Biden’s Middle East Moonshot

On July 21, U.S. President Joe Biden dropped out of the 2024 presidential race, prematurely hastening the lame-duck period of his tenure. Most observers assume that he will not be able to accomplish much in the coming months. But Biden has made it clear that there is one priority that he intends to pursue in his remaining time in office: an end to the war in Gaza and the restoration of American peacemaking in the Middle East.

Those goals may seem unrealistic at the moment, especially in the wake of Israel’s recent assassinations of top Hezbollah and Hamas leaders, against which Iran and Hezbollah have promised to retaliate, which could plunge the region into a full-scale war that no one wants. But as long as what follows is akin to past rounds of exchanges that remained contained and did not escalate to an unrestrained conflict, Biden’s coming exit frees him to concentrate on concluding an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal that would likely be conditioned on an end to the war in Gaza.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to resist an invigorated effort on this front by Biden and his senior aides. That may seem counterintuitive, but for several reasons, Netanyahu needs the Americans to take the initiative. He knows that without American involvement he won’t be able to strike a deal to free the hostages Hamas is still holding in Gaza. He also understands that a military defeat of Hamas will matter little if the group can reconstitute itself, either by smuggling materiel across the Egypt-Gaza border or by diverting resources from reconstruction efforts in Gaza—and only Washington has the ability to forge the agreements and mechanisms to block such smuggling and diversion. Moreover, he understands that if he wants an alternative to Hamas rule in Gaza, he needs key Arab states—the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and maybe Morocco—to work with the United States and other actors to create an interim administration in Gaza that would assume responsibility for day-to-day governance and security.

For his part, Biden does not only want to end the war. He also wants to change the political trajectory of the region—a goal that sits well with the Saudis, who also want to use this time to achieve a defense treaty with the United States, which they see as the ultimate deterrent against Iran. Saudi leaders understand that such a treaty is possible only if Riyadh normalizes relations with Israel.

Such a treaty would require 67 votes for approval in the U.S. Senate, which might seem like a tall order. But with the right timing, it would be possible. If the normalization agreement is reached before the U.S. presidential election in November, the Senate could consider it during its lame-duck session in December. If Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic nominee, wins the election, Democrats would respond to Biden’s call to support ratification, especially as his last major act as president. For their part, Republicans have generally favored the idea of a breakthrough like this and would be unlikely at that point to oppose it if their nominee, Donald Trump, has just lost the election. Alternatively, if Trump has won, he would have little reason to pressure Republicans to oppose the treaty, because Israel-Saudi normalization would build on his own Abraham Accords and impose limits on the Chinese-Saudi relationship—and Trump would be the beneficiary of those outcomes. (Moreover, senators who are close to Trump, such as Lindsay Graham, would likely persuade Trump that Democratic antipathy toward him and the Saudis would make approval of the treaty in a Trump presidency very difficult to achieve.)

The timing would also align with Israeli political realities. The Knesset is in recess until the beginning of November, and it would be very difficult to bring a government down when the Knesset is out of session. That means that for the next three months, Netanyahu will have the political space to make tough decisions—ones that right-wing ministers in his coalition government, such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, would otherwise reject. (Netanyahu has already signaled that he will not do what they want, which is to reoccupy and build settlements in Gaza.)

In this sense, the political calendar works for both the United States and Israel: an agreement reached before the U.S. election, while the Knesset is in recess, can then be brought to a vote in the U.S. Senate after the election. But without the Biden administration mobilizing and organizing others to assume the necessary roles, the war will not end, and a Israeli-Saudi normalization deal will not materialize.

THE PRICE OF PEACE

For several reasons, Saudi normalization with Israel would be a game-changer in the Middle East. The most important Sunni Arab state—whose king, Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, bears the official title “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”—would be making peace with Israel. That would reduce the religious element of the conflict between Muslim-majority states and Israel. In addition, normalization would bring tacit Israeli-Saudi economic and security cooperation out of the shadows, foster a regional coalition to counter Iran and its proxies, and limit China’s attempts to strengthen its military and economic influence in the region.

Normalization would clearly serve U.S. national interests. It would serve Israeli interests. When Netanyahu resumed power in late 2022, he identified a peace treaty with Saudi Arabia as a top priority, as it would integrate Israel into a broader regional strategy to counter Iran and its proxies. Realizing that objective now would also allow him to recover some of the reputational capital that he lost when Hamas attacked Israel last October. And normalization would also serve Saudi interests. A defense treaty with the United States would reinforce Saudi national security, allowing the kingdom to focus on its real priority: the social and economic transformation outlined in Vision 2030, Riyadh’s much publicized blueprint for achieving economic prosperity and global leadership in renewable energy, which Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (referred to as MBS), the country’s de facto leader, sees as the key to its future.

Although MBS wants a defense treaty with the United States and understands that normalization with Israel is an essential condition for it, he will not pursue a deal that does not address Palestinian statehood. Before Israel’s war in Gaza, the kingdom might have settled for less. But as images of death and destruction have inflamed Arab public opinion, the price has risen. For Riyadh to agree to normalize relations with Israel now, the Saudi leadership must see that meaningful steps are being taken in the direction of a Palestinian state.

Of course, for many Israelis, the prospect of a Palestinian state became unthinkable after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, as they fear that Hamas would come to dominate such a state. For this reason, the Biden administration changed the way it described its goals, shifting away from the idea of taking time-bound, irreversible steps toward Palestinian statehood and toward the idea of developing a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. At present, even that softened language is more than Netanyahu is willing to accept.

Reconciling Israeli fears concerning Palestinian statehood with Saudi concerns for the Palestinians will be a major challenge. If Netanyahu is to produce a deal with the Saudis, he must first persuade himself, and then the Israeli public, that satisfying Saudi demands will not pose a mortal threat to Israel. And then he must break with maximalist right-wingers in his government, such as Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, who would refuse to meet Saudi Arabia’s terms for normalization.

WHAT THE PALESTINIANS MUST DO

There is a path forward, but it requires the Biden administration to focus on rights and responsibilities. The United States should recognize the Palestinians as a people with the right to self-determination. But that right is neither absolute nor automatic, because with it comes obligations. Before Palestinian statehood can be realized, the Palestinian Authority (PA) must meet a number of benchmarks.

The first may seem obvious: Palestinian statehood can no longer be based on resistance to Israel but on coexistence with it. The PA must renounce armed resistance and reject all groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, that are defined by it. The PA’s security forces must have a monopoly on the use of force inside Palestinian territory. As long as there are independent militias such as Hamas, there cannot be a Palestinian state. The PA must also end its practice of paying salaries and benefits to Palestinians (and to the families of Palestinians) who attack Israelis and are in Israeli prisons because of their acts of violence. This practice of “pay for slay” should be replaced by a welfare system based strictly on need and that does not give more money and preferential treatment to the relatives of those are serving sentences in Israeli jails.

The PA must also revamp the Palestinian educational system to focus on developing skills needed to compete in the twenty-first century, as well as promoting tolerance and coexistence. The Biden administration should work with the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which have transformed and modernized their educational systems, to set up a board of experts to oversee the rewriting of Palestinian textbooks.

The PA must also reform its judicial and economic institutions with the aim of reinforcing the rule of law and the transparency of its financial, budgeting, and investment processes. The United States should work with the European Union, the World Bank, and others to create a board of independent legal and financial experts to oversee the reforms and evaluate their progress. Finally, after a transition period of perhaps three years, the Palestinians must hold free and fair elections, with the PA allowing only candidates who have explicitly renounced violence and declared their commitment to coexistence with Israel to run.

A timeline for Palestinian statehood must be flexible because its completion depends on the PA fulfilling these major commitments and actions. The PA has rarely, if ever, taken these kinds of actions. But that is all the more reason to establish these benchmarks so that the Palestinians know what they need to do. Should they meet these targets, a Palestinian state would emerge on an agreed timeline. But if they fail to perform, it would not.

WHAT THE ISRAELIS MUST DO

Israel also has responsibilities and obligations. It cannot take steps that make Palestinian statehood harder or impossible to achieve, such as taking more land for the expansion of settlements. Moreover, the outward growth of settlements must stop, and unauthorized outposts should be dismantled—not legalized. And it is past time for the Israeli government to make clear that it will not tolerate violence by extremist settlers against Palestinians.

Aside from ending acts designed to prevent or preempt a possible Palestinian state, Israel should take a number of practical steps to enhance the PA’s ability to function and govern more effectively. Israel must stop withholding the tax revenues it collects for the PA; permit the expansion of road and water infrastructure in the West Bank; reduce checkpoints to ease the movement of Palestinians; open up what is known as Area C, which comprises roughly 60 percent of the West Bank, for Palestinian businesses to operate in and to invest; and allow products such as pharmaceuticals and tomatoes from the West Bank to be sold in Israel if they meet Israeli standards.

Although greater territorial contiguity will eventually be necessary for a future Palestinian state, the Israelis, understandably, will not agree to it until the PA effectively acts against those groups carrying out terrorism and violence against Israelis. But to do that, Palestinian security forces need greater legitimacy—and that is likely to come only when Palestinians believe the PA is delivering on governance and state building—and not merely acting as a security contractor for Israel. That perception can take hold over time, provided the PA cleans up its act and Israel empowers the authority rather than undercutting it.

All this may seem fanciful now. The fact that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians have behaved this way or taken these kinds of steps is a testament to the political price and backlash they fear for doing so. But Israeli-Saudi normalization could change the equation for both sides. For Israelis, there is the promise of a real coalition against Iran’s “axis of resistance” that would transform the regional landscape. For the Palestinians, there is the promise of statehood.

WHAT THE ARAB STATES MUST DO

It will take an intense, well-organized, and coordinated effort for the Biden administration to orchestrate and direct such a process in its final six months. Arab states, especially the “Arab Quint”—the Egyptians, Emiratis, Jordanians, Qataris, and Saudis—have a special role to play. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will resist taking the necessary steps even incrementally if Washington is the only one pushing him to do so. He is far more likely to act if the Arab Quint presses him as a group and with one voice. There is little precedent for the Arab Quint acting in such a concerted fashion and with a blunt collective message, and it will not happen unless they all understand that, if they do not, Washington cannot and will not play the role they want it to play. The Arab Quint will expect the United States to pressure Netanyahu, and that will be necessary. But the irony is that the more Washington can point to in terms of Arab and Palestinian moves toward a deal, the greater leverage Biden will have over Netanyahu. That said, the greatest source of U.S. leverage will come from being able to present Netanyahu with the need to make a choice: normalize with Saudi Arabia and all that would mean for an effective strategy toward Iran and its proxies, or forgo his chance at transforming the region and Israel’s place in it—which would make the October 7 attacks his enduring legacy.

Some might object that such plans are too complicated and that the best that can be hoped for is a hostage deal that sets in motion an end to the war. They may be right. But if Washington does not pursue a more ambitious goal, it will not be long before the region reverts to the pre‒October 7 status quo, and the only parties whose interests would be served by that outcome are Iran and its proxies.

This is the moment to change the region’s trajectory. Peace won’t come overnight, but the Biden administration can chart a different course. No one can undo the tragedy of the last nine months. But a better approach, one that emphasizes rights and responsibilities for all parties, can start a new chapter for the Middle East. In his remaining days in office, Biden should seize the moment.