Axis of Convenience

In July 2022, as Russia’s offensive in Ukraine was sputtering and Moscow was running low on weapons, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan made a major announcement: Iran was providing or preparing to send Russia unmanned aerial vehicles. Tehran denied the accusation, but it quickly became apparent that Sullivan was correct. Between September and November, Russia bought hundreds of Iranian-made Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. Moscow then used these drones, which are small, simple, and hard to detect, to target Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure, helping knock out roughly half the country’s power. The drones also helped exhaust Ukrainian resources, allowing the Russians to preserve their own.

In a way, it made perfect sense for Iran to sell weapons to Russia. Iran and Russia are now both isolated from most of the world’s great powers, and so they need all the help they can get. Yet the degree of cooperation between Tehran and Moscow in Ukraine is remarkable in light of the two powers’ acrimonious past. There is no love lost between Russia and Iran, which have a tumultuous history of distrust and betrayal. They fought against each other in multiple wars. Russia meddled in domestic Iranian affairs. Even on geopolitical issues where they famously cooperate, such as the Syrian civil war, the two countries have frequently sparred.

The current relationship between Iran and Russia is still not exactly warm; it looks much more like a business partnership than a genuine friendship. But although a formal alliance between Iran and Russia is still a long way away, their cooperation could prove highly effective. The two sides have grown adept at compartmentalizing different facets of their relationship to ensure that they can partner when it suits them. Their ties span the economic, political, and military spheres. And both Iran and Russia have discovered that the other has much to offer. “We are both antisanctions and against the intervention of the West in the affairs of other countries,” an Iranian diplomat told me, speaking on the condition of anonymity. (The Iranian government has a fraught internal debate over just how close its ties to Moscow should be.) Their partnership, he said, “was only natural.”

ODD COUPLE

For centuries, the Iranian-Russian relationship was plagued by animosity. Sometimes, it featured outright conflict. From when they first made diplomatic contact in the sixteenth century through the eighteenth century, the two states sporadically fought wars. Then, from 1804 to 1813 and again from 1826 to 1828, the two states faced off in sizable conflicts over the control of disputed territories in the South Caucasus. For Iran, both these wars ended in defeat. The Persian Empire was forced to sign punishing peace agreements that ceded massive chunks of territory to Russia, and to this day, Iranians cite the settlement that followed the latter defeat (called the Treaty of Turkmenchay) as a national humiliation. Russia also intervened in Iran’s domestic affairs repeatedly throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including by stymieing domestic political reforms, attempting to seize more territory, and backing parts of the elite in power struggles against others. This made many Iranians increasingly nervous and afraid of what they saw as the bully to the north.

Despite the continued threat posed by Russia, Iran intensified its political and trade relations with Moscow in the early 1920s. During the Cold War, the United States successfully worked to bring Iran into its orbit and away from the Soviet Union, but Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 isolated Tehran from the West and gave its new regime a need to build relations with Moscow. Even though their two systems had sharp ideological differences (the Soviet Union was avowedly atheist, whereas Iran was a self-proclaimed Islamic Republic), the two states had a common enemy in the United States, giving them an incentive to collaborate.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Iran and Russia further deepened. In 1995, Russia agreed to supply the light water reactor for Iran’s nuclear power plant in Bushehr. The two governments also boosted military ties, and by 2000, Iran was the third-largest market for Russian weapons. In 2007, Russia promised to sell Tehran the S-300 missile defense system. Trade ties, political relations, high-level exchanges, and security cooperation kept increasing, especially after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014.

Centuries of distrust between Iran and Russia now seem like ancient history.

But the two states still remained wary partners. Iran believed that Russia dragged its feet in delivering supplies for its Bushehr power plant and in delivering the S-300 system. After a series of plane crashes, Iran also concluded that Russian aerospace equipment was inferior to Western gear. Even the countries’ cooperation in Syria has been complicated. Tehran wanted Moscow on board with its campaign to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power, but it believed it could dictate the terms of Russia’s involvement; after all, Iran had experience in Syria and soldiers on the ground, whereas Russia was only supposed to provide air cover. But Russia saw itself as the bigger, more capable partner, and it acted as such. Moscow even surprised and antagonized Tehran by striking a cease-fire agreement (albeit one never fully implemented) with Washington in 2016. Iran and Russia continued to work together when their interests aligned, including to keep Assad in office, but they did so with a watchful eye.

Then Russia invaded Ukraine, and Iranian-Russian collaboration ascended to new heights. The two countries conducted multiple high-level meetings, including between Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Tehran in July 2022. They deepened their economic ties. During the first ten months of 2022, for instance, Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent, and Russian imports from Iran increased by ten percent. They began removing the dollar from bilateral trade, and they signed a memorandum of understanding that Russia will invest $40 billion in Iranian gas projects, $6.5 billion of which was already contracted out by November.

Iranian-Russian military ties have become especially significant. In addition to the Shahed-136, Iran sent Russia its Mohajer-6 drone, one of its top airborne combat attack vehicles. According to Reuters, Iran pledged to supply Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, potentially including the Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar, although the United States said it has no evidence such transfers have happened. Iran has also supplied Russia with ammunition and body armor. Iranian military advisers have traveled to the Ukrainian battlefield to provide Russian commanders with assistance, and The Washington Post reported that Iran agreed to help Russia manufacture drones.

This collaboration is not a one-way street. In December, the British ambassador to the United States told Reuters that Russia was poised to offer Iran unprecedented amounts of military support. Later that month, Western intelligence officials reported that Russia was preparing to supply Iran with Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets. Iran confirmed this purchase in January and added that the jets would be delivered after March. Tehran has also bought helicopters as well as air defense and missile systems from Russia. The level of dialogue between Iranian and Russian military and intelligence officials was already close, but it has become even closer. Centuries of distrust between the states now seem like ancient history.

ENEMY OF MY ENEMY

The new, tighter Iranian-Russian partnership is still the product of circumstance. It is highly unlikely that Moscow would have gone banging on Tehran’s door were it not for the war in Ukraine, which has heightened Russia’s need for weapons while cutting it off from most of the world’s leading suppliers of technology. Iran’s stance is also the product of external stress. As talks on reviving the 2015 nuclear deal have faltered since 2021, Tehran found itself increasingly alone. This isolation was compounded by the protests that followed the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the Iranian morality police in September 2022, which Tehran responded to with beatings, arrests, and hangings. It linked up with Moscow less because it liked Russia and more because it was one of the few remaining countries willing and able to help.

But historical contingencies frequently lead to durable and consequential unions, and Moscow and Tehran’s bond could prove no exception. The partnership’s enabling conditions, after all, are unlikely to dissipate. Russia’s war in Ukraine is set to grind on, and the Iranian regime shows no signs of moderating its behavior. As a result, neither state can count on emerging from international isolation.

The two countries also have much more they can provide each other. Tehran, for example, could teach Russia a thing or two about how to circumvent sanctions, including setting up bartering deals such as the one they discussed in May 2022, where Iran would import Russian steel in exchange for car parts and gas turbines. Iran also has a formidable military-industrial complex that it developed under sanctions, which could potentially make it a supplier for Moscow. Russia is now an attractive market for the Iranian military, which wants to showcase and export its weapons. Russia can also continue providing Iran with more of its own arms, despite military losses in Ukraine. And Russia has a vote on the UN Security Council, which could be useful if the Iranian nuclear crisis again comes before the body.

Russia will have to balance relations with Iran and its warming ties to Israel.

For Iran, the turn toward Moscow has not been easy. Tehran long hesitated with its policy of “looking East,” including to Russia, and following the nuclear deal debacle, both the public and the political system were split into two camps. Some Iranians supported building ties with Russia, whereas others continued to oppose it. But the country’s hard-liners generally favor improving relations with Moscow, and they swept Iran’s 2021 presidential election, gaining control over all the country’s levers of power.

That is not to say the Iranian-Russian partnership will be smooth. There are still many disputes that will complicate their ties. Russia will have to balance relations with Iran and its warming ties to Israel, as well as its relationships with Tehran’s Gulf Arab rivals. Moscow and Tehran will also continue to compete in areas such as the energy sector. After the West ramped up its sanctions on Russia, for example, Moscow diverted its oil to China, undercutting Iranian sales. Tehran had to slash oil prices in response.

But both governments appear to be working hard to figure it out. They have a track record of compartmentalizing and being pragmatic in their relationship, working together where they can while ignoring areas of contention. They will continue to push back against Western influence, cushion themselves against isolation, and build alternative coalitions to the U.S.-led order wherever possible. Russia and Iran may not trust or even like each other, but they know how to collaborate in ways that will be useful in the years ahead.