Can America Win Over the World’s Middle Powers?

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many Western analysts contend that Moscow has become increasingly isolated and has lost much of its international influence. Russian President Vladimir Putin was indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court earlier this year, which means he can travel only to countries that have not ratified the court’s Rome Statute if he wants to avoid arrest. Western diplomats have begun to avoid Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, too. When German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock explained to a reporter at the UN General Assembly session in September why she had not met with Lavrov, she said it would be pointless because Lavrov lies and has no power to negotiate.

The widening gulf between Russia and the West is undeniable. But elsewhere in the world, another trend has become clear: Moscow has increased its influence and leverage in many important countries, including ones that matter a great deal to Washington. These countries, in turn, have taken advantage of new global divisions to raise their regional and international profiles.

Over the course of this year, we held conversations with scholars, private sector experts, and policymakers from seven important U.S. partners—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey—to discuss the core issues in these countries’ relationships with Russia, how their governments engage with Moscow, and how they view Russia’s war in Ukraine. Across the board, we encountered a reluctance to take sides in what is largely seen as a strictly European conflict. Our interlocutors made clear that publics in their countries were receptive to Russian narratives blaming the West for the war, a reflection of the persuasive power of Russian disinformation. Finally, we found a broad recognition that the choice to remain neutral is partly driven by incentives created by Russian influence and coercion. In certain countries, dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, fertilizer, grain, or weapons has helped shape the response to the war. And in India and Indonesia in particular, the Kremlin has capitalized on concerns about Chinese regional ambitions to present itself as a counterweight to Beijing.

This does not mean the United States and its allies have lost the battle for influence with Russia, but they cannot expect these countries’ full support. Then again, neither can Moscow.

In a world of renewed great-power rivalry, middle powers are seeking opportunities, not alignment. The challenge for Washington is to counter Russian disinformation and show these countries that the most fruitful opportunities lie with the United States and its allies.

THE STORIES RUSSIA TELLS

With a successful disinformation strategy, the Kremlin has convinced a good part of the world that NATO enlargement threatened Russia’s territorial integrity and that Russia had no choice but to defend itself by launching a “special military operation” in Ukraine. Moscow is particularly adept at exploiting wariness toward Washington in countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa.

The Russian narrative about the conflict’s “real aggressors” taps into a widespread resentment of the United States and anger at how the war in Ukraine and U.S.-Chinese rivalry have diverted attention and resources from urgent global concerns about climate, debt, energy, food, and health. The United States takes “an ‘outreach when I need you’ approach” across Africa, Asia, and South America, its “erratic” policies leaving gaps for China and Russia to exploit, a Brazilian policymaker noted. An Indonesian commentator added that “the West treats Indonesia as a pawn in an international game with China and Russia, not as a sovereign country and equal partner.” As a result, “Many of the West’s political problems with Indonesia are self-created,” the commentator added. Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar bluntly told his European counterparts in June 2022 that they must “grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.”

Western leaders have started to recognize Russia’s advantage in this war of rhetoric. At a conference in February, French President Emmanuel Macron said he has been “shocked by how much credibility we are losing,” referring to the West’s diminished status in the eyes of the rest of the world. At the same event, Josep Borrell, the EU’s foreign affairs chief, acknowledged “how powerful the Russian narrative is.”

The Russian narrative about the war in Ukraine taps into a widespread resentment of the United States.

Russian outlets spreading disinformation and propaganda have made significant inroads around the globe. For example, the Kremlin’s aggressive promotion of RT en Español­—the Spanish-language version of a Russian state media outlet—has gained traction across Latin America. In the Americas and in Israel, investigators have linked the Russian government to a network of websites that appear to be legitimate news sites but are really sources of disinformation. In India, Indonesia, and South Africa, social media platforms are saturated with Russian propaganda.

Under Putin, Moscow has presented itself as a global defender of traditional values against licentious Western societies that promote abortion and LGBTQ rights, suppress religious freedom, and impose their cultural preferences on others. The Kremlin portrays Ukraine as a dangerous outpost of Western “wokeness.” Such ideas resonate among some culturally and religiously conservative populations across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as in Europe and North America.

Russia has also instrumentalized the Soviet past to serve its present political purposes. In its dealings with India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa, Russia draws on historical Soviet support for anticolonial movements. Lavrov has positioned Russia on the side of countries that stand against the West’s “attempts to falsify history, to erase the memory of the horrible crimes of the colonizers, including genocide.” Such rhetoric has been particularly effective in South Africa, where the ruling African National Congress contrasts Moscow’s support for the ANC with Washington’s inaction during the apartheid era. Many of the party’s leaders were educated in the Soviet Union or in Russia. Their strong identification of Moscow with opposition to Western colonialism has led to a sense that they owe what one South African expert calls a “liberation debt” to today’s Russia—a sentiment the Russian government has cultivated. The result, according to another South African interlocutor, is an “almost naive adoration of Russia” based on the ruling elite’s perception of the “glorious Soviet Union.”

CARROTS AND STICKS

Beyond its rhetorical campaign, the Kremlin has concrete means of drawing other countries to Russia’s side. At first glance, Russia’s economic leverage seems to pale in comparison with that of the West: its GDP is lower than those of Canada, Italy, or South Korea, and its commercial ties to the countries we examined are less substantial than the ties those countries share with the West. Moscow offers comparatively little in the way of development assistance or investment, and international sanctions further limit the carrots the Kremlin can dangle before the countries it courts. Even so, Russia’s ability to make use of its economic relationships is evident.

Energy is Russia’s primary lever of economic influence. The West set a price cap on Russian oil in late 2022 to reduce Russian oil revenues, which help fund Moscow’s war effort, without stopping the sale of Russian oil, which would create global shortages. Europe has slashed its imports from Russia, but Russian oil continues to flow to global markets. The biggest beneficiary is India, which imports 85 percent of its oil. Before the war, hardly any of that oil came from Russia; now, Russia provides half of India’s supply, and at a discount. Energy exports have driven large spikes in Russia’s overall trade with several countries—since the 2022 invasion, Russia’s trade volume with Brazil has doubled and its trade with India and Turkey has tripled.

Russia is also using nuclear energy exports, which have not been sanctioned, to gain influence abroad. In 2010, Russia and Turkey signed a deal for Rosatom, a state corporation that has a monopoly on the Russian nuclear industry, to construct Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan opened the plant in southern Turkey earlier this year, he thanked Putin personally and announced his intention to build at least two more plants “as soon as possible.” Under the arrangement with Rosatom, which now owns and operates the Turkish nuclear plant, Turkey’s reliance on Russia will continue for decades.

Middle powers seek to exploit great-power rivalry to advance their own interests.

Russian fertilizer and grain are important to Indonesia, Turkey, and other countries we examined, too. Brazil imports the vast majority of its fertilizers, a quarter of which come from Russia—making Brazil Russia’s biggest fertilizer customer. This dependence on a critical Russian export partly explains why Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula) has said that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is “as responsible as Putin for the war.”

Historically, arms sales allowed Moscow to collect profits and build relationships with foreign leaders and their militaries. Russia’s role in this area had been declining even before its full-scale war against Ukraine. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia’s share of total global arms exports in 2018–22 fell by roughly one-third compared with the previous five-year period. Now, the war is constraining Russia’s ability to export on the same scale as before. Yet defense remains the cornerstone of some bilateral relationships, most notably the one Russia shares with India, whose reliance on military materiel from Moscow dates back to the Soviet period. India has been the single largest buyer of Russian arms, accounting for 31 percent of Russia’s total arms exports between 2018 and 2022, and the equipment the Indian military uses today is predominantly Soviet and Russian in origin. “It is in India’s interest to sustain a productive relationship with Russia for the purpose of its defense preparedness,” noted one senior Indian policymaker.

Russia has also been making an effort to penetrate the highest circles of power in each of the countries we examined. Russian intelligence operations are extensive, encompassing human, cyber, and signals intelligence, as well as reconnaissance and special forces units. Mexican experts privately confirm public comments by U.S. officials that Mexico City hosts a particularly large Russian intelligence-gathering operation because of its proximity to the United States. Putin’s own relationship building is a source of Russian influence, too. His close ties with Erdogan have led to an exchange of favors between the two leaders: Erdogan irked his NATO allies by purchasing a Russian air defense system in 2017 and refusing to join Western sanctions against Russia in 2022, and Putin allowed Turkey to defer a $20 billion gas payment during Erdogan’s difficult 2023 election campaign. Below the level of top leadership, the Kremlin’s operatives have tried to cultivate or even capture friendly political elites abroad. According to one South African expert, “South Africa’s elite-patronage networks involve the Russian state, Putin insiders, and oligarchs,” and transnational illicit networks operating “under the guise of South Africa-Russia diplomatic partnerships” have been “emboldened” amid the current war.

THE VIEW FROM THE MIDDLE

One of the most important reasons why Russia has maintained—and in some cases gained—influence in these countries has less to do with Moscow’s tactics than with the countries’ own foreign policy orientations. CIA Director William Burns has referred to the category to which these countries belong as the “hedging middle,” because the members are “intent on diversifying their relationships in order to expand their strategic autonomy and maximize their options,” and they “see little benefit and lots of risk in monogamous geopolitical relationships.” Similar to the United States and Europe, these countries are practicing forms of “de-risking” in the face of unpredictable global currents. The difference is that, whereas the West is focusing on threats from China and Russia, middle powers are trying to avoid getting tangled up in great-power rivalries and other global disruptions. In some cases, these countries seek to exploit great-power rivalry to advance their own interests. “Russia is a cheap hedge against the dominance of the United States and China,” an Indonesian analyst noted. “The Russia relationship is the door through which multipolarity is assured,” an Indian commentator added, “especially when U.S.-China bipolarity remains a possibility and a challenge.”

Today’s hedgers are different from the neutral and nonaligned movement of the Cold War era. These countries are often lumped into a single category, but they are not bound by shared mechanisms, geographies, allegiances, or affinities that allow them to coordinate; as one Mexican policymaker put it, “The term ‘global South’ doesn’t mean anything” in practice. But there are some commonalities in the way these middle powers view the war in Ukraine. They may not support Russian goals, but for the most part they have neither condemned Russia’s invasion nor sanctioned Russia. And as the war drags on, they feel vindicated by their refusal to take sides.

At the same time, these countries are concerned about the possible consequences of Russia’s strategic weakness, and they believe the war is hastening Russia’s long-term decline. Some lament “what Russia is doing to itself,” as one Indian expert put it. Most fear that a full Russian defeat in Ukraine could diminish Russian power with unpredictable consequences for the region and the world. “India wants a stable Eurasia,” the commentator added, “not one coming apart at the seams.”

WASHINGTON’S WINDOW

The persistence of ties between Russia and these middle powers since the war began has challenged Washington’s ability to isolate Moscow and expand the coalition supporting Ukraine. Despite the Biden administration’s outreach, these countries have more or less remained committed to neutrality—and their positions are unlikely to change any time soon. But Washington and its allies can push for modest gains. They should adjust their rhetoric to reduce support for Russian tactics and goals in Ukraine, avoid action that invites charges of Western hypocrisy, and double down on policies that address the interests and needs of middle powers. Even if these countries maintain their current approach to the war in Ukraine, they can cooperate with the United States on many other issues.

First, the United States and its allies can be doing much more to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation. The State Department has made a good start by uncovering and “pre-bunking”—providing tools for people to identify misleading information—messages by covert Russian information operations in Central America and South America. Kremlin narratives about the malign intentions of the West and specifically the “Anglo-Saxon world” toward Russia, about NATO’s supposed plans to invade Russia, and about Ukraine being a hotbed of Nazis cannot be allowed to circulate unrefuted.

Changing minds is not impossible, but the West needs a more persuasive message about the stakes of the war. Framing the conflict as a struggle between authoritarianism and democracy makes hedgers, some of which are not fully democratic themselves, less willing to support the West’s response. “India’s position on the war is not support for Russia,” an Indian observer noted. “But there is also little support for the democracy-versus-autocracy argument.” The United States might find a more receptive audience if it emphasizes Russia’s violation of the UN Charter and fundamental principles of sovereignty and international law. Allowing Russia to get away with invading its neighbor and seizing territory would set a dangerous precedent for future aggression by irredentist states or regional separatists—a problem that concerns all the countries we examined.

The West must supplement its steps to counter Russian narratives with initiatives that build on Western strengths and address the needs and interests of the middle powers. There is reason to think such efforts would be welcome, as some of these countries have second thoughts about Moscow. “Debate is raging on whether the continuing defense relationship with Russia has become a liability,” noted an Indian policymaker. “Given the priority of economic growth, India will necessarily gravitate to the West.” Brazilian, Indonesian, Mexican, and South African analysts all pointed to a generational gap in attitudes toward Moscow. Older elites tend to associate the Russia of today with the Soviet Union’s political positions, and they may still talk about “Western neocolonialism” while ignoring the colonial nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine and Putin’s lament of the breakup of the Soviet empire. But as one South African observer noted, “Younger people with no memories of Soviet times and no personal connections to Russia are less sympathetic. They do not see Moscow as a champion of global equity and justice.” Many African leaders were dismayed by Putin’s dismissive response to the Ukrainian peace plan they presented to him this summer, and they remain angry that the Russian leader is blocking Ukrainian shipments of critical fertilizers and grains.

Middle powers will continue to seek new coalitions and to steer clear of great-power rivalries.

To take advantage of these openings, the United States and its allies can begin with steps to ensure that essential foodstuffs reach countries whose imports have been disrupted by Russia’s war in Ukraine. They should make good on the pledges they made to developing countries regarding pandemic preparedness and climate aid. They can also build on innovative efforts that demonstrate the value of staying close to the West. One example is the Just Energy Transition Partnerships, which are climate financing programs that groups of Western countries have set up with Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa, and Vietnam, and are currently negotiating with India. Another is the Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation, signed by 32 countries in Africa, Europe, and the Americas in September, which provides a forum for members to collaborate on economic, energy, environmental, and maritime issues. Further examples include the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, a project co-founded by the United States that is meant to boost economic connections across Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe, as well as the Lobito Corridor project, which connects Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia to global markets and is funded by the United States, the European Commission, and several development banks.

In New Delhi, officials recognize that despite its cheap oil and arms, Russia cannot offer the kinds of investment, trade, and development aid that India really needs. “India’s relations with Russia are on a downward spiral,” reflected one Indian observer. “Our priority is internal development. The U.S. and the West at large have much more to contribute.” Even if India maintains its neutrality in the current war, that position will not prevent New Delhi from seeking other partners—as it has already done through its membership in the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) with Australia, Japan, and the United States. India’s relationship with the United States will strengthen further if India becomes a production base for innovative global companies. Similarly, since the United States lifted its arms embargo on Indonesia in 2005, Indonesia has moved to diversify its defense partnerships, choosing to make arms deals with the United States rather than with Russia. This summer, Indonesia also declined to join the expanded BRICS group, which stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, setting its sights instead on the largely Western Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

When the war in Ukraine eventually ends, the global order will look different than it did before Russia’s invasion. Middle powers will continue to seek new coalitions and to steer clear of great-power rivalries. Washington’s attention is now focused on the wars in Europe and the Middle East, but it should not neglect important steps to set itself up for success in the world that comes after. The United States and its allies should vigorously counter Russian narratives that misrepresent the current conflict and damage their standing in key countries around the world, and they must show the countries on the fence the benefits their partnership can offer.