Israel Needs a New Strategy

In February, Israeli military intelligence reportedly informed the country’s leaders that Hamas will survive as a terrorist group after the war. Despite this assessment, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to declare that there will be “total victory” over Hamas, and that it will take “months, not years” to achieve.

In part, this is because October 7 changed Israel, inflicting trauma and hardening Israelis’ belief that they cannot live with Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip. Israel’s air and ground campaign into Gaza seemed designed to root Hamas out—a daunting task given its extensive labyrinth of tunnels and its cynical use of the entire population of the strip as its shield. The price Palestinians have paid is a terrible one, as Israel strives to make certain that Hamas can never again threaten it from Gaza—which, as Netanyahu has said, still requires Israel to send troops into the southern city of Rafah, on the border with Egypt. U.S. President Joe Biden has insisted that this movement must not take place until after there is a credible evacuation plan for the 1.3 million Gazans who are now crammed into this area.

If Hamas is going to persist as a terrorist group in Gaza, as Israeli military intelligence forecasts, then Netanyahu must come to terms with the fact that no victory in the territory can be total. Similarly, while making sure that Hamas is not able to preserve its military presence in Rafah, Israel must also ensure that the border with Egypt is no longer a sieve through which huge amounts of material can be smuggled into Gaza. If nothing else, that imperative points to working out a joint regime or a coordinated approach with Egypt to stop the smuggling from the Sinai into Gaza. As such, Israel needs a strategy, not slogans, for ensuring that its military efforts (and achievements) in Gaza translate into a new political reality—a reality that means Israel will no longer be threatened from the strip.

WHILE THE BATTLE RAGES

The starting point for an effective strategy is framing the objective differently. It is time for Israeli leaders to recognize that they will never be able to eradicate or eliminate Hamas. As the United States discovered in its efforts to eradicate the Islamic State, or ISIS, one does not eliminate an ideology—however repugnant it may be. The United States defeated ISIS militarily, but it still keeps roughly 3,000 soldiers in Iraq and 900 in Syria to ensure that the group does not reconstitute itself.

Israel will not be able to retain a presence in Gaza if it wants the strip to be transformed. Nor does Israel want to be responsible for the 2.3 million Palestinians living in Gaza, let alone have to cope with an insurgency that would almost certainly result from any reoccupation of Gaza. Having said that, Israel should not leave Gaza before it knows that Hamas is not in a position to reconstitute itself, its military means, and its political control. That does not require the elimination of Hamas. It does, however, require that the organization’s military infrastructure, weapons depots, military industrial base, systems of command and control, and organizational coherence are largely destroyed. Furthermore, it requires the establishment of an alternative to Hamas that is able to preside over day-to-day administration and provide the law and order necessary for reconstruction. In other words, Israel’s objective—and the United States’—needs to be a permanently demilitarized Gaza, which can never again be used as a platform for attacks against Israel. That will have the virtue of sparing Israelis and Palestinians alike, as Israel will have no need either to quarantine Gaza or strike against it.

The good news is that the Israeli military is succeeding in demilitarizing Gaza and dismantling Hamas’s military capability. Israel’s forces have already destroyed 18 of the 24 Hamas battalions. Not all the battalions’ fighters have been killed or captured, but their units no longer exist and they are no longer part of an organized resistance. Of course, armed Hamas operatives can still pose a threat, meaning that some security presence will remain necessary for the time being, even in those areas where Hamas forces have been largely defeated.

A GRAND COALITION

It is these areas, starting in the northern part of Gaza, to which the evacuees from Rafah need to move. Many of these people were evacuated in the early days of the conflict, when Israel began its campaign in Gaza City, Beit Hanoun, and the Jabalia refugee camp. These evacuees would, no doubt, like to return to their homes. The problem is that 70 percent of all the buildings in the north have either been destroyed or made uninhabitable. That is why step one of the strategy must be the creation of a humanitarian mechanism, led by the United States, and in partnership with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. This must provide immediate assistance in terms of temporary and portable housing. The Saudis—given their experience in handling the very large numbers that come into the kingdom for the hajj and for whom shelter is often provided—can certainly be helpful in this effort. The Emiratis and Qataris, too, can finance caravans, trailers, and prefabricated housing.

True, the Gulf states have said they will not provide reconstruction assistance unless it is tied to a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But they are already providing humanitarian assistance, and nothing is more basic in meeting humanitarian needs than providing food and shelter. These countries can certainly justify their actions as necessary to relieve Palestinian suffering. The Gulf states, with Egypt, the European Union, Jordan, and the United States, should work with the bureaucratic structure in Gaza that was first established by the Palestinian Authority in 1994 and has continued to operate under Hamas. This structure’s role has been administrative, not political, managing daily needs. Palestinian businesspeople from within and outside Gaza should also be included in the territory’s administration, and the humanitarian mechanism should work with them to distribute assistance and stimulate the beginnings of commercial activity.

Security for the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid will be needed—as demonstrated by the recent crush to reach trucks carrying food in northern Gaza that left almost a hundred dead. Although the members of the humanitarian grouping are unlikely to put their forces on the ground, they can provide outside contractors with security experience, and local non-Hamas Palestinians can be hired. Contracting for security with local Palestinians may be possible because, as one senior UN official told me, those on the ground in Gaza want relief and many are angry with Hamas. When its fighters appear, people often throw stones at them. This security should be structured in accordance with best practices derived from existing models. The United Arab Emirates, for example, is providing security for the field hospital it has set up in Gaza and will apparently do the same for the five automated bakeries it is now sending to meet food needs. These zones could even be expanded. Through these efforts, the areas in the north to which evacuees will return can become successful pilot projects, demonstrating that life and recovery is possible as long as Hamas is not in control.

Parallel to the establishment of the humanitarian mechanism, the Biden administration should immediately broker understandings between Egypt and Israel to prevent the smuggling of covert supplies to Hamas. Even if Israel acts to take out the four Hamas battalions in this area, a new approach to Rafah will be essential to prevent the remilitarization of Gaza. Simultaneously, in the West Bank, Washington must act to encourage the reform of the Palestinian Authority. As long as 91 percent of Palestinians believe that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas should resign and 80 percent are convinced that the PA is corrupt, it is pointless to talk about a political horizon or an endgame. The PA must be overhauled. It was done in 2007, when the Bush administration mobilized all of the PA’s donors to collectively insist that Abbas appoint an empowered prime minister. Abbas conceded and appointed Salam Fayyad, who cleaned up the PA. This must be done again without delay—especially if other critical aims are to be achieved. For example, Gaza’s reconstruction and Saudi normalization with Israel will not be achievable without a political reunification of Gaza and the West Bank. Of course, these two goals also depend on ending the war in Gaza. Washington is hoping that a hostage deal can produce an extended pause that leads either to a permanent cease-fire or a fundamental change in the character of the war.

REBUILD AND DISARM

The Israeli military speaks of four phases in its Gaza campaign. The first three are the initial air campaign, the high-intensity ground intervention, which involved over five divisions in Gaza, and the more limited and targeted ground involvement, in which the presence today has shrunk to five brigades. The final phase will see withdrawal from Gaza with a narrow buffer established around the kibbutzim, and Israel reserving the right to go in and out as necessary either to target Hamas leaders who remain in the tunnels or to prevent pockets of Hamas from reemerging and becoming a threat. In theory, phase four could be characterized as the end of the military campaign. If nothing else, it is likely to mark the return of politics in Israel, with Israeli Ministers Without Portfolio Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot probably leaving the war cabinet, and leading security officials resigning to assume responsibility for the failure of October 7. These changes could set in motion events that lead to an election and the formation of a different government. Their timing very much depends on when phase four begins, which could be as the result of either a hostage deal or Israel’s destruction of the remaining six Hamas battalions. At that point, reconstruction, with the necessary monitoring mechanisms to ensure no diversion, must begin.

Necessarily, the reconstruction of Gaza will require the involvement of numerous international and regional actors. This will present challenges to Israel, as these agencies, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations may be unwilling to stay and manage reconstruction if Israeli forces continue to operate in Gaza. Ensuring Gaza’s permanent demilitarization should be Israel’s foremost objective, and at some point Israeli officials will want this done by others. As they will perceive it, demilitarization has been accomplished, and they do not want to stay in Gaza to ensure that there is no remilitarization. But this will require Israel nonetheless cooperating with a robust international approach to reconstruction and monitoring what comes into Gaza.

The basic formula must be massive reconstruction for demilitarization. At a minimum, that will require an international coalition of countries to bring in large amounts of material. Biden’s recent decision to create a pier to provide means for delivering material assistance will certainly set the stage for providing reconstruction materials later on. Supplies for reconstruction must be managed and monitored from the time of entry into Gaza to their storage and eventual use. The violation and diversion of supplies by Hamas or those with guns should bring an immediate halt to reconstruction and the entry of new material. Countries including Canada, which is experienced in postconflict situations, could assume a leading role in developing the needed onsite and online monitoring systems. These should be used to ensure that Hamas does not try to reassert itself. No donor will invest in Gaza if Hamas is in control or siphoning away supplies. Everyone knows that Hamas will seek to divert the assistance and to reconstitute itself and its military machine—so, publicly, a condition for reconstruction must be a genuinely different administration in Gaza.

The reconstruction of Gaza will require the involvement of numerous international and regional actors.

Finally, there is the issue of Saudi normalization with Israel. Before October 7, Riyadh had an interest in showing that it had delivered at least something symbolic for the Palestinians. Today, the Saudis understand they need something more. October 7 had two very different sets of consequences. For the Saudis and the Arabs more generally, the death and destruction in Gaza has awakened their publics to the need to address the Palestinian issue—and governments understand that they cannot ignore it. With that in mind, they want a clear endgame that is different from the previous processes, including the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, which failed to deliver a lasting solution. Hence these governments’ talk of an assured path to Palestinian statehood.

In Israel, there is the opposite view. Because of October 7, Israelis across the political spectrum are convinced that a Palestinian state will end up being dominated or led by Hamas or Hamas-like groups. Currently, they do not see a distinction between Hamas and Palestinians—especially given polling that shows Palestinian support for what Hamas did on October 7 and statements denying the atrocities. Add to that Iran’s determination to use its proxies to continue to confront Israel, and Israelis see a Palestinian state as a profound threat. Moreover, there is deep opposition to the idea that the result of October 7 should be a reward for Palestinians or Hamas in the form of assured statehood.

A TIME TO COMPROMISE

Israeli fears are understandable and need to be recognized. That said, it is incorrect to argue that a Palestinian state as part of a two-state outcome would be a reward for Hamas. The real reward for Hamas would be the death of a two-state outcome. This is because its leaders countenance only one state, as they reject Israel’s right to exist. Ironically, ongoing Israeli opposition to a Palestinian state will ensure a one-state outcome.

Still, Israelis need to see that a Palestinian state is not going to be a threat, even if the reality of statehood is a long way off. That is because much would have to be done before there could be a Palestinian state. Institutions would have to be built to ensure that it does not become a failed state. Today or any time soon, a Palestinian state would almost certainly be a failed state. More than that, there are a number of conditions that must be met before a Palestinian state can come into being. First, it cannot be led or dominated by Hamas or Hamas-like groups, nor can it be allowed to form alliances with states hostile to Israel. Second, it must accept two states for two peoples. Palestinian leaders have never acknowledged that the Jews are a people entitled to self-determination, meaning that they have never accepted the legitimacy of Israel; they have simply acknowledged Israel’s existence as a fact. That makes incitement against it easier to justify, and it is time for Palestinian leaders to end incitement and the socialization of hostility. Finally, theirs should be a nonmilitarized state. It can have police and security forces but no army.

For Israelis to accept the prospect of a Palestinian state, they must be reassured. The process of doing so can begin with steps on the ground designed to build a new, demilitarized Gaza, with Arab countries playing an active role in that effort, helping foster and sustain an alternative to Hamas control. At some point, these countries must be prepared to condemn what Hamas did on October 7. Today, no Arab leader wants to look as though he is defending Israeli actions in Gaza, but there must come a time when it will be possible to condemn Hamas. The inability to do so sends a message to Israelis that, ultimately, Arabs are not prepared to delegitimize Hamas or groups like it.

Saudi normalization with Israel will be an essential element of reassurance. Indeed, normalization offers more than just reassurance because it promises to transform the region and provide the basis for a coalition to counter the Iranians and their proxies. This, Israelis understand, can enhance their security, particularly because it could mean that there is a collective approach to countering Iran—and one that does not leave Israel isolated in dealing with Iranian proxies.

To be sure, Israel, too, must have obligations. The war in Gaza has produced profound trauma for Palestinians, and they need to see that Israel recognizes, in principle, their right to statehood. Beyond this, Israel must not act in ways that make a Palestinian state impossible. That means that Israel must stop settlement expansion, especially outside of the blocs. There also needs to be much greater territorial contiguity for Palestinians in the West Bank, and Israel must support reforming the Palestinian Authority, to help build the authority of a new empowered prime minister. Similarly, lifting constraints on Palestinian movement, trade, and investment in infrastructure, particularly in roads and water, could also help to show that the reformed PA is working. The same would be true of allowing much greater Palestinian economic activity in those parts of the West Bank where the Israelis retain total civil and security responsibility. And with Palestinians fearful that they are unprotected from extremist settlers, Israeli leaders must no longer tolerate lawlessness by the “hilltop youth” and others. Those who attack or threaten Palestinians should be prosecuted, and those responsible for incitement condemned.

FIRST FOR UKRAINE, NOW FOR GAZA

Out of the trauma of October 7 and its aftermath can come an opportunity to transform the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the region for the better. But it will not happen on its own. The Biden administration has often talked about how it is committed to waging “relentless” diplomacy. It certainly demonstrated that before and after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Swiftly, Washington mobilized and organized sanctions, acted to minimize the consequences of limiting Russian oil and gas sales, created a logistics hub for getting military assistance to Ukraine, coordinated and dispatched massive economic assistance to Kyiv, enhanced NATO’s deterrence with forward deployments, worked to absorb both Sweden and Finland into the alliance, and ramped up defense industries.

Washington had allies who were prepared to do their part, but it took the United States to lead and organize them. A similar effort is now needed in the Middle East. The scale of the challenge is daunting, for the Biden administration must broker Egyptian-Israeli understandings on Rafah, organize the humanitarian mechanism with Gulf states, and coordinate with the Israelis to permit evacuees to return to the north. At the same time, Washington must make sure that all necessary assistance, especially shelter and food, is being provided and can get into the area, while working with those who can organize security. In addition, the United States must reach an understanding with Israel on what constitutes sufficient demilitarization of Hamas and Gaza for the military campaign to end or for phase four to begin. All this must be done, and Washington must continue to do all it can to get Israeli hostages released, and to create a plan for reconstructing Gaza with sufficient monitoring and enforcement to ensure that there is no diversion of material. This will also require the mobilization of the Arabs and Europeans to join in insisting on reform of the PA and the institution of an empowered prime minister—even as the administration works to reach the normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and conveys to Hezbollah and Iran the cost of escalation. Both need to understand the reality that Israel after October 7 is not the same as it was before. Its tolerance level for threats is low—and so is that of the United States.

This is an imposing list of tasks that requires intensive and carefully coordinated efforts, which will need a whole U.S. government effort. Just as it organized itself to support Ukraine before and after the Russian invasion, so, too, must Washington do now to support Gaza and the Middle East. The catastrophe of October 7 and its aftermath calls for nothing less.