How Does the War in Ukraine End?

Almost since the moment Russia launched its war in Ukraine in February 2022, the world has wondered: How does this end? For the first few weeks, it appeared that Russia might succeed with its initial war aims and take Kyiv and install a government friendly to Moscow. Such a scenario is now off the table, thanks to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s faulty assumptions, the courage of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian people, and the Russian military’s unimpressive performance on the battlefield. But as Ukraine continues its counteroffensive, it remains unclear how the fighting will stop and when each country’s leader will be willing to negotiate. 

Please join Foreign Affairs Editor Daniel Kurtz-Phelan and authors Samuel Charap, Fiona Hill, and Andriy Zagorodnyuk as they mark the launch of the July/August issue with a discussion of possible endgames in Ukraine. 

Moderated by Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, Editor, Foreign Affairs

Transcript:

How Does the War in Ukraine End?
Monday, July 17, 2023
10:00 a.m.–11:00 a.m. ET

KURTZ-PHELAN: Great. Thank you, Sam, and good morning, all. And thanks for joining us for today’s discussion of the war in Ukraine and especially the question of possible endgames.

We are holding this as Ukraine’s long-anticipated counteroffensive starts to unfold. It’s been—we’re a few weeks in. It comes in the wake of last week’s NATO summit in Vilnius, which on the one hand left Ukrainian officials frustrated with the lack of any clarity on membership but did, I think, reinforce the NATO commitment to Ukraine over the long haul. And then also a few weeks away from the strange rebellion of Prigozhin in Russia and I think our attempts to make sense of where that leaves Putin and what decision-making might look like from the Kremlin’s perspective.

And also, of course, to mark the release of the new issue of Foreign Affairs, the July/August issue. The cover of that issue asks: “Tell Me How This Ends. Is There a Path to Victory in Ukraine?” And that is the big question we will try to get at in our conversation today.

We are lucky to have a fantastic slate of guests. Each of them has contributed really a slew of important pieces to the magazine over the last—the last couple of years. I will quickly introduce them, and then we will jump into conversation among the four of us before going to questions from all of you a little bit—about halfway through the conversation.

First we have Samuel Charap, who is the author of a trenchant essay in the new issue which is called “An Unwinnable War: Washington Needs an Endgame in Ukraine.” Sam is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and previously served on the State Department Policy Planning Staff during the Obama administration.

Next, we have Fiona Hill. Fiona served as senior director for Russia and Europe on the National Security Council from 2017 to 2019. She’s now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and has written three or four really powerful essays on Putin and Russia for Foreign Affairs over the last couple of years, the most recent of those from a few months ago. It’s called “The Kremlin’s Grand Delusions.” But it’s also well worth revisiting the piece she did before the war called “The Kremlin’s Strange Victory,” which is especially resonant at a moment when U.S. policy toward Ukraine and toward Russia is once again intersecting with a presidential election in which Donald Trump features quite prominently.

And last but not least we have Andriy Zagorodnyuk, who served as Ukraine’s minister of defense under President Zelensky in 2019 and 2020. He is now the chair of the Center for Defense Strategies. He’s done a few really notable pieces for FA over the last year. The most recent one made the case for Ukraine’s NATO membership. But I would also point you in the context of this conversation to a piece he did last year on Ukraine’s path to victory, kind of playing out an expansive definition of victory as seen from Kyiv. And Andriy is joining us from his car, as you can see, somewhere in central Ukraine. He has been traveling around seeing various parts of the battlefield, parts of the front, so he is especially well-positioned to bring us some of the ground truth as we try to make sense of where things are.

So, Andriy, let me—let me start with you. There has been so much argument over strategy in the last six months that has centered on the prospects of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, which is now unfolding. I think a lot of the kind of early analyses of the counteroffensive are kind of motivated by different senses of where the war might end. You’ve seen this on the ground more directly than certainly anyone in this conversation. What should we make of the counteroffensive so far? How’s it going? And what are the prospects, as you—as you look at it?

ZAGORODNYUK: Thank you. And hello, everyone, and thank you for inviting here.
First of all, I have to say that, you know, speaking to people who participate in that and then creating this understanding where things are—and then, obviously, looking at the whole information space, you know, around the world—it creates an opinion that we’re almost talking about two different realities and two different events. Because, indeed, there’s been very hard work, extremely tough, extremely dangerous, very—we have lots of losses. We have lots of losses in equipment, lots of losses among people. And it’s—but there is absolutely determination to make this as a success.

And then the main objective right now, the main sort of focus, is on ability of Russians to defend their positions, so—which means that there’s a substantial focus on destroying their logistical facilities—warehouses, particularly the ammunition depots, command posts—just to make sure that whoever is left of the people is—basically, they’re deprived from their basic command-and-control structure, logistical support, and so on and so on. That is number-one priority comparing to just sort of percentage of territory gained. And this is important to distinguish because sometimes I talk to journalists when I go back to Kyiv and the whole question which is asked is like: OK, well, how many villages are retaken? How many square kilometers of land is retaken? That’s not the performance indicator which people are looking at, at least at this point of time.

So the next—the next point is that, of course, attacking Russian positions with the—you know, with the—which are quite heavily fortified, particularly in some areas, and the quantity of landmines is just staggering. We have sometimes landmines in a distance of, like, half-meter for each—for one from another. It’s very difficult sometimes to locate them and it’s tough to plan any operations understanding that they’re pretty much in some—in some of the areas. Plus, generally, there are several layers of the—of the fortification lines. The question is not, like, whether it’s possible or not. The question is, like, we just need to make sure that it’s done in a very proper way, in a—in a very careful way, and the last thing—the last thing we need to do is to rush.

And of course, as soon as—it’s tough to me to say because I’m, obviously, understanding this from the discussion of the operational experts which are on the ground, but basically the idea is that they’re looking for windows of opportunity and they’re looking for some specific areas. They’re working in these areas. It’s not happening fast, but they’re absolutely confident that there will be another phase, another stage where they already pass through some—through some defense lines. And then, obviously, situation will be completely different.

What is—what the people who I’m in touch with they see as the success factor is more the—as I said from the beginning is the destruction of the (Russian ?) capabilities in the—in the near area; so, basically, operational depths of, I don’t know, twenty, thirty, fifty, sometimes a hundred kilometers. So as much as they’re weakened from their side, I mean, deprives them of ability to keep defending later. And that’s basically what is the main focus and the—and the main priority is.

And then, of course, there’s—the whole, like, a—like a massive wave of information attention to this. And sometimes the—sometimes the—you know, it’s perceived in a wholly different way. And it’s tough to say what one should do about that, except that all I can say at this stage is that I’m quite—let’s put it this way: I’m absolutely certain that the commanders which are currently on the ground, they know what to do. Of course, the different brigades have different experience. Different battalions have different training. And so, indeed, sometimes the performance very much different between the well-trained and experienced and not trained and less experienced. But I’m positive that we will see the development further and it’s going to be a success.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Fiona, let me turn to you to do what you can to make sense of how things look from Moscow. We all watched the Prigozhin affair a few weeks ago with, I think, fascination. That led to some analysis that Putin is much weaker than we thought. As we’ve watched things unfold in the last few weeks, it’s a little bit hard to say whether that’s true or not. What do you make of the state of Putin’s power, whether there are real threats to his grip, whether that does indicate anything about the state of his regime? And then, second, how do you think he sees the path forward in the war? What is his theory of what he’s trying to do in the months ahead?

HILL: Thanks very much, Daniel. It’s really great to be with everyone. And, obviously, I hope people have been paying, you know, very close attention to what Andriy has been saying here because there’s a couple of points that relate to what you’ve just asked me to focus on, Daniel, as well. Because I’m actually sitting in Berlin at the moment. I’ve been here for five months. And actually, it feels like I’m in Moscow a lot of the time because there are so many Russians here, many people—many who people on this call know. So many people have transplanted here. Obviously, they’re debating all the time all of these same questions. There are also, of course, an enormous number of refugees from Ukraine and also from Belarus. So I mean, this is, you know, kind of a bit, in a way, of transplanting of a lot of the areas of discussion and another reality here, you know, on top of the German and the European and other perspectives. So you get to pick up on quite a lot of information from the Berlin vantage point.

And one thing, you know, first of all, to pivot from in terms of talking about Putin’s own grip on the regime and then where he thinks things play from here is this point that Andriy has mentioned about how we tend to fixate on percentages of territory, and that’s really the wrong way to look at things. And the very fact that Andriy and all of his colleagues are finding that the defensive lines in Russia are so heavily mined really underscores the situation here. Russia does not really control in kind of those physical military terms all of the portions of Ukrainian territory that we always have, you know, highlighted in the media as being under Russian occupation. There’s just simply not enough people for that, which is hence why they’re overcompensating in the amount of landmines to try to keep Ukraine at bay.

There’s also the question of the populations there. I mean, we’ve seen, you know, so much of this dislocation. We have to remember it’s not about percentages of territory and villages; this is about people who are under occupation and are being, you know, tortured and, you know, all the kinds of attacks on ordinary Ukrainians. Because really, you know, the Russians and Putin are very worried about their grip on the territory that they have taken. It’s not just a question of Crimea. We’re, of course, talking today against the backdrop of yet another incident on the Kerch Strait Bridge. But it’s also kind of a question of how much does Russia really have a grip on Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, the Donbas region, you know, despite having declared that Russia is here to stay and these are now parts of Russian territory. And all these things are tied together, because if Putin can’t show that he is in control that really does undermine his position at home. And what the Wagner incident shows us here is that now the war in Ukraine, Russia—Putin’s war in Ukraine, that is; I mean, it’s not something that Ukrainians have started off themselves—and how things are progressing there is very much tied together to the perception of the grip of the regime.

Now, it’s very interesting, stepping back a little bit and looking at polling and talking to various people here in Berlin from Russia, that although everybody is saying this was a terrible mistake, there really is a kind of a feeling of great angst and concern about Russia losing. And actually, if you kind of pick beyond some of the most obvious dissidents and people who are in opposition here, a lot of Russian diaspora people here in Berlin and elsewhere don’t want Russia to lose. This was reflected in the whole Wagner episode. So, you know, what we’ve got from Prigozhin, in addition to the spectacle of, you know, a rogue general or a rogue mercenary heading towards Moscow, which looks like it’s ripped out of the pages of history—think about how many times this happened in ancient Rome or in any other, you know, kind of authoritarian or historical setting. We’ve seen this so many times before—putsches, you know, rogue generals and colonels being angry about the cost of war. Putin himself referred to 1917, but lots of people have talked about other episodes in Russian history.

But what we also had was an unveiling of the truth about this whole exercise. You know, basically, Prigozhin says there was no threat from Ukraine; there was no threat from NATO; this war was a mistake from the beginning, but now we have to win it in some fashion; and our generals don’t know how to do it, only the Wagner Group knows how to do this. Obviously, there’s business interests involved here. We’re now hearing even more about the fact that the Wagner Group is actually fully funded by the Kremlin. All the veil is off now about the pretense of what this was about. But it’s an admission that the Russian military itself is not up to the task—beyond all of their heavy mining and the destruction of civilian settlements, and you know, the shelling and the bombing that, you know, we’re seeing, that the military cannot prevail on the ground in the way that, obviously, they intended to, and the Wagner Group has been filling in. So we’re seeing behind the scenes here a real kind of battle for the future of this war against the face of the counteroffensive.
We’ve also seen all of the chinks as a result of that in Putin’s grip on the security forces around him. This was a whole battle among his security forces.

But the other thing that we’re also seeing is that there is no sign of an evident successor to Putin. We have all been speculating about this, but you know, I would just say that we have to be very hesitant about getting into the whole action that Putin’s grip is so weakened that he could go. I see no evidence of that at this point, which isn’t to say that something couldn’t happen because we see that the situation is quite precarious.
Now just, you know, so we can move over to Sam and his commentary here, I think, you know, what the Wagner episode shows us is that, as usual, all authoritarian systems are brittle and fragile; that there’s a lot of fighting behind the scenes; that war always intensifies those stresses; that something could happen at any point; and that the authoritarian leader himself is the wildcard in the system. He is both responsible for its failures and its successes. So everyone now is watching Putin in a way that they were not before. And of course, there’s a lot, I think, of this episode to play out because we don’t know what the heck is going on with Prigozhin. We have all kinds of generals missing in action, lots of speculation about them. You know, so this is playing out. But we now know very clearly that the whole Russian war effort was based on shifting sands that has now put it under a great deal of pressure.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Sam, let me go to you on two points. First, let’s talk a bit about the recommendations you laid out in your piece. This was a fairly clear blueprint for moving toward—or laying the groundwork for negotiations now, and looking ahead to negotiations between Ukraine, and Russia, the United States, and other actors in the months ahead. Explain what you would like to see in the coming months. And then tell us how far that is from existing U.S. policy. What elements do you think Washington has embraced of the kind of blueprint you lay out? And where would you like to see policy change?

CHARAP: Great. Well, thanks, Dan. Thanks for the invitation.

So, you know, my—the argument I made in the piece starts out with analysis of the trajectory of the conflict. And basically, I think we have fifteen months, or more now, of evidence to use to draw some at least preliminary conclusions, if not conclusions, and analytical judgments about where things are heading. And I think that evidence suggests that really neither side is in a position to deliver a decisive military victory, defined particularly as the destruction of the other side's capacity to pose a threat to it going forward. And so equally, that the political differences are now so irreconcilable between Russia and Ukraine that the idea of some sort of peace treaty or political settlement is also off the table. 

So we're likely to have a trajectory defined by those two dynamics whereby both sides—neither side is capable of essentially delivering a decisive military victory, both sides will continue to pose a threat to each other with their military capabilities, and neither will likely achieve fully their territorial goals. So that, essentially, where the line is, is just one piece of this broader puzzle that is going to be relatively, you know, continuous over time, those fundamental drivers. And so that is sort of the ingredients for a war that could go on for a very long time. And that, I think, at this point, seems to me the most likely outcome.

But ultimately, it's likely to end with those fundamental factors being in place. And so the point I make in the piece is that, you know, we can either think about achieving some sort of negotiated and, in the medium term—obviously, this is not a short term proposition. Or, it could be years from now. And likely the fundamentals will be not significantly altered, but the costs will have increased dramatically both humanitarian, economic, and otherwise. And so the most likely outcome in this context looks something like an armistice. An armistice being a durable ceasefire that does not resolve the political disputes between the parties. That would not end the broader conflict, but it would end the violence, if it were successful.

And so in the piece there are several proposals for particular measures that would make that armistice potentially stick, including security commitments, and ceasefire support mechanisms, and so on, and steps that the U.S. could take now to enable that outcome over time. So between appointing somebody who actually has a job to deal with this kind of conflict diplomacy issue to beginning discussions with allies and Ukrainians—and the Ukrainians about this end game, and eventually opening up channels with the Russians to engage on this issue. And, of course, it's important to emphasize that none of this need come at the expense of anything else that's going on, be it the Ukrainian counter offensive, U.S. support—military support for it, and so on.

And so I guess where I would, you know, where I think my proposals differ from where the U.S. is right now is that essentially there—basically on the diplomatic side right now there's a sense that—well, there's not much activity at all. And there's a sense that basically, it's not—unlikely to yield any results, and that the cues must come from the Ukrainians on this for any sort of change. Moreover, that leverage on the battlefield will be required to get an acceptable outcome, so that we need to see this counteroffensive out and provide the Ukrainians with a better position to engage at the end of that.

And I guess where I diverge somewhat is that I don't see the diplomatic piece as contradictory to the coercive pressure peace. That these things can be complementary, in fact, and written mutually reinforcing. In other words, you know, you don't lose anything by having an active channel at the very most. And you could stand to gain something, in the sense of learning, at least, about where the other side's position is. And so I don't expect, even if this were to be implemented tomorrow or so channels be opened and conversations about the endgame to begin, that this would produce an outcome in a week or a month. 

We're talking about a months-long process. And in the piece, I, you know, recall the fact that it took two years to negotiate the Korean armistice. And during periods when the fighting was probably the most intense and the United States incurred 45 percent of the casualties total during the war. So I think that, you know, the point is that there are costs to waiting and beginning the process soon would be, I think, beneficial to all. That’s the case, at least.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Andriy, let me have you react to the proposal broadly, but also to the assumptions that Sam started with, that there's not really an alternate path. You've argued that there is a path to victory that differs from the one that—the course that Sam lays out. So how do you see that proposal? And how do you see—where would you see potential for an alternate—an alternate path?

ZAGORODNYUK: OK, so, first of all, before I say anything, I'd like to just to reiterate to our listeners that—I'm sure the participants know about that, but just wanted to say that there's no more people in the world which wants this war to end than in Ukraine. I mean, there's absolutely no desire at all, to continue it longer than absolutely necessary. 

And people are very exhausted. People are extremely traumatized. There's a lot of tragedies happening every day in a regular family. As you know, the majority of the armed forces are not professional, military people. They became professional military people over the last year and a half, or even less. There's, of course, a professional element with some history, but it's a minority. So we do want peace. And the only skepticism about any proposals which involve Putin’s good faith is because we have extremely bad experience of dealing with that person, whether—over, like, very, very long period of time. So we just—we just have a lot of—already a lot of track record which works against this idea.

So the what I outlined in the paper back in October was that we can free Ukraine, we can push through the Russian defense lines, and we can free the territory of Ukraine. And, of course, then there would need some sort of equilibrium after that, because we do need to stabilize the situation. And the question is, how we're going to stabilize the situation is—of course, is open. And that's one of the reasons why G-7 last week decided to start some discussion about that, is because we are absolutely certain that only denial of opportunity to Putin to continue is something which will—which we will actually practically stop him.

So what we had in—and again, I'm not trying to criticize Sam's position. I personally welcome all positions, and particularly the ones who, you know, soberly understand the chances, and so on. The only problem which we see is that we've been in negotiations with Putin, on the Minsk Treaty, for example. Clearly, there's been a desire from Ukraine to find it. And as the person who worked with Zelensky since the beginning of his tenure as a president, I can tell you, he was absolutely sincere to find the solution. He tried. And a lot of people were saying, you know, we've been in war with Putin for a long time. It's not possible. He has very different strategic goals.

But he tried to do that. And the Minsk agreement didn't work out simply because we have seen that the Russian side, they had a totally different goal than the peace and stability in the region. They wanted to—basically to pursue with their destructive policy. And that policy and that strategy was above everything else. So and that's why we’re quite negative about the ceasefire proposals, just simply understanding that the ceasefire will give Putin an opportunity to recover, rebuild the forces, and then start again.

We understand that he can do that—if he stays in power, of course—he can do it in any case. So basically, we understand that wherever we push him out, even if it's like a complete line of the border of 1991, he still can start recovering. He still can—you know, can do all this, you know, collection. And since we know that he's— percentage of the economy invested in the war right now is not like it used to be in World War Two when it was, like, over 72 percent. You know, it's much less. It's several percent of the economy is in the war. So he—potentially in the long term he has—he has a chance to continue. And if he's stable politically, he would—he will try to continue.

So we need to learn two things. One thing is that if he goes on in the negotiations, where he walks away from his claims—for example, claim on the annexed territories, claim about Crimea, claim about Donbas, and basically recognizing the defeat, that can destroy his internal political situation. So that's why we're quite skeptical that he'll do that. And secondly, if he has a chance to continue, he will continue. So our job is to make sure that he doesn't have that chance, basically deny him an opportunity. And that's why we need to build a very strong security in the region, obviously, in Ukraine, in order so for any realistic calculation that basically that that capability is present, like in a high readiness state, disable him from starting another season of that campaign. That's basically it.

KURTZ-PHELAN: And just to—just to be clear, can you imagine a negotiation at some point down the road when Ukraine has more made more progress on the battlefield, when he might be feeling more vulnerable, is there is there any circumstance under which you can imagine a negotiation with Putin?

ZAGORODNYUK: I think I certainly can imagine negotiations was Russian delegation after Putin, that's for sure. Because after that, they will clearly understand that they need to get out of this situation. And whoever they are, they may start to play differently. With Putin based on—well, our understanding of his personality, I don't think he will—he's able to do in negotiation in good faith. And that's just based on our assessment who that person is. Also, he passed through so many lines which he cannot un-cross now, you know, including the destruction of Mariupol, together with inhabitants, for example. So we certainly are going to be insisting that there is a justice in place. We're certainly going to be insistent that there is a court—an international tribunal in place, and so on and so on.

The question, how he's going to negotiate understanding that we're pushing for that? For example, how we—we’re clearly not going to accept his annexation of territory, because there are our people there who never asked him to come and they are going through immense suffering every day. And we have reports and records about that on a daily basis. And it's completely terrible what's happening there. So of course—and that's why—that’s why from a negotiation theory to imagine the zone of possible agreement, even in theoretical perspective, is extremely difficult, if possible at all. That's why—that’s why we’re a very practical people. We just see that as something which is extremely low probability.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Fiona, let me go to you to react to this notion of negotiations, but especially you've studied Putin longer and more deeply than almost anyone in this debate. You've spent time around him. What are the prospects that there might be a space for negotiation that would yield better results in the one—the one Andriy sees?

HILL: Well, I don't think there's actually much space for yielding better results than Andriy sees, to be honest. I’ll be frank about that. But which does not rule out diplomacy to, you know, push back to what Sam has been saying. Diplomacy is different from a negotiation, because you are preparing the ground to get to some, you know, different place, which has to go in parallel to what we're doing in the military front. So I think that sometimes what Sam is saying is misunderstood in that regard, because I think Sam would also recognize the difficulties of basically finding some negotiated solution that doesn't lead to any kind of loss for Ukraine, because everything involves a loss of Ukraine because Ukraine is already, as Andriy said, lost enormous amounts of people, so many people's lives traumatized and uprooted by all of this, even at the same time that it has secured a victory by pushing back Putin's initial war aims.

So we've got a very complex situation at hand here. But Andriy is absolutely right. Putin has put himself into such a corner that he can't get out of it even if he wanted to, because he's made such expansive claims to Ukraine—not just to Crimea, but to the whole of Donbas, Donetsk and Luhansk, and all of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, even the territories that he does not—or, the Russians do not control. And they also loosely control, as I said, before, much of the territory, you know, that we see on the maps in the newspapers as being, you know, shaded in, you know, with Russian occupation there.

He has also, you know, as I said earlier, in terms of the attitude of Russians, made it impossible for himself to really back away, as Andriy has said as well. I mean, Prigozhin was basically saying: This war was a huge mistake—and he's been saying it in even more crude terms than this—but we're not going to lose it. And that's, unfortunately, where we come down in most of the Russian polling, including for people who are here in exile. You know, many of them are actually saying in polls: We think this was disastrous. We’re opposed to the war. We don't want to fight the war. But we don't want to see Russia lose. We don't want to see Russia give anything up. Because they're thinking in terms of these absolute victories of World War One and World War Two, and following the scenarios through of what happened to Germany in both of those instances.
You know, and as Sam has said, you know, the kind of the logic of international diplomacy and negotiation seems to, you know, result in the loss of territory somewhere along the lines. And the Russians don't want to see themselves in that regard. So that's where things become really complicated. But I do think that there is a major diplomatic effort that we could engage in. And let me just briefly explain, because there aren’t two sides to this. It's not just Russia and Ukraine. It's not just sort of Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and NATO. This is a huge, enormous threat for European security, and also for global security even if it's not fully recognized. 

We just had today Russia tearing up the Black Sea grain deal. We could have between ten and twenty million people worldwide dying of starvation this year because of lack of access to Ukrainian grain. Lots of those minefields are on some of the most productive Ukrainian farms. We've had the Kakhovka Dam blown up. And we've an ecological and climate disaster on our hands. We've got the threats of the Zaporizhzhia plant, which is very deliberate on the part of Russia. We've seen Russian troops already moving through the Chernobyl exclusion zone. So, you know, we see all of these ecological, climate, and threats to food security that are there. This is very deliberate for Putin. He's weaponizing food and he knows that this will, you know, have some of an effect.

But we've also got Europeans—I mean, I'm hearing it all the time now—that are a huge sea change, particularly at the elite level in Germany and elsewhere, and in in Europe. People are not going to go back at this particular point to just handing things over to Vladimir Putin, because he's trying to rewrite European history. And you have the Finns who have joined NATO because of this, the Swedes who have thrown away hundreds of years of neutrality. We know that the Poles are nervous, not just the Baltic States, for example. So Europeans are party to this, and they really do see this in a different light. So it's not just a question of, you know, Putin trying to, you know, negotiate with just Ukraine, or negotiate with the United States. Europeans now see this as intrinsic to their security as well.

And whatever we do will set a precedent, because what Putin is basically saying is any nuclear state that goes rogue and wants to, you know, kind of basically predate on its neighbor can do so. And we have so many territorial disputes around the world that could be affected by this as well. So, I think, you know, Sam is also making a case for a big diplomatic effort. You know, so we see Ukrainian government, you know, going around the world—Zelensky and Yermak, and Andriy, and others, you know, have been all over the place trying to talk to counterparts, as the G-7, its other countries as well, meetings with Brazilians, attempts to meet with South Africa. You know, basically to make this point that what's happening in Ukraine has global implications and we need a global effort to reframe this and to try to address it. So that's diplomacy.

Now, whether we get to some, you know, negotiation at the end of that is another matter, but we can focus, as Sam was saying, on a diplomatic effort. So I think it's just a question of how we frame it and how we think about it. But we have to do that in parallel with the military effort, because ultimately there will be some kind of diplomatic response to this, and perhaps somewhere down the line a diplomatic solution.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Sam, there's one common element or one particular common element that strikes me in Fiona and Andriy’s responses, and these have come in other responses to your proposal, which is really about the willingness of the Russian side to engage in any meaningful way, even if it's correct that some kind of armistice would be more preferable than a kind of long war that has terrible human costs, for Ukrainians above all. There's just no sign that the Russians are there. Do you see any reason to see hope on that side? Is there some path there? Or even, would a major diplomatic push likely bring us to a long war that will continue indefinitely?

CHARAP: Well, I mean, I think it's important to note, of course, that it might fail. And it's probably likely to fail. And so I have no illusions about this being easy, or Russia being a—particularly under this leadership—being an easy actor to deal with in international politics. I mean, I think we're past the point where anyone can make that case. I think there are two questions, really. And the problem is that we have only secondary information about how to answer them. And you know, the first is, like, are they willing to engage at all? And some make the case that Russia’s still pursuing their original maximalist aims and they have no interest in talking under any circumstances, particularly not now. And then the question of, like, will they operate in good faith in the context of a negotiation? 

And so on the first question, you know, I think I could—I see the case for why you could make the argument that Russia’s still pursuing maximalist aims and wouldn't sit down at the table. I've seen evidence to suggest that Russia’s sort of had to adjust its aims given its failures. But the only way you can really find out for sure is by trying. And otherwise, it's just sort of, you know, attempt—educated attempts at reading Putin's mind, really. So I think we don't actually lose anything by testing the proposition that under the circumstances they might be willing to engage.

And the second question, of course, is, you know, do they comply with, agree with, operate in good faith during negotiations or engagement of any sort? And, of course, you have to assume bad faith given Russia's history, right? How many agreements it’s broken that related to Ukraine security, how many times it has reneged on ceasefire agreements, et cetera. I think the point to make here, though, is that there have been good ceasefire agreements in the past in history and bad ones. And Andriy rightly points to the failures of the Minsk agreement to ever really produce security outcomes for Ukraine. 

And so the focus, I think, should be on how to make this, if there is to be one, a good one that actually holds and that denies the opportunity to transform it into an operational pause. And I think that, you know, there are ways you can imagine doing that. Part of that—the groundwork was laid at the—at the Vilnius Summit, with the beginning of the negotiation of security—long-term security commitments for Ukraine. It's going to have to be, you know, a mixture of deterrence and sort of diplomatic mechanisms that that reinforce the ceasefire. But we sort of have to assume bad faith and try, nonetheless, to find ways of basically boxing in the Russians so they can't—so that the costs of violating any potential agreement is higher than any gains that are perceived to accrue from it.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Great. Well, I will leave it there. And, Sam, let's go to questions from those on the line. Let me remind everyone that we are on the record, and that includes those of you asking questions. Also, please keep your questions crisp and make them questions so we can get in as many as possible. 

Sam, let's go to the first one.

OPERATOR: Thank you so much.

(Gives queuing instructions.)

Our first question is a written submission from Ali Wyne, who asks: Almost seventeen months into the war, how do Ukraine, Russia, and NATO respectively conceptualize victory and defeat? And what would each of them consider to be a minimally acceptable outcome?

KURTZ-PHELAN: Thanks, Ali, for that. Why don't we go to Andriy quickly, and then Fiona, and then Sam, if you want to add anything you may.

ZAGORODNYUK: Our understanding of the minimum outcome is that we free our territory so that people are not suffering any longer. And that also includes people who are currently kidnapped, particularly children. We have tens of thousands of children which have been illegally deported to Russia. They really need to come home because the conditions in which some of them are captured is completely unacceptable, and the fact that they’re not—they’re away from families is also completely unacceptable. And so—and apart from territories, and apart from the—and apart from returning our people is also, of course, the question of justice. We believe that we don't want to live in a world where people can do things like that without the convictions and without the proper legal qualification. Thank you.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Fiona, let me go to you and asked you to especially focus on the Russian definition of victory at this point.

HILL: Well, I mean, I think Andriy has, you know, very clearly laid out kind of a victory path that others, you know, would accept as well. But, I mean, with Russia at this particular point, I mean, are we talking about Putin's definition of victory, and others as well, because Andriy is talking about a shared sense. And I don't think there is just a shared sense in Russia. And that kind of becomes part of the problem for all the issues we were talking about before. Putin has made it very clear what's his victory. You know, unfortunately for him, because he hasn't left a lot of wiggle room even though, as Sam said, obviously they've adjusted somewhat. 
And it's basically, you know, the keeping control of the territory is declared to be, you know, now part of Russia. And that creates an enormous problem. And, you know, for other Russians and opinion polls as, you know, we're seeing, would be definitely the end of the war. They want the war to end, but without losing anything. And so those definitions definitely collide with what Andriy has said. And I think, you know, if you come back to other Europeans—and, you know, Sam can add to this as well—I mean, NATO and other Europeans would want to see—who are not in NATO—would want to see the return of deterrence and strategic stability to Europe, because this is a failure of European deterrence.

And when you think about the Finns and the Swedes wanting to join NATO, it's because of the risks now that they see that Russia could, you know, invade another country as well, a risk that becomes even more heightened as a result of, you know, what they did in Ukraine—having lied about all of the buildup to this war. So, you know, we need to have a return to the idea that Europe is not going back to previous centuries, and that we once again restore the prohibition against war and the use of force to change borders or to actually, you know, change any political arrangements within Europe. So, I mean, right now in Russia is completely out of step with all of the rest of Europe, as well as with Ukraine and how it would define—or, rather, how Putin and some of the others around him would define a victory.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Sam, anything you would add on the NATO definition especially?

CHARAP: Well, I mean, I think on the one hand there's an emerging narrative that Russia has already lost. And you heard President Biden essentially articulate that in Helsinki, I believe, at the tail end of his European trip. And I think that does reflect a—you know, that wasn't just an off-the-cuff remark, I would say. But on the details, I think there's still the official policy of sort of essentially not getting into details about the outcome, and that might be acceptable in terms of how this ends. 

I would add one thing on Russian goals, though, which is that there's a striking degree of vagueness in the details about what Putin talks about when he talks about victory. Just one case in point, he has—they have yet to officially declare where their view of the borders of these two new regions they claim to be there on their own—Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the regions of Ukraine—whether, you know, the administrative boundaries of Ukraine are what they claim to be the new borders. There's no clarity on that at the official level, which I think does leave them some wiggle room. 

And I think that is actually classic Putin, where he sort of keeps his options open and doesn't actually commit himself to any particular or detailed outcome there. He has, of course, claimed them, but he hasn't said what the boundaries are. So, you know, I think that's an interesting—I wouldn't read too much into that, but it does suggest that there's a little bit of—he's giving himself a little bit of negotiating room.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Sam, let's go to the next question.

OPERATOR: Our next question is from Joseph Nye.

Q: This is a great discussion. Fiona, I want to take you back to your days as national intelligence officer for Russia. And imagine that you have a request from the White House for an estimate of the probabilities that Putin, having put himself into this box, will use a nuclear weapon tactically over the Black Sea or over a front unit, or whatever. And what's your estimate of the probabilities? And what's your estimate of the outcome were he to do so?

KURTZ-PHELAN: Thank you, Joe. And we should add for everyone else on the line that you are a former head of the National Intelligence Council. So this is more than just a casual question. But, Fiona, I’ll go to you.

HILL: And also a former dean of the Kennedy School when I used to work there. I'm sort of feeling like I'm back in class, you know, kind of getting grilled again. (Laughs.) You probably saw my expression going, oh, God, the probability.

Look, I mean, to be—in all honesty, I want to be very careful about that, because I think that they those probabilities are also very case dependent. And Andriy, you know, and others will remember that when the Russian troops were pinned down some time ago on the other side of the Dnieper in Kherson province, that there was a lot of concern at that point, a higher probability that they might resort to a tactical nuclear weapon. And what we've been trying to do at all times is to reduce that, and to make those cases all the less.
I mean, the very fact that, you know, Ukraine is having such hard going, you know, with landmines—you know, the kind of conventional warfare, you know, is showing that the Russians themselves are, you know, perhaps also trying to avoid this instance, because they did get a lot of pressure put on them by China, by India, and by other countries. So, I mean, the probability goes up when the constraints are not there and in very specific cases.

So this is not a kind of a blanket issue. I mean, right now, we're also concerned not just about the tactical nuclear weapons, per se, but about the manipulation of the Zaporizhzhia plant. The Zaporizhzhia plant is actually a very safe design plant, but it's not safe if it's being shelled and if it's basically being—having, you know, reduced access to cooling. And we've had to see, you know, the plant being shut down. We've had plenty of statements being made by Rafael Grossi, you know, for example. We should be having an international larger scale intervention on this. This gets to the diplomatic effort I was talking about before. 
But we should be reducing whatever we see that when the probability starts to go up. And again, I don't want to play around with that because I think, you know, part of it is also the terror tactics that Russia is engaging in. So if I give a probability that looks high, I'm going to scare the hell out of everyone. And I don't want to, you know, play the part of Vladimir Putin, because that's definitely what he's trying to do. This is a psychological game here, to make the links to the euro missile crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, which he's threatened to do publicly, and, you know, many cases in the past, to basically manipulate, you know, the populations in Ukraine and elsewhere. 

And people are now on to that game. But again, the probability goes up in certain circumstances, if they feel that the defenses are being overrun, and also if they feel that there will be a chance to actually have an effect of that, so more likely to have a negotiation on Putin's terms. So we have to keep up the pressure, basically, the United Nations supporting Rafael Grossi, but also keeping China, India, and other nuclear players in on the game to reduce that probability that's being factored into Russian calculations. Not a satisfying answer, but I would definitely be trying to say that to the president if I was given half a chance to do it, beyond the kind of the warning and the probability indexes that we normally use.

KURTZ-PHELAN: If we were if we were at the NIC or in the Kennedy School I imagine Joe would want to follow up, but he will not have an opportunity here, unfortunately. (Laughter.)

Sam, let's go to the next question.

OPERATOR: Our next question is a written submission from Dan O'Connell.
Who asks: What expectations should the international community have for China's role in ending this conflict?

KURTZ-PHELAN: Sam, let me have you take a crack at that. And then, Andriy, let me also briefly have you give your sense of what this looks like from the Ukrainian government's perspective?

CHARAP: Well, I think expectations should be low. But nonetheless, the fact that they—that the Chinese were willing to sort of throw their hat in the ring with this so-called peace plan, as unsatisfactory as it was, and, you know, having an envoy who went around to relevant capitals to discuss this issue, that—I think, you know, you can use their, at least, engagement on this to potentially Ukraine's advantage, particularly given the fact that, you know, the Chinese have more leverage with the Russians than any other international actor.
So if you can get China to be invested in an outcome that's satisfactory to other key parties, particularly Ukraine, and have them be in a position to use their clout with the Russians, that would be a positive way of taking, you know, of using China's engagement on this. But frankly, my expectations are somewhat low. I think there were a lot of instrumental motives behind the outreach, given that the Chinese were trying to burnish their image with the Europeans and put some distance between them—at least in the sort of public perception arena—between them and the Russians. But nonetheless, it's—you know, you sort of have to, in a situation like this, take advantage of anyone's interest, even if it's just for show.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Andriy, do you see any potential constructive outcome from Chinese engagement?

ZAGORODNYUK: I will be very brief. Currently, they technically have a neutral position. However, they did not condemn Russian actions. They have not recognized a whole number of quite obvious events. And Russia is buying a lot of parts and elements through China, which always Chinese approval, which basically from this perspective, they’re bypassing the Western sanctions and they are increasing their capabilities, which is very concerning. So I would stop on that, since, you know.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Sam, let's go to another question.

OPERATOR: Our next question is from Nayla Rizk. Miss Rizk, if you can unmute your microphone.
It seems like we're having technical difficulties with her, so our next question will be from Kelebogile Zvobgo.
Q: Hi, everyone. Thanks so much for this discussion.

The European Court of Human Rights is investigating human rights abuses through September of last year. The International Criminal Court is considering atrocity crimes, including the mentioned illegal deportation of children. But no tribunal has jurisdiction to criminally prosecute the crime of aggression in this instance, which is at the center of the war. How likely do you think an ad hoc tribunal on this specific crime is?

KURTZ-PHELAN: That’s a great question. Fiona, do you want to take that, or Andriy? Maybe go to both of you?

HILL: Yeah, I mean, look, I think Andriy would probably have some things to say about this because, obviously, the Ukrainian government has been pressing this hard and asking for different mechanisms, particularly to reflect what Keleboglie has said, which is because it's very difficult to do this in this current frame. I mean, the ICC, as already noted, is looking at this actively in a very specific set of cases. And, of course, the Russian government has even made public statements underscoring the fact that they have taken large numbers of Ukrainian children, even in excess of those that have fallen into the case at the ICC. But I think Andriy should really speak to this, because this is really part of Ukraine's outreach at the moment.

ZAGORODNYUK: Yeah, well, again, this is a specialist matter. There's a whole number of experts from all countries around the world participating in this. There’s a mass of legal talent working on this from—particularly, I know, some people from U.K. with very serious experience. So I'm sure that wherever the—whatever the combined effort of the expertise can come up with, I mean, they already came and they are already coming up with the specific resolutions. But there is no straightforward answer.

So there must be some compromise made. Meaning that they would have to choose a certain framework, which, yes, have some risks of acceptance by everybody. But if we have a universal recognition of that, then that would work. And I guess we already, like, very close to some consensus, or at least a majority consensus, on how this is going to look like. And as soon as that happens, the materials which they collected are enormous. I mean, there is, like a lot of experts working on the ground collecting the—collecting the human right abuses. So there will be a massive legal process coming up soon.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Sam, let's go to another question.

OPERATOR: Our next question is a written submission from Sebastian Liche (ph), who asks: During the past months, we have seen strong leadership by President Biden within NATO, rallying its members in support of Ukraine both militarily, financially, and from a security perspective. Considering the upcoming U.S. presidential election in 2024, how might its outcome alter the U.S. position regarding the support of Ukraine within NATO and consequently impact the outcome of the war?

KURTZ-PHELAN: It’s a great question. Fiona, why don't we start with you? And then, Sam, I'll let you react to that as well.

HILL: Yeah, I had a feeling you might start with me. (Laughs.) I was also looking down a lot of the questions and I can, you know, see that a lot of other people have also asked the same question about, you know, is Putin waiting for 2024? Look, he clearly is. And it's not just a question about the U.S. presidential election, just for, you know, kind of larger framing. I mean, technically, Ukraine has to have a presidential election there. But I mean if—obviously, under wartime and extremes circumstances, that's very difficult. But so does Putin, we have to remember, right? So technically, Putin is supposed to have an election earlier in 2024 than the U.S. presidential election. But, of course, you know, the U.S. campaign is already underway.

There are also likely to be changes in Europe, which Putin is factoring in. So it's not just about waiting to see if Trump is going to come back in the United States. He's looking to see what might happen in France with Marine Le Pen, you know, the possibility of, you know, her emerging as Macron, you know, basically can't continue in the presidency for, you know, an advanced term. We have elections in Germany, in three key states, and Thuringia, Saxony, and Brandenburg, where the AfD, the Alternative for Deutschland, might emerge. Putin is basically betting that across the board there will be sufficient changes in the United States and in Europe that will undercut the support for Ukraine.

Big bet, obviously, on Trump. We’re watching, you know, things very closely. President Trump, of course, has bragged that he could, you know, solve the whole, you know, Ukraine conflict, as he puts it, overnight. I think, you know, his track record on this is very clear, that he doesn't take Ukraine, or the war, or any of these things seriously. And, you know, that there would obviously be a major jolt, not just with him becoming the—or at least being, right now, the presumptive Republican candidate, but as the campaign unfolds. 

So I think the message from all of this, not just for Ukraine, obviously, but for Europeans—and it's the message that I'm trying to spread while I'm actually here in Europe—is to, you know, make Europe, and NATO's, on all the other institutions positions is very clear now. Because the outcome of this does not only solely depend on the United States. And I think other countries that have a vested interest in a resolution of this war in a way that doesn't just pander to Putin’s aims, really need to take a stance now about why this is important, and to continue their military and diplomatic support for Ukraine as well. I mean, if we know that Putin is waiting, you know, for 2024, well, it's still, you know, some time out. Let's take some action now while we can.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Sam, is Putin making a good bet here?

CHARAP: Well, I wouldn't speculate on the outcome of our presidential election, about which, you know, I think there's a lot to still unfold. But, you know, I think the very fact that this has become such an important factor in the thinking about—of both U.S. allies, about U.S. staying power, and plausibly, at least, in Russia, and thinking about, you know, their own timeframes for potentially ending the conflict, I think is telling. And, you know, the question is, is the fact that Putin might be thinking that he could be dealing with a much easier interlocutor after the U.S. elections a motivating factor for us, or a factor that we should—(laughs)—you know, be trying to somehow address in some other way?

And here, you know, there aren’t any easy outs. But it does, you know, underscore, I think, the extent to which—you know, you hear this question in European capitals a lot regarding us the future of U.S. policy on this issue. And, actually, regarding the war as a whole, that this is sort of one of these exogenous factors that could have a major impact on the outcome.

KURTZ-PHELAN: Andriy, let me close with you quickly, not by having you try to offer commentary on American or European politics, but to get to this question of staying power from the Ukrainian perspective. If we are, in fact, as many commentators suggest and you seem to allow as a possibility, looking at a war that will continue for some time, what are the challenges to Ukraine of sustaining that, given the incredible cost, the, you know, ammunition used, everything else that you are seeing with your own eyes? What will determine whether Ukraine can stay the course in a long war?

ZAGORODNYUK: Ukraine will stay the course whatever happens, simply because we don't have any better alternative. We are absolutely determined to, because there is nothing which is worse than Russian occupation. And we’ve seen that already. And that's why we will be fighting, whatever it takes. And, of course, then there are questions of the resources. There are questions of the economy support. There are questions of the continued shelling of the—of the critical infrastructure. We believe that Russians will try to do this again this summer. Or, sorry, this winter, and so on, and so on.

So, for sure, we are not interested in war taking as long—longer than absolutely necessary, because, again, there will be changing politicians in various countries, there would be constant discussion of the so-called fatigue, there will be literally shortages of ammunition, and shortages of the—of the weapons, and so on, and so on. We know about all that. I mean, military analysts are very clear about that. The world wasn't ready for that war. Not psychologically, not materially. So we are against the time. But, again, nobody—there's absolutely no better chance for us than to win it, because simply, Russian strategy is very clear. And our strategy is just—is to save our country. That's pretty much as simple as that.

KURTZ-PHELAN: We will end on that note. Thank you to all three of you for joining us for today, for the work you've done for the magazine that has contributed to this conversation. And with no disrespect to Sam and Fiona, thanks especially to Andriy for joining under very, very difficult circumstances. Really appreciate it. And we will look forward to having more from all of you soon. Thanks, everyone.

ZAGORODNYUK: Thank you.

(END)