Getting Russia Right

Graham, who spent over 30 years studying Russia and working on Russian affairs in the U.S. government, offers a forthright analysis of Washington’s Russia policy. The United States, he claims, bears significant responsibility for U.S.-Russian relations now “scraping the depths of Cold War hostility.” Deluded by post-Soviet Russia’s weakness, the United States grew oblivious to Russia’s sense of its immutable historical self: its deeply ingrained self-perception as a great power and its perennial security concerns over its long and mostly indefensible borders. Washington would not recognize Moscow’s national interests unless they were compatible with U.S. goals. Graham condemns American hubris as post–Cold War administrations aspired to transform Russia into a free-market democracy. The U.S. commitment to integrating Russia into the liberal Western world sounded insincere at best as it went hand-in-hand with fierce hedging against Russia’s great-power aspirations. Yet Russia’s autocratic regime does not need to be the United States’ implacable foe. To bring about more constructive relations, Graham urges, Washington must reassess the goals and limits of its power and frame its rivalry with Moscow in terms of geopolitical competition rather than as an existential contest between good and evil.