How Israel Could Lose America

Israelis are still reeling from the devastating effects of the most colossal intelligence and operational failure in their country’s 75-year history. Israel’s long-held assumption that “smart fences” and the generous flow of foreign money would keep Hamas contained has unraveled. The October 7 raid on southern Israel left staggering numbers of victims—almost 1,200 dead, thousands wounded, more than 240 abducted and taken to the Gaza Strip as hostages, and hundreds of thousands displaced. Israel’s national trauma will endure for the foreseeable future.

In the immediate aftermath of the assault, the Israeli government declared an emergency mobilization of the Israel Defense Forces, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu committing to “finish” a war that Israelis “didn’t want.” Now approaching its three-month mark, Operation Swords of Iron—as the Israeli military action in Gaza was initially dubbed—continues unabated, after a brief hiatus in late November during which 105 civilians were freed from Hamas captivity. Netanyahu has announced that the campaign’s aims are to eliminate Hamas, recover all the kidnapped Israeli citizens, and ensure that no element in Gaza can threaten Israel again. But the timetable for the completion of the ambitious IDF offensive remains nebulous, as do the contours of a feasible endgame for Gaza.

What is abundantly clear, however, is that Israel’s latitude to pursue its stated war objectives would be vastly constrained were it not for the emphatic support of the United States. As the fighting persists and gaps emerge between the U.S. and the Israeli positions, Israel has strong reasons to invest in keeping its primary alliance intact. To ensure that its bond with the United States survives this war, Israel must not only manage the current military campaign judiciously but also tackle domestic political problems and determine once and for all how it plans to settle its conflict with the Palestinians.

SWITCHING GEARS

The present chapter in the decades-long relationship between Netanyahu, who returned for his latest stint as Israel’s prime minister last December, and U.S. President Joe Biden got off to a rocky start. Biden—who has often recalled signing a photo for Netanyahu with the words “I don’t agree with a damn thing you say but I love you”—waited four conspicuous weeks after his inauguration before calling the Israeli leader. Many viewed the delay as payback for Netanyahu’s procrastination in congratulating Biden for defeating President Donald Trump in 2020. (When Netanyahu finally called Biden, Trump blasted the prime minister for exhibiting a lack of loyalty.)

The Biden administration made no secret of its dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s choice of coalition partners from Israel’s extreme right—most notably, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich—promising to hold the prime minister personally accountable for the actions of his government. It was not long before Washington acted on that pledge. In January 2023, when Ben-Gvir ascended the Temple Mount, a sensitive religious site that houses the al Aqsa mosque, during his first days in office, U.S. officials sharply condemned the move and eschewed direct engagement with Ben-Gvir. Tensions escalated later that same week, after Justice Minister Yariv Levin unveiled controversial plans for a drastic overhaul of Israel’s judicial system.

Fallout from the apparent disconnect between the U.S. and Israeli governments was particularly embarrassing to Netanyahu, a politician who prides himself on a superior understanding of American politics. The premier was left waiting by his mailbox for a coveted invitation to the White House; he is the first Israeli prime minister in more than 50 years to have been denied an Oval Office meeting during the first year of his term. Smotrich, for his part, was treated as persona non grata when he visited Washington in March. He and Ben-Gvir have been shunned by bipartisan congressional delegations to Israel and, together with other members of their factions, excluded from the guest list for the annual Fourth of July reception hosted by the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem.

Clashes between the Netanyahu government and the Biden administration over the intended transformation of Israel’s judiciary also spilled regularly into public view. In January 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken—on his first trip to Israel since the country’s November 2022 election—added quality time with civil society representatives to his itinerary, giving a morale boost to critics of Netanyahu’s agenda and delivering a not-so-subtle hint of U.S. concern about the fate of Israeli democracy.

Israel’s latitude would be constrained were it not for emphatic U.S. support.

The White House expressed similar misgivings. Speaking in June at a celebration of Israel’s 75 years of independence, Vice President Kamala Harris pointedly highlighted “strong institutions, checks and balances, and . . . an independent judiciary” as pillars of democracy in both the United States and Israel. Eli Cohen, Israel’s foreign minister, retorted hours later that Harris probably had not even read the proposed law and that she would not be able to identify a single component of the reform that “bothers her.”

The brutal events of October 7 reset this caustic cycle. Animosities between Biden and Netanyahu did not disappear, but sympathy for Israel’s predicament overrode lingering disagreements. Biden, arriving in Israel on October 18 as the first-ever U.S. president to visit the country amid a war, promised the people of Israel that the United States would “stand with” them. “We’ll walk beside you in those dark days, and we’ll walk beside you in the good days to come,” Biden vowed.

On the whole, U.S. officials have maintained their backing of IDF operations in Gaza, deferring often to Israeli prerogatives. Blinken, asked on December 10 when he expected the IDF to conclude its military campaign, responded bluntly, “These are decisions for Israel to make.” On December 8, casting a veto of a UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, the U.S. deputy ambassador reasoned that such a halt would “only plant the seeds for the next war, because Hamas has no desire to see a durable peace.” Washington has issued periodic admonitions, such as Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s assertion on December 2 that “protecting Palestinian civilians in Gaza is both a moral duty and a strategic imperative.” But such comments have not diluted the overall impact of a U.S. policy that—as Austin also confirmed—upholds “Israel’s bedrock right to defend itself.”

Biden has preferred to embrace Israel in public and convey U.S. reservations in private conversations with Israeli leaders, evidently reckoning that this strategy grants him more influence over Israel’s calculus than a confrontational approach would. The president’s personal appeals have yielded some results by, for example, helping persuade Israel to abort plans for a preemptive strike against Hezbollah in Lebanon in the days after Hamas’s initial attack. Skeptics of Biden’s methods point to the scale of the destruction the IDF has inflicted in Gaza, despite the efforts of U.S. backroom diplomacy—but the United States is also acting on its vested interest in Israel’s success at routing Hamas, which Washington has designated as a terrorist organization. Either way, Israel has benefited significantly from its ally’s friendship.

FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

The United States’ attachment to Israel has evolved gradually since President Harry Truman’s recognition of the Jewish state on May 14, 1948. It was not until the 1960s, under President John F. Kennedy, that Washington began to provide military hardware to Israel. Shipments of Hawk antimissile batteries were soon followed, under Kennedy’s successor, President Lyndon Johnson, by M-48 Patton battle tanks, A-4 Skyhawk light attack aircraft, and F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers. The first explicit U.S. pledge to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge—an assurance of Israel’s military superiority over its rivals—came in a 1982 letter from President Ronald Reagan to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

U.S.-Israeli cooperation has been turbulent at times, but it has maintained a steady upward trajectory. U.S. security, diplomatic, and economic assistance has bolstered Israel’s position in a volatile region. Having a “big brother” over its shoulder has enabled Israel to punch above its demographic weight and geographic size, projecting strength well beyond its borders. And the United States’ commitment to Israel has endured through both Democratic and Republican presidents, including the most recent holders of that office.

As president, Trump formally acknowledged Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Golan Heights as sovereign Israeli territory. His actions affirmed a broad consensus among Israelis and sent a formidable message to neighboring countries about U.S. support for Israel. Trump’s “Vision for Peace, Prosperity, and a Brighter Future for Israel and the Palestinian People”—a plan that most Israelis expected to fail—never led to U.S. acceptance of the Netanyahu government’s aspiration to extend Israeli sovereignty throughout the West Bank, but it became the catalyst for the Abraham Accords, which brought Israel’s surreptitious ties with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain into the open. Yousef al-Otaiba, the UAE’s ambassador to the United States and an engineer of the deal, explained the logic in 2021: “The reason it happened, the way it happened, at the time it happened was to prevent annexation.”

This is not to say U.S.-Israeli relations were without problems. In 2017, Trump divulged Israeli intelligence to Russia, possibly revealing sensitive collection methods. He repeatedly accused American Jews who vote for Democratic candidates of being “disloyal to Jewish people and very disloyal to Israel,” not only entrenching Israel as a wedge issue and jeopardizing bipartisan sponsorship of close U.S.-Israeli ties but also stoking anti-Semitism. And his unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal without an alternative plan to stymie Iran’s race to acquire nuclear weapons only accelerated Tehran’s progress. Netanyahu encouraged Trump’s decision at the time, but that move has, arguably, made Israel less secure today.

Despite early frictions, the Biden administration’s support for Israel since October 7—expressed in words and deeds—has been uncontestable. U.S. civilian and military officials have been constant fixtures in Israel, often participating in consultations with Israel’s war cabinet. The United States has sent Israel multiple airlifts of bombs and other munitions to replace its depleted inventories. Washington has also intervened to block UN Security Council resolutions that would sanction Israel or insist that the IDF end its mission in Gaza, called attention to the plight of the hostages being held by Hamas, and worked to secure their freedom. It has demanded that other countries condemn the acts of sexual violence that Hamas’s fighters committed against Israeli girls and women.

Speaking at the White House on October 10, Biden warned Israel’s enemies not to join forces with Hamas. “To any country, any organization, anyone thinking of taking advantage of this situation,” he said, “I have one word: Don’t.” Among the chorus of world leaders who have urged similar caution, Biden was the only one who deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups and other military assets to reinforce the warning. The president’s steadfast support has been all the more remarkable as the United States enters an election year, given the vocal criticism of Biden’s Israel policy in some quarters of his own party.

Biden has preferred to embrace Israel in public and convey U.S. reservations in private.

On the other hand, differences have begun to emerge between U.S. perspectives and Israel’s operational priorities. As the fighting in Gaza continues, the United States has lobbied on behalf of “tactical humanitarian pauses,” which—as happened during the truce from November 24 to December 1—would give Hamas time to reestablish internal lines of communication and reposition its forces for additional attacks on IDF troops and missile launches on Israeli cities. (Israel’s government has been amenable to these pauses, another of which is now under negotiation, only for the sake of facilitating hostage releases.) Hamas has also exploited U.S. appeals for Israel to allow more food, fuel, and other aid into Gaza. Although civilian needs are pressing, the terrorist group has been caught commandeering this aid to sustain its hold on power. Biden’s objections to “indiscriminate bombing” by the Israeli Air Force and to the high numbers of civilian casualties in Gaza have compelled Israel to recalibrate the IDF offensive, which some Israeli leaders allege has prolonged its duration and exposed Israeli soldiers to heightened danger.

Overall, however, Israel has gained much from its partnership with the United States. The Abraham Accords advanced the formal integration of Israel into the Middle East, altering the regional map in ways that enhance Israel’s security. Although combat in Gaza has slowed the pace of normalization, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE have all indicated that they do not intend to abandon their connections with Israel. And Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, in a meeting with U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on December 13, expressed interest in the idea of eventually joining their ranks.

The United States’ material and political cover has also been essential to Israel’s ability to restore its lost deterrence after the disaster of October 7. “You may be strong enough on your own to defend yourself—but as long as America exists, you will never, ever have to,” Blinken said in a message to the Israeli people on October 12. The secretary’s precise balance between validating Israel’s independent capabilities and reaffirming the United States’ commitment to its welfare illustrates why Israel cannot afford to lose its best friend.

NO GUARANTEES

Israelis have always attributed staunch U.S. support for their country to a set of shared values—including freedom, pluralism, and democracy—and interests, such as the promotion of peace and stability. That ground is shifting now, especially as younger Americans express dramatically less affinity for Israel than older generations. Joe Biden, who has asserted often that “you don’t have to be a Jew to be a Zionist,” may well be the last Democratic president with impeccable pro-Israeli credentials.

This trend should, and does, worry Israel. The stark reality is that the country has no viable alternative to the succor of the United States. Hedging its bets, as other Middle Eastern countries have done, by building relationships with China and Russia—permanent members of the UN Security Council that have both taken the side of Hamas—is not an option for Israel. And lately, even Biden himself has begun to qualify his statements about the war in Gaza. In a speech on December 12, he affirmed that “Israel’s security can rest on the United States,” but he added that Israel is “starting to lose” its support in other parts of the world. Harris, meanwhile, has advocated a “tougher” line in Washington’s dealings with Netanyahu.

Rather than trying to close this distance from the United States, Netanyahu might actually be seeking to spark a row with Washington in order to improve his own job prospects as his approval ratings plummet. “A prime minister who cannot withstand American pressure should not enter the prime minister’s office,” Netanyahu announced to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on December 11. But engaging in public brawls with the United States is the last thing Israel needs right now. To avoid a future in which Israel is forced to resist existential perils without recourse to U.S. military arsenals or UN Security Council vetoes, Israeli policymakers must change tack.

Israel has no viable alternative to the succor of the United States.

First, they must take care in prosecuting the Gaza campaign. The inclusion of opposition party members in the war cabinet was a responsible step in that direction. As the war proceeds, the IDF should pursue its aims—which Israelis overwhelmingly endorse—as quickly as possible while minimizing collateral damage and the injury of innocents. To that end, the IDF chain of command should be meticulous in identifying legitimate operational targets, authorizing attacks only when those standards are met. It should also continue to implement ethical protocols for combat. Demonstrating professionalism and integrity will help Israel avoid a repeat of the 2006 war in Lebanon, when the absence of an unambiguous Israeli victory prompted U.S. President George W. Bush to conclude that Israel “mishandled [its] opportunity” to land a decisive blow against Hezbollah and its masters in Iran and Syria.

Israel desperately needs to prioritize national security over politics. A supplementary 2023 budget passed on December 14, which was meant to cover the unanticipated expense of the war in Gaza, diverted precious funds to unrelated bureaucracies—including the Ministry of Jerusalem and Heritage and the Ministry of Settlement and National Missions—to satisfy key constituencies of the Netanyahu coalition instead. There is widespread concern that the 2024 budget will follow the same pattern of allocating resources for political patronage to religious parties at the same time that the United States is being called on to help offset the costs of the war.

Netanyahu also canceled cabinet votes to approve the transfer of tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority and to allow Palestinian laborers from the West Bank to return to work in Israel—the IDF; the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency; and the National Security Council all favor the employment measure, under certain stipulations—in order to avoid tangling with hard-line ministers whose incendiary statements and actions he generally tolerates. The prime minister’s own use of inflammatory rhetoric to shore up his lagging poll numbers, moreover, is sowing divisiveness while Israelis mourn their dead. Repairing Israel’s broken social contract, which had previously enabled its diverse society to coalesce around shared Jewish and democratic principles, and holding new parliamentary elections as soon as the security situation permits are two obvious ways to restore confidence in the country’s elected leadership among both Israeli citizens and Israel’s external backers.

Israel desperately needs to prioritize national security over politics.

Finally, and most urgently, Israel needs to formulate a clear position on the Palestinian issue. When the state of Israel was created 75 years ago, it had to fight off threats to its survival; today, Israel’s stewards must articulate a coherent vision of its ultimate destination. Otherwise, they will struggle to convince the United States and other countries to remain by Israel’s side. Netanyahu must lift his embargo on genuine discussion—within his government and with the Biden administration—of what will come after the Gaza conflict, and define not only what Israel will not countenance but also what outcomes it will accept. The prime minister has rebuffed attempts to have this conversation for fear of destabilizing his ruling coalition. Biden has expressed his frustration with this situation, commenting on December 12 that Netanyahu “has to change,” but the “government in Israel is making it very difficult.”

Whether Israel wants one state, two states, or something else, its leaders and citizens need to decide on a course soon. They should recognize also that, no matter what their decision—and it is their decision alone to make—it will have consequences not only for Israel itself but also for its essential relationship with the United States. If the United States were to become sufficiently disenchanted with Israeli policies that Washington imposed conditions on the provision of U.S. military assistance, Israel could find its operating environment drastically restricted. The Biden administration’s recent delay of the export of more than 20,000 M-16 rifles intended for Israeli civil defense teams because of U.S. concerns about settler violence in the West Bank could be a harbinger of further impediments.          

With Hamas vowing to replicate the savagery of October 7 until Israel is “annihilated,” Hezbollah escalating its attacks across Israel’s border with Lebanon, Yemen’s Houthis disrupting Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabia still dangling the prospect of normalization, Israel’s next moves could be the difference between deepening violence and progress toward peace.