The Case Against Israeli-Saudi Normalization

When President Joe Biden leaves office early next year, he will probably do so without having realized a signature item on his agenda for the Middle East—a diplomatic normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, sealed by a formal U.S. security guarantee to Riyadh. Yet this elusive agreement runs the risk of being picked up again by his successor, no matter who wins the election in November. While in office, former President Donald Trump was among Saudi Arabia’s biggest supporters, and he has already signaled his desire to expand the so-called Abraham Accords—a series of bilateral agreements between Israel and a handful of Arab countries, negotiated under his watch—to include Saudi Arabia. Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate, could be compelled to revive the deal or some variation of it, both for the sake of continuity and because hammering out a grand bargain in this troubled region would be a foreign policy achievement for a relatively inexperienced politician.

But for Harris or Trump, continuing to elevate this regional accord would be a grave mistake. The proposed arrangement will not end the war in Gaza, solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, block China’s inroads to the Middle East, or counter Iran and its militant proxies. Instead, by committing Washington to defend a deeply repressive Arab state with a history of destabilizing behavior, the pact’s main achievement will be to further entangle the United States in a region that successive U.S. presidents have tried to pivot away from.

The single-minded pursuit of this bad deal has also blinded U.S. policymakers to other, more important drivers of conflict in the region, and it has caused the United States to delay efforts to ramp up pressure on Israel to end its war in Gaza. The next U.S. president should therefore jettison the proposed accord and focus Middle East policy instead on the economic and social issues most important to the region.

RAW DEAL

Though an Israeli-Saudi agreement has yet to be finalized, its broad outlines have already become clear. According to the terms of the proposed accord, Saudi Arabia would formally recognize Israel in return for Israel’s commitment to establish an independent Palestinian state. The United States would promise to defend Saudi Arabia from external attack and support Riyadh’s civilian nuclear program, and the Saudis would give Washington new military access to the kingdom’s territorial waters and airspace. Riyadh would also pledge to restrict Chinese military bases and security cooperation in Saudi Arabia, including forgoing purchases of advanced Chinese technology and weapons and limiting some Chinese investment in the Saudi economy.

Concluding the deal has an obvious appeal for both Israeli and Saudi leaders. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could present it as a political win after facing heavy domestic criticism for failing to prevent Hamas’s horrific October 7 attacks and prolonging the military campaign in Gaza. Saudi Arabia’s crown prince and de facto leader, Mohammed bin Salman, also remains intent on signing some version of the agreement because it offers the kingdom protection, substantial economic benefits, and the prestige of being counted among the United States’ closest allies.

As for Washington, Israeli-Saudi normalization may seem to offer a way to advance a two-state solution—thus ending a conflict that has sucked up U.S. resources and attention—while blocking the growing influence of China in the Middle East. But on inspection, normalization would achieve neither of these aims. For starters, the deal won’t be the path to peace between Israelis and Palestinians that Washington hopes it to be. There is simply no evidence that Netanyahu—or any Israeli government—will make and adhere to the concessions needed to create a Palestinian state, which Riyadh has demanded as a prerequisite, no matter what economic and security benefits Saudi normalization might bring. Added to this, Israeli public support for Palestinian statehood has dropped since the Hamas attack: according to a spring 2024 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, just over a quarter of Israelis now support such an arrangement.

Even if Israel and Saudi Arabia were to arrive at some agreement, the prospects that it would create lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians are slim. According to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, a majority of Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank support armed struggle against Israel. Some Israelis are armed and radicalized and might also try to sabotage such a deal. In fact, even the normalization deals that Israel has already signed appear to be on shaky ground. After October 7, protests against the Abraham Accords broke out in Morocco and Bahrain. Arab and Israeli leaders are having trouble upholding commitments that have already been made. It would be especially hard for them to adhere to new ones.

Even the normalization deals that Israel has already signed appear to be on shaky ground.

The deal also wouldn’t give the United States any real advantage over China in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has been expanding relations with a range of outside powers, including China and Russia, on energy and trade to avoid overreliance on the United States. Riyadh thinks a diversity of partners will attract better economic opportunities and allow access to more advanced technology and military systems, especially in areas in which the United States lacks a competitive edge. China and Saudi Arabia, for example, are working together on infrastructure and technology projects, as well as on renewable energy initiatives. The deal would not prohibit this activity, so this trend is likely to continue either way.

The agreement would block Beijing’s military activities by preventing China from building military bases in Saudi Arabia and limiting Saudi acquisition of Chinese weapons and domestic surveillance technology. But these are near-meaningless concessions: military ties are not the main source of Beijing’s growing influence in Saudi Arabia or, for that matter, in the broader Middle East. Today, China has no permanent military presence or planned military bases in Saudi Arabia and is not a major weapons supplier to the kingdom, and the two countries rarely train their forces together. More important, the economic and commercial partnerships that are the real drivers of China’s regional leverage would be left largely untouched.

Notably, U.S. efforts to push China out of other Middle Eastern countries have come up short. In the nearby United Arab Emirates, for instance, Microsoft recently announced a $1.5 billion investment in G42, an Emirati artificial intelligence company, brokered with the help of the U.S. government. In return for Microsoft’s funds, G42 agreed to sell off its Chinese investments and remove Chinese-produced technology from its systems in favor of U.S. components and services. Since Microsoft’s announcement of the investment, however, complications have emerged. For example, although G42 has reduced ties with Chinese companies, other Emirati firms have not. As a result, talent and know-how that G42 gains from its partnership with Microsoft could easily flow into firms in the UAE that have deeper relationships with Chinese investors, possibly defeating the purpose of the restrictions.

The terms of the proposed U.S.-Saudi deal are quite different than those between Microsoft and G42, of course, but some of the same challenges apply. Trying to selectively limit Chinese technology and investments inside Saudi Arabia would be difficult, and Beijing would likely maintain a significant and sometimes hard-to-detect presence in the kingdom. Even under the potential accord, for instance, China would probably retain its investments in Saudi ports, which might be leveraged for under-the-radar military operations or to refuel or resupply Chinese military ships. The deal, then, is a poor way to deprive China of a foothold in the kingdom.

GO YOUR OWN WAY

The purported military benefits to the United States of Israeli-Saudi normalization are also overblown. In theory, the agreement would offer the United States some marginal military advantages when it comes to containing Iran. Washington might use new access to Saudi waters and airspace to improve its ability to track and disrupt Iran’s militias and interdict weapons shipments bound for its proxies. But in practice, the military gains would be minimal. Saudi Arabia, like other Gulf Arab countries, seeks to avoid open conflict with Iran and its proxies, so it has been reluctant to help the United States fend off Houthi attacks in the Red Sea or act against Iranian proxies elsewhere in the region. The agreement is unlikely to change that fact.

Even if it did, the additional access in Saudi Arabia would not give Washington much of a leg up: trying to deter low-intensity militia activity with ever-grander displays of U.S. hard power has often proved disappointing. Iranian-backed armed groups have become masters at inflicting damage to Israel and U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria with just enough restraint to avoid crossing U.S. redlines or triggering escalation. The United States’ campaign to stop Houthi attacks on commercial shipping over the past year is a case in point. Even senior U.S. military officials have acknowledged the operation has been a costly failure because the Houthis have successfully dispersed their weapons and personnel. Washington is not hamstrung by its capabilities or access. It has decided that conducting a larger ground operation, which is probably necessary to stop Houthi attacks by force, is not worth risking American lives or a wider war. With this experience in the rearview, it is doubtful that additional military access in the region would make the United States safer.

Perhaps most worrying, a normalization agreement would bog down the United States in the Middle East at a time when the White House should be prioritizing other global challenges, such as countering Beijing in the South China Sea. Despite receiving millions of tons of advanced weaponry from France, Germany, and the United States, Saudi Arabia needs outside help to defend itself. In the event of a war, it would likely prove more of a liability for Washington than a valued partner. The United States should continue to assist Saudi Arabia in developing niche capabilities it needs to protect itself, such as air defense systems. But it should avoid making a sweeping commitment to send U.S. troops and materiel to defend the regime from external aggression. Such a pledge might dissuade Riyadh from pursuing conciliation with its neighbors and embolden the kingdom to take risks.

The deal would also harm the Middle East in more subtle ways. The relentless pursuit of Israeli-Saudi normalization has sidetracked Washington from helping the region make progress on its actual sources of conflict and extremism. To end the war in Gaza, for example, the United States will need to apply greater and more direct pressure on Israel. Instead, U.S. officials have behaved as if they can resolve the conflict by dangling the carrot of normalization. More broadly, the Biden administration’s preoccupation with this deal has distracted it from other looming problems in the Middle East, including authoritarianism, corruption, human rights abuses, the lack of economic opportunities for young people, and climate change.

Whoever moves into the White House in January would do well to remember that these thorny and deeply rooted afflictions won’t be solved through accords orchestrated by an outside power. Instead, these problems require patient and painstaking work by the region’s governments, with greater involvement from their citizens. Pushing these partners to take responsibility for their future and their own security through more inclusive, accountable, and transparent governance should be the centerpiece of the next U.S. administration’s Middle East policy. Helping tackle these endemic issues is more worthwhile than the pursuit of an illusory pact that will leave the United States worse off than before.