The Dangers of Defeatism for Ukraine

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Ukraine may be facing the toughest chapter of its war since the first days of Russia’s invasion. Its top general has used the word “stalemate,” and frontlines have changed little over the past year. In the West, the political tides may be shifting—especially in the United States, where Republicans in Congress are holding up new aid to Ukraine. Since the war began, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has been tirelessly and eloquently making the case for Ukrainian victory on the world stage as well as in the pages of Foreign Affairs. He joined me on January 23 to discuss why the West should not give up on Ukraine and its prospects of victory in the months and years ahead. 

Foreign Minister Kuleba, thank you so much for joining me, and for the series of notable contributions you’ve made to Foreign Affairs over the last few years.

DMYTRO KULEBA

Well, it’s my honor to appear on your pages.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Let me start with something that you wrote in Foreign Affairs last month with regard, of course, to the war. You wrote, quote, “Pessimism is unwarranted, and it would be a mistake to let defeatism shape our policy decisions going forward.” I want to start by laying out what I think is the fairly pessimistic view that has become fairly widespread in U.S. and allied policy circles right now, and have you react to it or critique it point by point. 

Just to convey that narrative in broad strokes, Ukraine, of course, heroically, repelled the full-scale Russian invasion starting on February 24. It then had some remarkable success taking back territory. I think I saw you in Kyiv the day that Kharkiv was retaken by Ukrainian forces, which was, I think, the first sign to much of the world that that kind of progress was possible.

But then things started to stall a little bit—and, of course, you had the article from General [Valerii] Zaluzhnyi about using the word “stalemate” on the battlefield. And what we have now is this brutal back and forth; some people have talked about it as a war of attrition. Ukraine’s counteroffensive over the last several months did not seem to take back as much territory as some people hoped. And that’s kind of where we are.

That has, of course, coincided with shaky Western support, which has led a lot of people to question whether much is going to change on the battlefield in the months ahead. I realize I’m putting a lot on the table there, but I’m eager to know what you see in that as roughly right, what parts of that narrative are missing the point somehow, and any big pieces that you’re focused on that are missing from that view.

DMYTRO KULEBA

Well, it is difficult to fight a war when, first, no one believes that you are able to survive at all. Then everyone gets excited about you surviving and actually defeating an enemy that is much stronger than you. Then people fall down in depression again once we stumble. This is not a strategy. I think those who pretend that they think of the war in strategic terms, if this is the line they follow, this is definitely not a strategy—it’s an emotional rollercoaster, something that an outside commentator can afford. But not us; nor any real strategist who sets the goal, calculates and puts together the means, and then moves steadily towards achieving this goal.

If the goal is to defeat Russia, is to teach it a lesson, is to teach a lesson to everyone in the world who is thinking of changing borders by force, then whatever happens on the ground in Ukraine should not be used as an excuse for cutting support or casting doubts about the feasibility of the ultimate goal. But instead, as strategic thinkers, we should be looking for solutions on how to overcome the difficulties and get closer, step by step, to the goal that we have set for ourselves.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

I would go back to a piece you wrote in the early months of the war for us called “Ukraine’s Theory of Victory.” Can you describe that theory of victory here? Not just what the objective is, which you and President Zelensky and your colleagues and various other Ukrainians have been very clear about, but the way of getting there—what you expect to happen that will get you to that objective.

DMYTRO KULEBA

Well, if you do a simple math exercise, I take a list of countries who militarily support Ukraine, and I take a list of countries who militarily support Russia, and then I combine GDPs of the countries on both lists, and I find out that the combined GDP from the Ukraine list is 21 times higher than the combined GDP of countries on Russia’s list. Therefore, the conclusion is, “I have the resources available not only to win in the war, but also to win the war of attrition.”

And then the next question is, how many more countries do I need to support me? One category consists of the countries who support the belligerent party, which is Ukraine, militarily, but also there are other different parts of support. You need someone who will simply vote for you in the General Assembly or support you in other international organizations, others who will be with you on the peace initiative that you put forward, like Ukraine’s peace initiative. And if we do very careful analysis of our capacities to build these coalitions, we will still outcompete the capacity of Russia to build its coalitions. 

And it’s funny, because Ukraine is not a member of G7, and yet G7 is much more united in helping Ukraine defend its interests. Russia is a founding member of BRICS, and yet the BRICS grouping is much weaker in supporting Russia, although it’s supposedly a member of their family.

In the end, when you do a very dry, rational analysis of the situation, it doesn’t matter from whatever angle you approach the issue. You come to a simple conclusion: Ukraine’s victory is in the strategic interests of countries who believe in the world order, in the rules-based order, who realize that whatever the price of helping Ukraine is, it’s cheaper than fixing the world if Ukraine doesn’t win.

And we end up with one simple argument: why are we having all these defeatist voices and deliberations? And there can be multiple answers to that, but one of them is also that Russia doesn’t sleep. And Russia, despite its seriously undermined capacity on the global stage, is still trying to use hybrid warfare to cast doubt, to sow divisions into the elites and stakeholders involved in the decision-making process across the globe.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

If we think about this war of attrition, is the assumption that, after a matter of months or years, if the supporters of Ukraine are united and continue to support it at the levels they have so far, eventually, Putin will decide it’s no longer in his interest, the Russian people will overthrow Putin? What’s the mechanism that changes that war and leads to the objective that you’ve laid out?

DMYTRO KULEBA

I think we are having two conceptual issues here. The first one is, not all of our friends view Putin as evil. In their thinking, they still consider him as a man, as a leader, who made a grave mistake that he has to pay for, but not an evil that must be eliminated as a political concept, as the way to handle international affairs. 

Now, if you consider that this is the leader who made a grave mistake, you come up with one strategy and one line of treatment. But if you consider him as an evil that has to cease to exist in global affairs—I mean, not physically—then, of course, it’s a different strategy. And I think the issue is that even some of our friends are still viewing Putin as a leader who made a mistake and not as a leader who turned evil, despite all the lessons that he [taught] them over the last 20 years of his rule. Because we remember numerous attempts to make a deal with him, to reset relations with him, to appease him, to engage him, but they all failed.

And the second conceptual issue that we are still facing is this line that “Russia must not win this war.” We’ve been saying from day one that the right way to put it is that Ukraine must win this war, because Ukraine must win this war, and Russia must not win this war. These are also two different strategies.

I think that these are two conceptual foundations of the shortcomings in the current policymaking. And I don’t want to say that everything is wrong. In fact, what the West did since February 24, 2022 is outstanding and remarkable. But it could have done much more if these two concepts were not standing in its way to victory.

So, the time has come to remove these two concepts from the toolbox of our thinking and approach the situation in a different manner, because coming [to] terms with Putin is impossible. Appeasing Putin is impossible. The strategy must be very simple, based on what we already discussed: militarily, politically, and economically, put him in a situation where he will himself go for a face-saving option. And when I say a face-saving option, it means that, because of his propaganda tools, he can sell any solution to his own people. It’s not a face-saving option for international affairs, it’s only for his domestic purposes, because apparently the only thing that he cares for is staying in power.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

In Putin’s mind, he has to say, “I’m going to risk losing power if I stay in Ukraine.” That’s ultimately what Ukraine and its supporters—the message they have to send him. Is that right?

DMYTRO KULEBA

Well, yes. I think he’s playing the argument that “If you go too far in pushing me out of Ukraine, this will destabilize the situation in Russia to the extent where you will have to sort out the mess occurring across a large span of territory, from Europe to Asia.” That’s definitely what he’s playing with.

But we had exactly the same set of fears dominating the thinking of Western powers in the months and weeks ahead of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and this nightmare did not come true. But the difference is that Putin, of course, is playing his game in a rather smart way. And he’s bluffing a lot. This is also something that must be taken into account. And unfortunately, his bluff has good value on the market.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

I’ve heard you frequently and ironically recount the pattern of conversation you have with your counterparts in European capitals and in Washington where they say, “We can’t possibly give you this weapon system or as much of some weapon as you need because of risk escalation.” And then, after a period of weeks or months of you making the case for it, they finally give it to you, you use it, and there’s no escalation, as you’ve argued. As you look back at the last couple of years, are there moments when you think having had some specific weapon or more of some weapon would have allowed Ukraine a breakthrough that could have left us at a very different place in the war?

DMYTRO KULEBA

Well, in this war, nothing benefited Putin more than the “don’t escalate” concept. This is really something that he should be grateful for, because the “don’t escalate” concept protracted [the] adoption of many decisions that were still made. But we lost time, we lost territories, and we lost lives.

I understand it wasn’t easy for many capitals to scrap decades and centuries of foreign policy thinking toward Russia. If generations of your diplomats were raised on the premise that Russia should be treated as a partner—as a difficult, but still, a partner—it’s extremely difficult to make a U-turn in one day. And yet, I have to commend many of them by at least partially making a U-turn when they allowed transferring weapons to Ukraine, changing their legislation and decades-long policies on this. But was this U-turn comprehensive? No, it wasn’t.

But you see, again, ending a war of this kind demands the elimination of the core reason of the war. And the core reason here is the imperialistic thinking of President Putin. And whatever you do with it, whatever kind of balanced approaches you may entertain, it doesn’t matter how careful you are trying to be. He will always be one step ahead, because this is how empires think and act.

He thinks not in terms of Ukraine only. He thinks of restoring the spheres of influence that his predecessors had established for the Russian empire. And you can entertain any kind of philosophy or strategy, but as long as this man is in place, and he has the capacity, and he’s not taught the lesson of going back behind his border, he will keep doing it. This is why it is so essential to change the way we think of Russia, to change the way we treat Russia, and to design a policy that will aim at basically de-imperializing the thinking in the Kremlin. And the only way to that, as we all know it, is to teach them a lesson on the battlefield.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

The moment of probably most acute escalation fear, at least in Washington, came in the fall of 2022, when there was really a sense among American intelligence officials and people in the Biden administration that nuclear use by Russia was a significant risk. You hear reporting that senior officials suddenly put the odds in the mid double digits, or 50 percent, that Putin will use a nuclear weapon. 

You were, of course, skeptical that that would ever happen. You would see that as a bluff. What were those conversations like with your American counterparts, and what do you think they were getting wrong in taking that risk seriously?

DMYTRO KULEBA

It was a very careful conversation on our side because we realized, we were fully aware of the importance of nuclear deterrence theory or doctrine in the way the U.S. decisionmakers think. But I would like to recall, to remind everyone that we fell victim [to] this thinking in 1994 when the United States and the Russian Federation colluded behind Ukraine with only one task: to deprive Ukraine of its nuclear arsenal. 

And the reason why Russia was doing it was simple: because they wanted to disarm Ukraine and deprive us of the most powerful tool of defending our independence and deterring Russian nuclear threats and military threats as such. But the reason why the United States did it was just the doctrine, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Ukraine was the friendliest country to the United States and still is. Ukraine did not pose any threat. But the choice the United States articulated to Ukraine back then was either to give up the nuclear arsenal or to become a pariah in international relations, similar to what North Korea is.

And now, elites made their choice because they trusted the West, they trusted the United States. I don’t want to dwell, but I just want to say that we take the nuclear arguments in the U.S. thinking very seriously, and therefore our conversations about Russian nuclear threats were always very balanced and rational. There was not an element of a single emotion in it. And basically, we let our colleagues leave through it without pushing on them. And the more time passed, the less present this nuclear argument was in their discussions. I don’t know if you have a better feeling of where the U.S. discourse stands on this now, but I think that it’s clearly not as influential as it used to be even a year ago.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Focusing still on Washington for a bit, there is, of course, a big fight going on about the next package of aid to Ukraine, 61 billion dollars supplemental. A lot of this is, of course, about immigration politics in the southwestern border in the United States, but there are skeptics of that in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere. I want to ask you, what would the consequences be for Ukraine and the war effort if it does not get that 61 billion dollars?

DMYTRO KULEBA

There is a political answer to that and there is a more mathematical answer to that. What is the calculation of those who are trying to withhold the support, the financial and military support, to Ukraine? Perhaps their assumption, their calculation, is that if we do this, Ukraine itself will realize that it’s time to make concessions to Russia and to enter in negotiations with Russia, and that will put an end to the war. This equation may sound appealing to some political players, but two numbers stand in the way.

The first one is that we held 200 rounds of consultations with Russia between 2014, when it annexed Crimea, and February 2022, when the large-scale invasion began. We announced, we agreed on, I think, 20 ceasefires with them, and all of them failed. Both rounds of talks did not deliver peace, and ceasefires did not save lives. They were all broken by Russia. Basically, the answer is very simple: Russia wanted the war all the time. 

And now, when you turn to today’s situation, there is a different number: two years of fighting. Enormous suffering on behalf of Ukraine. The existence of our nation is still at stake. To make anyone think, believe, that Ukraine will stop fighting and concede because it will lack resources is just a bad math exercise. It’s like you have two plus two equals four, and you come up with five as the most credible answer. This is not the case. 

So Ukraine will keep fighting, but of course the situation will get much worse on the battleground. In fact, we already feel a much bigger shortage of artillery ammunition than we had two or three months ago. And if Ukraine will not concede, Russia will not stop, because why should they stop now if they see that they can take it all?

So there will be more battles, there will be more losses, and the moment will come when the same politicians who are withholding support today will realize that the only way to remain credible in international affairs is to restore, resume, supporting Ukraine in order to help Ukraine stabilize the front line again. My problem is that it’ll happen again at the cost of Ukrainians because someone is playing domestic games elsewhere, in Washington or in other capitals. 

And I think the Biden administration is perfectly aware of this scenario, and this is why they so stubbornly defend the line that the systems should be delivered. It’s not just about the credibility of the United States. It’s also the understanding that it’s cheaper to help now than to fix the mess that will occur if help does not come on time.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Would it require a change in strategy? Is there a change in strategy? People talk about a defensive period, just given the limited amounts of artillery rounds and other things. Are there other changes in strategy that would be required by that reduction?

DMYTRO KULEBA

I think it’s a change in tactics, not in strategy. There are two most overused words in international relations: the first one is “strategy” and the second one is “genocide.” Basically, everything is called a strategy. Even if one blinks an eye, it’s called a strategy. But it’s just tactics, sometimes. And the same goes with genocide; everything is labeled as genocide. But what you just mentioned is not a change of strategy whatsoever. It’s a change of tactics, and it makes sense, given the lessons that we learned over the last six, seven months.

And second, I think there is a good reason for both sides, actually, for both Ukraine and Russia, to change tactics. Last autumn, we saw how the war transformed in front of our eyes. It used to be the tank artillery war, and it turned [out] to be drone artillery war. And you have to change tactics, you have to change the way you fight, the way you operate your armies on the ground. It requires time, and therefore it’s one of the reasons why tactics are being adjusted to reality. But to speak of the change of strategy, you have to change the strategic goal, objective, that you pursue. That is not in question, neither here in Kyiv nor in other capitals that stand by Kyiv.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

There is a theory that Putin is waiting for the possible election of Donald Trump. I imagine you’re thinking about that possibility as well, as we watch him get closer to having the Republican nomination. I’m curious how you’re thinking about the possible return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency. He, of course, has a long history with President Zelensky and the Ukraine issue. He’s talked about ending the war in one day, which I think President Zelensky has called a dangerous claim. How do you see Trump’s possible return, and what would that mean for your prospects in the war?

DMYTRO KULEBA

Well, correct me if I’m wrong, but it seems President Putin already waited for the election of President Trump once. And I remember the day when it happened, and people were pretty agitated and even panicking, speaking about the big deal that Trump and Putin will conclude: they will strike a big deal that will send Ukraine down the drain. And Russian propaganda and agents of influence were excited about this narrative and were pushing it on through every channel they had in control. But somehow it didn’t work, perhaps because life is more complicated than that. 

Many think of Putin as a genius strategist, but in fact, I don’t see him this way. I think Putin is instinctively imperial in his thinking, but this is where his strategic thinking ends. Basically, he’s very postmodernist, in a way that he’s just trying to do what his predecessors had done and to put himself in the same role with them. How to get there is not a strategy. It is a purely opportunistic approach. And the most strikingly visible evidence of this approach is that he always waits for elections in country A, B, C, Z. 

He was waiting for elections in Greece in 2015 in the hope that the left-wing socialist Syriza party will form the government and block the extension of EU sanctions. He was waiting for elections in France; he was actively working against the election of then-candidate Emmanuel Macron. He was waiting for elections in the United States of America in 2016. And I can go on and on and on and on. And here he is waiting for elections again: he’s waiting for elections in America, he’s waiting for elections in Germany, he’s waiting for elections in France. 

But over the last 20 years, all of his expectations failed, because none of the elections allowed him to create more favorable conditions for his expansion. So, I don’t mind President Putin waiting for new elections. And that brings me to the second part of your question, which is, I don’t mind who is going to win in the U.S. elections. In a way, that is the right of the American people to make their choice and to create a reality that we will have to work with. 

And I have adopted a beautiful—I think it’s actually American, not English—idiom: “Cross the bridge when you come to it.” I can give advice to everyone; if anyone finds himself in a war and problems start falling on your head and shoulders from all corners, first, remain optimistic, and second, cross bridges when you come to them. If you adopt these strategies, the likelihood of crossing the bridge instead of drowning will be much, much higher.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Before we close, I want to ask you about two other diplomatic fronts that have been sources of focus or concern for you. The first is China. Do you see any possibility that China will play a constructive role in ending the war or restraining Putin? There’s been talk of another call between Xi Jinping and President Zelensky. What’s the goal of that exchange, and what do you hope for from the Chinese?

DMYTRO KULEBA

China is waiting for the opportunity to play a constructive role because its whole strategy in international affairs is to wait until the opportunity to position yourself as a constructive player occurs. The difficulty with China is that, for a number of reasons, it cannot afford losing neither Russia nor Putin. Quite to the contrary; China benefits from Putin’s weaknesses today, and the weaker he gets, China benefits more.

But at the same time, those who believe that we should court Putin or we shouldn’t be too tough with him because that will throw him into the hands of China, they are completely wrong in their thinking, because Russia is already in the hands of China, and there is no way you can take them out of there. He’s trapped, and he will not get out of this trap. So, this is kind of the way we see China and the way we understand Russia’s relationship with China.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

I suppose I think about your earlier comment about Ukraine’s strategy. As soon as China starts to worry that Putin might lose power because of battlefield failures in Ukraine, that’s the moment when it’s likely to do something to restrain him.

DMYTRO KULEBA

If you read the statements and comments coming from China, they will reassure Putin of his importance and [irreplaceable] nature of President Putin. But I think what matters more to China is Russia and its resources rather than Putin himself. Putin is just the man with whom China built a relationship and who allowed China to increase its impact and penetration into Russian resources. But as valuable as he, Putin, may look like today for China, I think, in the end, it just depends on the equilibrium that you built.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

A final question: I want to get your thoughts on the October 7 attack and the war in Gaza that’s been, I think, challenging for Ukraine in a couple of regards. One is just the loss of focus among policymakers in Washington and in Europe. There’s also the hypocrisy or double standard argument that one hears from parts of the developing world, especially. I think it’s probably mostly an excuse, but it’s certainly something you’re hearing. I’m curious how worried you are about that loss of focus, or the shift in focus to the Middle East, and what that might mean for you, and then also how you see those double standard or hypocrisy arguments.

DMYTRO KULEBA

Well, I have mixed feelings on this because, first, I think it’s inappropriate for journalists, foreign relations experts, to frame the narrative in a way that suffering of one group of people and destruction of one territory overshadows suffering of other people and destruction of another territory. People who die in Gaza and die in Ukraine, they’re all human beings. They feel the pain of loss in exactly the same way. 

So I think that, partially, we, commentators—and I do not exclude politicians from this list—bear the responsibility for framing the narrative in a way, and emphasizing the point that one war overshadows another war, one war becomes more important than another war. If 100 people die in one day tomorrow in Ukraine, I’m sure we will be on the front page again. But do I want to pay this price for reappearing on the front page? No, I don’t. And I don’t mind being on the second page, because I know that people still read the second page.

All wars are essentially about the suffering of human beings. But because we live in a rather cynical world, I know one fact: people get used to everything. People get used to the war in Ukraine. People will get used to the war in Gaza. The longer it lasts, the more they get used to it. Then, a new war will break out and they will get used to it, too. What really matters is that we stay focused on ending the wars, on stopping people’s suffering, on restoring peace instead of finding excuses for not doing so.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Dmytro, thank you for taking so much time and engaging these issues so substantively, both in this conversation and also in the series of really excellent pieces you’ve done for Foreign Affairs. We will look forward to the next one, and in the meantime, all the best to you and your colleagues.

DMYTRO KULEBA

Thank you, Daniel, and thank you for all the space and time that you dedicate to Ukraine on the pages of Foreign Affairs.