in large parts of Africa. In April, the Pentagon announced withdrawals of U.S. military forces from Chad and Niger, two key U.S. partners in counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel that are now turning to Russia for security assistance. In the case of Niger, a military junta that seized power in a coup last year ordered U.S. personnel to leave a $100 million drone base. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has been pouring mercenaries, proxies, and materiel into Libya for the past six months, adding to its already sizable presence in that country. Libya is now an important access point for Russia in the Mediterranean and a launching pad for operations elsewhere in Africa.

A string of coups across Africa since 2020 has allowed Moscow to strengthen its position on the continent, even as it funnels vast military and economic resources into the war in Ukraine. Russia’s increased military, political, and economic presence in a diverse array of countries that now includes Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan also flies in the face of expectations expressed by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who said in June 2023 that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine had “diminished Russian influence on every continent.” More than two years into that war, Russia clearly remains capable of seizing opportunities to expand its reach in Africa and other parts of the world.

With so many other crises calling for the Biden administration’s attention, rolling back Russia’s advances in Africa will not be easy, not least because the Kremlin has ingratiated itself with many unsavory regimes there. Moreover, Russia’s recent successes capitalize on a combination of worsening regional security dynamics and the continent’s postcolonial history. In the Sahel, for example, Russia touts its ability to help governments respond to rising violence and jihadist threats while scorning France, the former colonial power, for its long record of heavy-handedness and failed policies.

The key question for the United States is how to identify realistic policy goals that play to Washington’s strengths, align with U.S. values, and harness Africa’s enormous potential while recognizing that many countries want to hedge their bets when it comes to foreign partners. Democratic and Republican administrations alike have often treated countering Russia as an end in itself, citing the demands of great-power competition as justification for action in every country where Moscow gains a foothold. U.S. policymakers should take a more selective approach. Instead of simply trying to compete for the affections of African leaders who are sometimes more of a liability than an asset to the United States, Washington should continue helping its current partners deliver good governance, economic opportunities, and security for their citizens. Such aid can both improve the lives of ordinary Africans and diminish the likelihood that their governments will look to Russia in the future. As for those countries that have already turned to Russia for assistance, Washington needs to acknowledge that in many cases the most fruitful policy—difficult as inaction may be—is to step back and allow Russia’s appeal to fade on its own.

RIPE FOR RUSSIA

Russia is benefiting from a wave of democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation across the continent. Coups have ousted several Western-friendly governments in former French colonies such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger. These recent trends have deep roots. As European colonial rule ended, from the 1950s through the 1970s, many African countries, such as Senegal and Tanzania, embraced multiparty elections, but others, including Burundi and the Central African Republic, devolved into coup-prone dictatorships. Former French colonies were especially predisposed to authoritarianism, given the highly centralized political structures bequeathed by the colonialists and Paris’s support for strongmen rulers.

In the fight against violent extremists in the decades after 9/11, Washington and Paris trained military officers in the Sahel who often committed serious human rights abuses. Years later, some of these officers launched or supported military coups—including those in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The United States and France also frequently overlooked the fact that militant organizations in the Sahel drew strength from the domestic misgovernance that their own security and counterterrorism assistance had enabled. The Western response to the uprising in Libya in 2011 made matters worse. After NATO intervened in support of a revolution that toppled the longtime dictator Muammar Qaddafi, the country plunged into chaos.

Russian patronage will leave African leaders worse off in the long run.

Libya’s fragmentation created an opening for Russian intervention and destabilized the countries to its south. Security conditions in Libya deteriorated after the United States disengaged in 2012 and when a civil war broke out in 2014, and Moscow took advantage of the resulting power vacuum. Russia began establishing in Libya a bridgehead for its activities in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018. The Kremlin dispatched thousands of fighters from the Wagner paramilitary group, an ostensibly private mercenary outfit controlled by the Russian government, along with regular Russian soldiers, advanced weaponry, and disinformation specialists to aid a warlord based in eastern Libya in his bid to defeat the internationally recognized government in the capital. Although that effort failed, Russian forces gained access over time to many of Libya’s air bases and, later, key ports, which they now use to ferry arms and fighters to Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Sudan. Russia’s presence in Libya also allows the Kremlin to profit from the smuggling of fuel, gold, drugs, and migrants.

Russia learned lessons in Libya that now inform its meddling across the continent. Limited, flexible, and nominally deniable interventions—often on behalf of distasteful partners that the West is unwilling to countenance—can establish Russian influence on the cheap and secure lucrative revenue streams, such as from gold mining. For relatively little effort, Russia has successfully marketed itself as a partner that can provide military assistance and regime protection without demanding concessions on human rights or democracy.

Moscow understands, of course, that it cannot outperform Western governments when it comes to providing economic prosperity or human security. But as many in the region remain resentful of Paris’s paternalism—and, to a lesser extent, skeptical about Washington’s intentions—Russian policymakers have discovered that their biggest advantage is that Russia is neither France nor the United States. Although the United States remains more popular than Russia throughout Africa, the gap in approval ratings between the two countries among Africans has narrowed over the past decade, according to a 2024 Gallup poll. Western officials should not assume that Russia’s reputation is as toxic in much of Africa as it is in Western countries.

LESS IS MORE

U.S. policymakers must learn that they cannot always outbid Moscow in places such as Mali or Niger. The United States has often failed in its efforts to bend ambivalent foreign governments to its will, and leaders in such places are adept at playing great powers off each other to get what they want. A better use of Washington’s attention and resources would be to support existing partners in Africa who share American values and are committed to helping their citizens, not just shoring up their regimes. Washington should strengthen ties with African countries while holding its partners to a high standard. It was a step in the right direction for the Biden administration to designate Kenya as a major non-NATO ally. Of course, the Kenyan government’s violent suppression of protesters just weeks after Kenyan President William Ruto visited Washington underscores the need for the United States to continually scrutinize its partners.

It should not give any government—even a democratically elected one—a free pass simply because it aligns with Washington instead of Moscow. The United States should continue to include policy conditions to its aid packages to help African leaders govern more effectively, reduce corruption, expand trade, improve competitiveness, and reduce high debt. It would be short-sighted to jettison these stipulations simply to win over countries that have been wooed by Russia. In parallel, the United States should continue to put a spotlight on Russian misdeeds, predatory behavior, human rights abuses, and support for large-scale corruption by publicizing damning information collected by activists, independent journalists, and Western governments.

In some cases, as when its vital interests are at stake, the United States should push back against Russia through sanctions, diplomacy, pressure campaigns, or intelligence operations. For the most part, however, Washington should take advantage of the fact that Moscow is often its own worst enemy. The bargain the Kremlin typically strikes with Africa’s autocrats is that it will protect their regimes, provide hired guns, and organize flashy disinformation campaigns in exchange for a lucrative stake in extractive industries.

Russian help often backfires. In Burkina Faso and Mali, for example, military-led governments have killed scores of civilians and engaged in horrific human rights abuses, sometimes with the help of Russian mercenaries. Such brutal tactics will only exacerbate the security problems that are engulfing parts of the Sahel. In Sudan, Russia is supporting both sides of a bloody civil war, thus inflaming the violence, in a bid to get permission to build a base on the Red Sea. In time, the most self-serving of African leaders will probably realize that Russian patronage leaves them worse off in the long run.

Of course, it would be naive to expect that African countries exploited by Russia will simply fall back into the arms of the United States. Across the continent, citizens and governments alike are increasingly keen to chart their own course and diversify their external relations, and Washington must accept this reality. But by offering its partnership to countries that want it and leaving the door open to future cooperation with those that, for now, do not, the United States can craft more effective policies without pressuring leaders across the continent to take sides in a Cold War–style battle for influence.