Israel’s Hidden War

In August, Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s general security service, the Shin Bet, wrote a remarkable letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli cabinet ministers. The letter didn’t get much attention in Israel or abroad, but it went to the heart of the crisis that has afflicted the country since the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas. Bar warned that intensifying attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, which he called “Jewish terrorism,” challenge “Israel’s national security” and are a “large stain on Judaism.” He described a trend in which “hilltop youth” (the term used in Israel for extremist settlers, although some of these militants are long past their youth) in the West Bank are not only assaulting Palestinians but also clashing with Israeli security forces—all with the backing of senior members of the government. The settler militias had gone from “evading the security forces to attacking the security forces,” Bar wrote, “from cutting themselves off from the establishment to receiving legitimacy from certain officials in the establishment.”

Over the past year, events in the West Bank have been obscured first by Israel’s ongoing offensive in Gaza and now by the war’s escalation in Lebanon and Iranian strikes on Israeli territory. But since October 7, 2023, the UN has recorded over 1,400 incidents of settler attacks in the occupied territories (ranging from vandalism to assault, arson, and live fire) that resulted in injury or property damage and led to the displacement of 1,600 Palestinians from their homes, an uptick after an already record-breaking year of settler violence in 2023. Bar’s intervention in the summer came as Israeli officials in the defense ministry and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) warned that the West Bank was on the verge of an explosion that could cause hundreds of Israeli fatalities in a new conflagration in Israel’s multifront war.

How Israel conducts itself in the West Bank has implications that go well beyond the fate of Palestinians. The contest that pits Israel’s security establishment against the ascendant far right and its settler allies is not over whether Israel should use force in Gaza, stop occupying the West Bank, or make concessions to help find a solution to the decades-old conflict. It’s a clash over the security of the Israeli state, which for many Israelis is a battle over its identity. Israel could heed the warnings of security officials such as Bar or it could continue to be guided by the imperatives of the far right. The latter course will cause more bloodshed, ultimately hurt Israel’s standing and support in the West, and lead to further international isolation and even pariah status. Many Israelis who still view their country as secular, liberal, and democratic see the struggle against the extreme right as existential, with ramifications for every level of governance and Israel’s foreign relations. This battle will decisively shape Israeli politics and security in the years to come.

A WIDENING RIFT

The fault line between the security establishment and the far right can be traced back to the Elor Azaria affair in 2016, when Azaria, an IDF soldier in the occupied city of Hebron, executed a Palestinian assailant after he already lay on the ground wounded by a gunshot and no longer posed a threat. At the time, right-wing politicians, including Netanyahu, came to Azaria’s defense, and some even called for him to be pardoned, directly contradicting then IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot’s statement that Azaria’s actions ran counter to IDF norms. The incident not only revealed a growing divide between the army and government but also exposed the strength of the settler movement in Israeli politics. Azaria was initially charged with murder, but that was later reduced to manslaughter, and he served nine months in prison.

Israel’s top security officials, who are tasked with preventing and countering violence against Israelis, are raising the alarm, asserting that sections of Israel’s political right are working directly against the country’s own interests. They point specifically at Bezalel Smotrich—the religious nationalist finance minister who represents the radical settler movement, who through another position in the defense ministry has de facto control over civilian affairs in the West Bank, and who was arrested and interrogated in 2005 on suspicion of plotting to blow up a highway to protest Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip—and Itamar Ben-Gvir, the minister in charge of the police, who has been convicted numerous times for inciting racism and for his support for a Jewish terrorist group. Both live in West Bank settlements, promote the territory’s annexation, and, after October 7, have advocated resettling Gaza with Israeli Jews. Ben-Gvir has called for the dismissal of both Bar and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for their failures to prevent the October 7 attack and their support for a hostage release and cease-fire deal with Hamas in Gaza.

The growing clash between the far right and the security establishment is “unprecedented,” in the words of a former top Israeli intelligence official. It is rooted in Netanyahu’s effort to stay in power by tying himself to the far right and blaming the military and intelligence apparatus for October 7, while denying his own responsibility. More than a year on, Netanyahu still refuses to establish an independent state commission of inquiry into the murderous Hamas rampage. But beyond the blame game, there is a fundamental gulf between, on the one hand, Jewish ideologues intent on formalizing Israeli control of the occupied territories and, on the other, veteran security commanders deeply involved in the day-to-day operations of maintaining Israel’s security and communicating with U.S. counterparts. The latter are part of a military establishment that has been traditionally identified with Israel’s secular, liberal democratic order, determined to at least keep up the appearance of abiding by the rule of law. The former have become increasingly hostile to the army—an extraordinary development in a country whose military has long been sacrosanct and is mired in its longest and most complex war since Israel’s founding, in 1948.

FLASH POINTS AND PROVOCATIONS

The clash concerns not just the far right’s ambitions in the West Bank but also Israel’s dilemma over what to do with Gaza. The security establishment, led by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, has backed a hostage deal and cease-fire for months, aligning itself with the Biden administration. Gallant and others openly criticize Netanyahu for failing to present an endgame for the Gaza war that would offer a realistic alternative to Hamas rule. Gallant described in August Netanyahu’s desire to achieve “total victory” as tantamount to “rhetorical nonsense.” Netanyahu bristled, accusing Gallant of adopting an “anti-Israel narrative.” Their dispute predates October 7: in March 2023, Gallant warned that the government’s bid to overhaul the judiciary, a controversial proposal that prompted combat reservists to threaten not to show up for military duty, was endangering national security. Netanyahu fired him but reversed his decision a few weeks later amid mass public protests. In their latest rift, Netanyahu canceled Gallant’s planned October trip to the United States to coordinate Israel’s retaliation against Iran, stipulating that a call between Biden and Netanyahu must come first.

Last month, the cabinet voted to keep the Israeli army deployed indefinitely in the Philadelphi corridor, a narrow strip along the border between Gaza and Egypt. Netanyahu had neglected to mention this condition in negotiations about a cease-fire deal in May, and both Hamas and Egypt oppose an Israeli military presence in the border zone. Many Israelis interpreted the cabinet vote as Netanyahu deciding to destroy the possibility of a deal, indicating his preference for continued war in Gaza as a way to maintain the support of the government’s far-right flank. The Israeli right wing bitterly opposes a cease-fire and even, in the view of some of its leaders, wants to return settlers to Gaza. By contrast, Gallant and the security establishment insist that Israel can withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor as part of a deal—and recapture it later if need be. Shortly after the September vote, Israelis learned of the apparent execution of six young hostages by Hamas as the IDF closed in. The killing outraged an Israeli protest movement desperate for a hostage deal, triggering a half-day labor strike and some of the largest demonstrations in Israeli history, with an estimated half million people in Tel Aviv alone demanding that Netanyahu reach a deal to release the remaining hostages. With the main fronts now shifting to Lebanon and Iran and another Israeli offensive now happening in northern Gaza, a hostage deal appears out of reach. An October report in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz outlined the frustration of senior defense officials, who have accused the government of effectively sacrificing the hostages in pursuit of the annexation of Gaza.

Another driver of the clash between the security establishment and the government, or at least its far-right elements, is the deteriorating status quo at the Holy Esplanade—the sacred complex in occupied East Jerusalem home to the al Aqsa mosque and the Temple Mount. It has been a major and repeated flash point in the past. Ben-Gvir, in his capacity as national security minister, has on several occasions undermined the fragile status quo at the site by encouraging Jews to pray there, which they are now doing in increasing numbers. The security establishment has condemned his actions as dangerous provocations that inflame not just Palestinians but also provoke Jordan and the wider Muslim world. The complex is set to become an even more incendiary flash point: a growing far-right messianic movement, once on the fringes, is making its way into the mainstream with the aim of establishing a Jewish monopoly over the entire compound, conducting animal sacrifices there, and rebuilding the temple.

The confrontation between the far right and the security establishment continues unabated despite a rapidly deteriorating situation in the West Bank and beyond. Since October 7, Israel has prevented 150,000 West Bank Palestinians from working in Israel. It has also withheld Palestinian funds from the PA—under the terms of the Oslo accords, the Israeli government collects taxes from Palestinian territories and transfers the revenue to the PA—as part of Smotrich’s attempt to weaken the Palestinian government and consolidate Israel’s control of the West Bank. The severe damage to the West Bank economy caused by those policies directly undermines what security officials see as their ability to maintain a modicum of order since Palestinian unemployment and immiseration only increase the likelihood of violence. In vain, the security establishment has implored the Netanyahu government to release tax revenues to the PA and resume issuing work permits for West Bank Palestinians employed inside Israel. When it comes to the West Bank, the government remains perilously in thrall to those far-right ministers who want nothing less than the territory’s annexation and are willingly provoking further strife and chaos.

PYRRHIC VICTORIES

The government is not listening to either the security establishment or to protesters in the streets, leaning instead on its strong base that supports its approach in the West Bank and the multifront war more broadly. The question is whether outside pressure can get Netanyahu to change course. Washington’s nearly unconditional support for Israel, even as settlements expand across the West Bank, has contributed to the impunity with which hard-line settlers can operate in the occupied territory and their growing influence within Israeli institutions and politics. The United States has started to sanction violent settlers and some groups that fund the settlement enterprise, although it has not yet singled out Ben-Gvir and Smotrich or the entities that are integral to the settlement project, including quasi-governmental groups and regional settler councils. Nor has Washington placed serious limits on the delivery to Israel of arms that might end up in settlers’ hands or used its supply of weapons to the Israeli war effort as leverage to press for a cease-fire in Gaza.

To be sure, it’s unclear whether stronger measures from Washington could reshape Israeli politics. Netanyahu would still likely rely on the far right to stay in power even if pressured by the United States, and Israeli society is largely aligned with his posture of rejection of any concession to Palestinians. But even a partial rift with the United States could affect the country’s ability to prosecute war. A tougher stand from the United States would also show more clearly which side U.S. officials are prepared to take in the struggle between two visions of Israel: the far right’s ideological drive to seize the West Bank and exterminate the possibility of Palestinian statehood—in the process making Israel less safe—or the security establishment’s more pragmatic approach.

At the moment, the escalation of the war in Lebanon, as well as Israel’s resolve to retaliate against Iranian strikes, is obscuring the divisions regarding the West Bank. But those differences form a critical fault line. If the far right wins out, as currently seems likely, Israel will continue to dispossess Palestinians from large swaths of the West Bank and build more settlements, pushing forward with the piecemeal annexation that Smotrich has spearheaded. Together with provocations on the Temple Mount, this trajectory almost guarantees a future of increased violence and instability for both Palestinians and Israelis. Triumph for the hard-liners could spell disaster for Israel, as a deepening culture of lawlessness and chaos only further weakens the beleaguered mechanisms of Israeli democracy.