The Dangers of an Ungovernable Gaza

In early April, in the seventh month of Israel’s campaign to dismantle Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew the majority of its ground troops from the Gaza Strip, leaving just one brigade in the central part. This included pulling Israeli forces out of Khan Younis, the sprawling area in southern Gaza below which U.S. intelligence officials believe Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar is hiding in an extensive tunnel network. In explaining the decision to pull these soldiers out, Israeli officials pointed to their military campaign’s success in destroying 18 of Hamas’s 24 battalions. Israeli forces needed time to rest before returning to Rafah in the southernmost part of Gaza to dismantle the four Hamas battalions based there. For several weeks, daily life in Gaza was not dominated by continuous airstrikes and ground forces’ maneuvering. But neither humanitarian groups nor civilians knew where to look for basic security, for no one is running Gaza.

That is why some UN officials now refer to Gaza as “Mogadishu on the Mediterranean.” In some areas, remnants of Hamas-run ministries are providing services or diverting humanitarian aid, while in others criminal networks loot and then distribute it. Elsewhere, communities and humanitarian groups are contracting with armed groups other than Hamas to provide security. Gaza is an ungoverned space with parallel and competing authority structures taking root. The conditions for long-term instability have already emerged.

In the same month, as generalized lawlessness spread across the strip, The New York Times reported that consultancies, development agencies, and financial institutions had begun expansive planning efforts for Gaza’s reconstruction. Talks were held in London in December 2023, bringing together development experts, private-sector representatives, and international financiers to map out an alternative future for Gaza. Under this plan, Gaza would have a deep-water port, its own currency, and a soccer stadium. But basic matters—including ensuring that Hamas has no role in this modern economy, establishing a political framework for governing, and determining Gaza’s connection to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank—were not discussed. Meanwhile, Israel refuses to plan for what will come after its forces leave Gaza.

The paucity of realistic solutions for “the day after” in Gaza reflects a more troubling absence of planning. In fact, observers are paying attention to the wrong day. What matters most is “the day in between,” when the flow of civilian support and services beyond emergency humanitarian aid are needed, even as IDF military operations continue. This support—which will require Israeli political resolve to plan and to prioritize Palestinians, combined with international expertise and funding—will be critical to ensuring that “the day in between” is not wasted.

OVER THE HORIZON

When officials and commentators talk about “the day after,” they are referring to the period after Israel ends its active military operations to dismantle Hamas’s military infrastructure. In this “day after” scenario, the expectation is that the IDF will have effectively collapsed Hamas as an organized entity, leaving it unable to govern the Gaza Strip. It is also expected that there will be an agreement, acceptable to Arab capitals, Israel, the United States, and international bodies, to create a security force on the ground, a framework for non-Hamas governance, a plan for increased humanitarian aid delivery and distribution, and funding for stabilization and reconstruction.

Such an ambitious plan for postwar Gaza requires detailed planning and sequencing, civilian-military coordination, and international support that should have started concurrently with the IDF campaign in Gaza in October 2023. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has intentionally avoided that kind of planning, seeing it as a concession that relieves pressure on Hamas. That, however, should not keep Israel from planning for “the day in between”—or what organizations such as RAND refer to as the “golden hour.” This is the period of weeks and months immediately after active military operations end but before long-term reconstruction begins. This short period is critical because it sets the postconflict recovery on either a positive or a negative trajectory.

Recent history is rife with examples of failures to plan for this period directly contributing to bad actors seizing opportunities, accelerating insurgencies, enabling terrorism, and inflaming additional cycles of violence. U.S. officials are aware of how difficult it is to effectively stabilize a postconflict society and prevent an insurgency. To that end, the U.S. State and Defense Departments have repeatedly offered to share lessons learned and best practices with Israeli counterparts. Not only has Israel declined to learn from this body of knowledge and experience on the sequencing of activities to prevent worst outcomes for postconflict societies, but it also appears that Israel is on track to repeat the same mistakes.

UNTAPPED EXPERTISE

There is an extensive and easily accessible body of scholarship focused on learning from past failures to plan postconflict activities. This makes it even more remarkable that discussions on post-Hamas Gaza are so underdeveloped. U.S. and UN experiences in Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003 provided valuable experience and information for international organizations, nongovernmental groups, and the U.S. government. These organizations and bodies devoted significant time and resources to restructuring planning efforts, training personnel, and documenting the decisions, or lack of decisions, that led to unsuccessful outcomes when seeking to stabilize and reconstruct societies after deadly conflicts.

At the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, when the U.S. armed forces failed to plan for armed insurgencies and governance vacuums, U.S.-government-funded bodies focused on ensuring that lessons were learned. Since 2005, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) has convened a group of civilian and military experts in humanitarian crises and relief and recovery efforts. This group has argued persuasively that uniformed military personnel are warfighters, not peace builders—although they frequently find themselves responsible for postwar activities before civilian workers arrive on the ground. The trouble is that these civilians are not included in warfighting planning, leaving them to try to insert themselves into military chains of command to manage inherently nonmilitary activities. In 2009, USIP released a manual called “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.” This manual argued that civilians lack doctrine and road maps for working in the unique context of postconflict environments alongside active-duty troops. In 2011, USIP opened the Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding to offer continuous training for U.S. government employees, so that past failures would not be repeated.

Civilian support and services beyond emergency humanitarian aid are needed, even as IDF military operations continue.

In 2004, the U.S. State Department, recognizing that its personnel lacked the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively conduct diplomacy, development, and military coordination in postconflict situations, opened a new entity called the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, or CRS. The following year, CRS published a list of more than 100 essential tasks for postconflict reconstruction, including ending hostilities, disarmament, interim policing, and clearing unexploded ordnance, as well as building transitional governance, civil service staffing, and famine prevention. In 2011, the CRS office became a bureau, and today it is led by a Senate-confirmed assistant secretary. It has the personnel and expertise to partner with the Israeli government and support a planning process that effectively addresses immediate postwar needs in Gaza. The bureau could also leverage its international relationships to support planning for post-Hamas Gaza.

In 2018, the U.S. secretary of state, secretary of defense, and USAID administrator jointly released a “stabilization assistance review” to streamline U.S. government efforts in conflict-affected areas. This review noted that more than half of conflicts that “achieve peace” fall back into violence, and warned that without political stability, longer-term development efforts are unlikely to be successful. The review called for civilian stabilization experts to coordinate with their military counterparts through “institutionalized mechanisms,” and observed that “stabilization is an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning U.S. Government efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—toward supporting locally legitimate authorities and systems to peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence.” It also argued that stabilization planning should be integrated with military plans from the beginning and warned that counterterrorism operations can have a destabilizing effect. The conclusions, recommendations, and warnings from the 2018 review are yet another example of readily available expertise that Israel appears to be willfully setting aside in the case of Gaza.

SEIZE THE MOMENT

The golden hour is the critical period that is missing in Gaza planning. During this period, those on the ground will be traumatized and the social contract broken. Humanitarian aid may be available, but no occupant of Gaza will readily accept a life of waiting in lines for foreigners to distribute assistance. Civilians will want to understand the plan and who will be responsible for implementing it. They will want to know if they can go home and what remains for them to return to. They will want information on whether they will be safe and on what authority will organize essential services and respond to their needs as they seek to rebuild their lives. Without confidence that there is a plan, armed groups and foreign powers will move in and create parallel structures that set conditions for further instability. This is the opportunity that Hamas, Iran, and others are cynically waiting to exploit.

A 2020 RAND study, “Seizing the Golden Hour,” states that in this short period “first impressions are established, expectations are created, and local support and resistance begin to coalesce.” The report identifies dynamics that affect the trajectory of the postconflict period. It highlights the need for the United States and its partners to provide reassurance that there will be sufficient protection for a new political order, as well as long-term political and financial support. Armed remnants of the pre-war regime must be co-opted or disrupted before they have an opportunity to create alternative or illicit networks. Most alarming is RAND’s conclusion that in every post–Cold War U.S.-led intervention, a larger force was required on the ground to stabilize the situation than was used to fight the war itself. If the IDF will not be on the ground in large numbers and there is no consensus on a postwar security force, the golden hour will be lost.

Israel is already running risks by not planning for the golden hour. The IDF withdrew most of its forces from northern Gaza in January as it progressed south, declaring that Hamas battalions in the north were dismantled. As IDF forces left northern Gaza, the U.S. director of the UN World Food Program, Cindy McCain, declared that this area was already in “full-blown famine.” Then, in May, the IDF returned in large numbers to Gaza City and the Jabalia refugee camp, areas previously declared free of Hamas, to address renewed terrorist activity. Without a credible security presence and a plan to provide for the needs of the civilian population in northern Gaza, Hamas and others will continuously return, filling the governance and security gaps.

SEND IN THE PEACEMAKERS

The United States has painfully learned that without a civilian-centric approach to stabilizing an area after war, any military accomplishment will be fleeting. The Israeli campaign in Gaza is at risk of not only squandering opportunities during the golden hour but also of missing the opportunity to set conditions for postwar recovery in Gaza that will be critical for Israel’s security. These are all mistakes that have been made elsewhere by the United States, the UN, and others. It is a political decision to disregard the weight of historical experience when it comes to planning and decision-making for post-Hamas Gaza.

To reverse this trajectory in Gaza, civilian-focused activities must be elevated to the same priority as military operations. Most urgent, Israel must articulate a proposal for a law enforcement presence that it finds acceptable and meets the minimum conditions necessary to provide services to Palestinian civilians and an alternative to Hamas. This proposal has the best chance for success if it is internationally recognized and supported by the United States and Arab capitals, including Abu Dhabi, Amman, Cairo, and Riyadh. Second, outside stakeholders committed to preventing Hamas’ resurgence, including Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the United States need a partner on the ground that retains legitimacy in the eyes of civilians to distribute aid and begin other essential activities, including rubble clearance and explosive ordnance disposal. This could be done under the same international mandate, with Israeli, U.S., regional, and international support. Finally, Israel’s governing coalition must identify civilian leads within the Israeli government to relieve the IDF from the primary decision-making role in postwar Gaza. Then genuine civilian-military planning must begin.

Israel’s campaign against Hamas has only military benchmarks, foremost among which is collapsing the terrorist organization’s command-and-control structure. This is to be achieved by targeting Hamas’s fighters, neutralizing its terror tunnel infrastructure, and eliminating its top leaders. But with only these metrics to assess progress and with two of them—tunnel neutralization and leadership elimination—nowhere near completion, Israel risks focusing on the elimination of threats rather than on formulating a proactive vision for what replaces Hamas.

Netanyahu has stated that Israel does not want to occupy Gaza in the long term. Israel shares the goal with Arab capitals, the United States, and other countries that Hamas should not be able to return to power, impose a stranglehold over Gaza, and export terrorism. This suggests that there is still political space for unity on post-Hamas governance in Gaza. The sequencing is key: first, an interim multinational or UN-led mission must be established, which should eventually hand over governance responsibility to a Palestinian-led entity.

WHO GOVERNS?

Two urgent tasks remain. The first is forming a law enforcement presence in Gaza, both immediately and in the long term. If order cannot be maintained, no meaningful stabilization and recovery activities can take place. Arab capitals that have ties to Israel through peace treaties or normalization agreements may be willing to contribute personnel, equipment, and funding for the post-Hamas security presence. But first they will need reassurance from Israel that Palestinian civilians are a priority, that the IDF will not jeopardize the safety of this law enforcement presence, and that there is a road map for postwar Gaza recovery and an international framework for Palestinian self-determination. Because local solutions are the most enduring, Palestinian forces should ultimately protect Palestinian civilians. Security forces associated with the Palestinian Authority should begin training now, with the assistance of the U.S. Security Coordinator in Israel and Jordan.

The second urgent task is achieving consensus on a governing framework for Gaza. To coordinate postwar activities and demonstrate to local communities that there is a credible alternative to Hamas, an internationally empowered and resourced entity should be positioned to immediately take action and prioritize civilian engagement. The Wilson Center, for example, recently proposed that a multinational authority and international contact group administer Gaza, under an international charter that provides legitimacy for the mission. Members of the group could include the G-7, some Arab capitals, the United States and perhaps Asian treaty allies including Japan and the Republic of Korea. The Palestinian Authority should have a role, but it will first need regional support and pressure to address its own weaknesses. A multinational governing mission, eventually transitioning to a Palestinian-led entity, appears to be the best option at this point in the war. This mission will need to partner with local actors, including former Palestinian Authority civil servants, aligned with the goal of building a non-Hamas governing framework for Gaza. Israel has successfully coordinated with Gaza-based Palestinian business leaders and non-Hamas civil servants in the past, meaning that the necessary local cadre exists today and is best positioned to be trusted by Gaza’s civilian population. Israel can accelerate this process by readying vetted lists of civil servants and businesspeople to coordinate with and supporting cooperation mechanisms between these individuals and the multinational governing mission, so that planning and sequencing are underway.

In Gaza, civilian-focused activities must be elevated to the same priority as military operations.

Reorganizing Israeli roles and responsibilities for Gaza will also be necessary if the golden hour is not to be squandered. Today, daily oversight of the West Bank and Gaza is conducted by COGAT, or the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. COGAT is within the Ministry of Defense and has the Israeli lead for coordinating humanitarian assistance into Gaza, retaining the primary role for civilian issues in the West Bank. But COGAT has never led a postwar stabilization mission and has not invested in the personnel, skills, or relationships with international partners required to successfully implement such a mission. Retaining COGAT as the Israeli lead for postwar activities in Gaza risks failing to learn the lesson that uniformed military actors are not best positioned to lead inherently civilian tasks. Reconstructing Gaza will require civilian partners. As months of planning for postwar Gaza have already been lost, a civilian-military planning cell that includes diplomatic, development, and security representatives from Arab capitals, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the UN, and the United States should convene immediately. It must build relationships and organizational ties so that coordination mechanisms are in place for the golden hour.

Finally, responding to urgent needs in Gaza and enabling long-term reconstruction will require funding and resources. The UN Development Program has described the reconstruction requirements for Gaza as the most significant since World War II and estimates that it will cost tens of billions of dollars. This funding will be possible only through an international pooled mechanism. There are plenty of examples across the UN and international financial institutions of postconflict funding programs, including when, in 2022, the World Bank mobilized financial commitments and pledges for Ukraine to support civil servant salaries, public health initiatives, infrastructure repair, and flexible funding facilities for relief and reconstruction efforts. The maritime route from Cyprus to Gaza for delivering humanitarian aid is already operating on a pooled funding scheme, approved by Israel. This offers a helpful proof that when political will aligns with recognition of urgent needs for Gaza, countries can cooperate on funding. This alignment will be crucial to ensuring that the critical golden hour is not squandered.