The Day After—in Israel

Since Hamas’s October 7 attack, Israel has found itself embroiled in a multifront war for the first time in nearly 60 years. It is fighting in Gaza, countering armed groups in the West Bank, and facing missile strikes from Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Israel seems less safe than most Israelis assumed it to be on October 6—and its leadership must now reshape the country’s national security policies accordingly.

For the moment, Israel’s priorities are to secure the release of the remaining hostages, eliminate Hamas’s military capabilities, and ensure the safe return of hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens to their communities in both the north and south of the country. But Israel must also take more far-reaching steps to avoid another October 7. To that aim, the state must ramp up defense spending and reinforce its borders. Diplomacy with the Palestinians must be part of the picture, but any mutual arrangement for governing Palestinian areas will have to include strong provisions to prevent the emergence of a remilitarized Palestinian territory. Any progress on longer-term objectives, such as a two-state solution—which is currently perceived as unfeasible and even detached from reality by most Israelis—will require both the support of the United States and normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.

Even as the Israeli government remains focused on immediate military objectives, it must address the question of what happens when the fighting stops. A failure to plan for an alternative to Hamas risks prolonging the Israeli presence in Gaza and could lead to the imposition of military rule. A better future is possible, but it will require Israel to work with the United States and regional partners, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, to establish a provisional, technocratic Palestinian administration that engages in reconstruction, not terror.

In addition to reestablishing deterrence and strengthening its intelligence capabilities, Israel must also restore its moral standing as a progressive, democratic state, by defending and strengthening its democratic institutions, as well as its economy and technological innovation, and by further integrating with the region. If Israel is to rebound from the calamity of October 7, it must work on security, diplomacy, and political reform simultaneously and without delay.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

After five months of fighting in Gaza, Israel Defense Forces have made impressive progress. The territory is one of the most complex combat zones in the world, with an intricate urban landscape and extraordinary population density, and an enemy that is operating within the civilian population, using an extensive network of tunnels and underground facilities. Nonetheless, IDF forces have been able to dismantle the nerve centers and organizational structures of Hamas in Gaza City and Khan Yunis and significantly degrade terrorist infrastructure in other parts of the Strip. And they have established a security buffer zone between Gaza and Israeli territory.

In doing so, Israel has largely neutralized the immediate ground threat to the towns and villages near Gaza, allowing residents to gradually return to their homes, which were evacuated following the October 7 massacre. Meanwhile, on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, where daily skirmishes persist with Hezbollah, the IDF has gained the advantage, having eliminated more than 200 of the group’s commanders and operatives. And Israel has destroyed much of Hezbollah’s missile launch sites and military infrastructure along the border.

Realizing these difficult objectives has come at a high cost to the population of Gaza, and the humanitarian situation has raised pressure on Israel to limit its operations. And yet, calls for Israel to stand down are premature. Hezbollah persists in its aggression against Israel, preventing the return of residents to their homes along the northern border. Additionally, Israel cannot bring an end to the conflict in Gaza as long as Israeli hostages are held captive there. Without a hostage deal, Israel may be compelled to increase pressure on Hamas, potentially by extending operations to Rafah.

The solution to this complex situation lies first in a hostage deal that encompasses a temporary pause in the fighting. This should then be followed by a concerted effort by a coalition of partners, led by the United States, to bring a new and capable Palestinian administration to Gaza. Additionally, Israel could signal its willingness to discuss a political process based on the two-state principle, even if it is evident to all parties that the realization of that process is likely impossible for the foreseeable future: such a signal will help ease tensions with the Biden administration and give all parties a long-term political horizon at which to aim.

As the intensity of the fighting in Gaza subsides, Israel, the United States, and their Arab partners must bolster political efforts to bring about a viable Palestinian alternative to Hamas, initially in the northern region of the strip. Such an alternative must be strong enough to prevent Hamas from regrouping and reasserting control. Failure to do so risks prolonging the fighting in Gaza and making it even harder to rebuild the strip.

MENDING DEFENSES

The defense and intelligence failures of October 7 have prompted calls from Israel’s military leaders for the development of a new security strategy. It is worth noting, however, that preliminary analysis by MIND Israel (of which I am president), suggests that the breakdown may also have been particular to the circumstances. Efforts should be directed toward identifying and rectifying the deficiencies that might have caused the specific failures rather than scrapping Israel’s overall security doctrine, which is premised on the principles of deterrence, early warning, defense, and decisive victory. Israel is now restoring deterrence through the IDF’s actions against Hamas and Hezbollah. In the months to come, Israel must learn from the intelligence lapses of October 7 to improve its early-warning system and, in the event that the Gaza war expands to the north, enhance its military readiness to secure a decisive victory.

Israel’s most pressing need is to strengthen its defenses. Before hundreds of thousands of displaced Israeli citizens can safely return to their communities, the IDF will need to beef up its presence along Israel’s borders. That means establishing a second line of defense inside the border, fortify existing boundary outposts, and establish additional border stations. The country should also develop new, innovative strategies to secure border buildings against direct fire.

Israel will also need more powerful missile defenses. Both Hezbollah and the Houthis have deployed precision missiles and drones in their attacks, and although Israel has impressive defense capabilities against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, its defenses are not impenetrable. Israel must accelerate the development of antimissile and antirocket laser systems. It should also move certain types of sensitive infrastructure, such as power stations and communications and data centers, to underground locations, and when that is not possible, such facilities should receive enhanced physical protection. Finally, all public buildings must be equipped with secure spaces or underground shelters—starting with schools.

The best defense, of course, is a good offense, and Israel must revitalize the proactive approach—known as the “campaign between the wars”—that it has applied in Syria, where the IDF has been carrying out strikes on an ongoing basis since 2013 in order to degrade enemy capabilities and preempt emerging threats. Israel must also hold accountable, and when necessary, during large-scale escalations, retaliate militarily against countries such as Lebanon that host terror organizations. And Israel must expand its military options for attacking Iran’s nuclear program should global efforts to curb that program fail.

All public buildings in Israel must be equipped with secure spaces or underground shelters—starting with schools.

A proactive and preemptive policy also demands that Israel be prepared for military escalation in multiple theaters at once. This, in turn, requires Israel to build up its forces to levels that surpass those it had on October 7. Israel responded to the attack using its reserve army, which mobilized quickly and has fought effectively. But to deter its adversaries—and, if needed, fight a multifront war—it must increase the size of the standing IDF, including by recruiting more from the country’s ultra-Orthodox community, whose members are currently exempt from military service. Israel can also increase its fighting force by giving female soldiers an expanded role in combat operations.

Additionally, the IDF needs more Iron Dome interceptors, precision air munitions, tank and artillery ammunitions, and infantry fighting vehicles. And given Hamas’s extensive network of tunnels, the IDF must urgently develop and acquire new advanced technology to destroy underground infrastructure. To that aim, Israel must build up its defense industrial base.

MORE FRIENDS, MORE SECURITY

In parallel with dismantling Hamas in Gaza, Israel must collaborate with both regional and international partners to establish a new reality in the region. Israel has no interest in occupying or assuming full responsibility for Gaza. But as long as Gaza remains militarized and attacks against Israeli territory persist, Israel will be compelled to maintain overriding security control. Consequently, Israel must work with a coalition comprising the United States and moderate Arab countries to build a technocratic Palestinian administration in Gaza under an international mandate. This committee should be guided and overseen by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, working in cooperation with a reformed and revitalized Palestinian Authority.

This interim arrangement could be reviewed after five to ten years, contingent on the Palestinian administration’s progress on security and stability. As long as Israel’s security needs remain unmet—as long as the Gaza Strip remains militarized and there continues to be terrorist infrastructure either above or below ground and attacks against Israeli territory persist—Israel will be compelled to maintain overriding security control.

At the same time Israel has no interest in ruling over millions of Palestinians in Gaza or the West Bank and must not annex those territories. It must also take legal measures against violence by Jewish extremists, dismantle illegal outposts, and halt the construction of new settlements, while promoting advanced infrastructure projects for Palestinians, including in Area C, which is currently under Israeli control.

Finally, the international institutions that operate in Gaza need to reform. On January 26, Israel presented evidence indicating that at least 12 UN Relief and Works Agency workers partook in the October 7 massacre, causing an uproar among UN members and major donor states, leading some of them to suspend their funding. Subsequently, the IDF uncovered a Hamas military command center beneath an UNRWA headquarters in Gaza City. In March, a United Nations report found “reasonable grounds to believe” that Hamas militants committed sexual violence, including gang rape, on October 7. In early March, the IDF released a recording of UNRWA employees boasting about their part in kidnapping young Israeli woman. As of this writing, the UN’s response has been to investigate specific individuals rather than viewing UNRWA as a failed enterprise.

In the short-term, international aid organizations and the moderate Arab states should provide humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza. After the war, donor states must consider reforming or replacing UNRWA with uncompromised institutions that are dedicated to the peaceful resolution of the Palestinian refugee crisis.

REBUILDING THE AMERICAN BULWARK

The United States’ status as Israel’s main strategic partner will not change, despite a widening gap between Netanyahu’s government and the Biden administration with respect to how the war is being prosecuted. Washington has largely stood by Israel’s side even as Israel has come under withering international criticism. Still, in order to secure its future, Israel must deepen its engagement with the United States on a host of diplomatic and economic initiatives, and to allay U.S. concerns about the humanitarian costs of the war in Gaza.

Israel must work with Washington to resolve the conflict in Gaza. The two countries should also develop a coordinated strategy to make sure that Hezbollah obeys Security Council Resolution 1701—which requires the group to put down its weapons in southern Lebanon and withdraw from the border region—and rally support for an Israeli military operation in Lebanon if diplomatic efforts fail. They must also coordinate policies to counter Iran’s malign activities by applying direct economic and military pressure on Tehran rather than solely focusing on its proxies. Additionally, concerted efforts are needed to halt Tehran’s nuclear advancements. And the two nations can exert pressure on Qatar to curb Hamas by severing the group’s financial support.

In exchange for more U.S. aid, Israel should adjust its policies toward Beijing.

Meanwhile, Israel and the United States should work to strengthen support for peace and normalization in the Middle East. They can do so by paving the way for a grand bargain with Saudi Arabia, in which the latter normalizes ties with Israel in exchange for a U.S. security treaty, a United States–supplied civilian nuclear program, and a commitment from Israel to the principle of a two-state solution. This agreement should be coupled with the resumption of political negotiations involving a reformed Palestinian Authority. Simultaneously, any agreement must include U.S. assurances to Israel that Saudi Arabia’s access to a civilian nuclear program should adhere to the so-called Gold Standard—the protocol set out by the United States in 2009 that does not permit any enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material without a further negotiated agreement—rather than to the looser standards of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran. Furthermore, these assurances must ensure that Saudi Arabia’s capabilities do not compromise Israel’s ability to maintain its qualitative military edge, or superiority in defense technologies and capabilities over other regional powers.

Israel and the United States can preserve Israel’s advantage by launching an official technological alliance. For example, they could jointly commit to investing billions of dollars in collaborative projects and startups that develop artificial intelligence, quantum computing, chip technology, space exploration, and drones. Along with helping Israel, this cooperation will advance American interests in the United States’ technological rivalry with China.

In exchange for more U.S. aid, Israel should adjust its policies toward Beijing, as well as its relationship with Russia. Although Israel should not turn China into an enemy, it must reduce and mitigate ties that create dependence on Beijing or expose Israel to Chinese espionage and technological threats. When it comes to Russia, Israel must consider taking more steps to help support Ukraine, potentially by enhancing its capabilities to counter the threat posed by Russia’s Iranian-made suicide drones, as well as publicly endorsing Western efforts to help safeguard Kyiv’s sovereignty.

FROM CRISIS TO CONSENSUS

On October 7, Israel’s security doctrine failed, and its efforts to dismantle Hamas will require a long-term commitment. Israel has no choice but to make a significant further investment in its security—one that could result in a lost economic decade if the government is not cautious and if it bears the burden, which is already high for Israel, alone. The country must therefore adopt a farsighted national strategy that not only strengthens its security but also enhances its alliances and international standing.

It is far from certain that the current government in Israel, largely influenced by political considerations and constrained by its ultra-right-wing members, can spearhead the necessary reforms. The unprecedented challenges confronting Israel will ultimately require a new government that is capable of fostering broad national consensus and navigating the country out of one of the most severe crises in its history.