In a time of intensifying great-power rivalry, the Group of 20, or G-20, has become an indispensable forum for urgent global problems. As the West enters an increasingly entrenched conflict with Russia and tensions rise between the United States and China, the G-20—which brings together 19 of the world’s largest economies along with the European Union—provides a crucial way to make progress on shared international concerns ranging from food security and financial stability to climate change.

Yet in one respect, the G-20 has fallen short of becoming a truly global forum: since its inception in 1999, it has left the African continent staggeringly underrepresented. Its members include only a single African country—South Africa. As a result, some 96 percent of Africa’s population, accounting for 85 percent of its combined GDP, have no voice in the forum. This lack of representation is particularly glaring given that Africa will play a crucial role in many of the G-20’s primary concerns in the years to come, including the global push for clean energy and the digital transformation.

But Africa’s absence from the G-20 need not become a permanent defect. In fact, a solution is already at hand: the G-20 could transform its relationship with the continent with a single stroke by admitting the African Union—the continental body that includes nearly all African countries—as a new member. Moreover, the coming G-20 summit in New Delhi in September could provide a prime opportunity to raise the issue, since India, the current G-20 chair, has made the global South a key theme of its presidency. Successfully executing AU membership will require concerted support from leading G-20 countries, given that the G-20 does not have specific eligibility criteria or even a concrete process for adding members. But the current geopolitical climate and India’s presidency have produced a particularly favorable moment to pursue this. In the long run, failing to include Africa in the G-20 could harm not only African countries themselves but also the many G-20 countries that are increasingly relying on the continent to achieve climate objectives and other global economic goals.

GLOBAL AMBITION, AFRICAN OMISSION

There is little doubt about the G-20’s importance as a driver of international economic cooperation. The group was established with the aim of representing most of the world’s largest economies yet remaining manageable in size, thus able to act nimbly to address urgent problems. Its members include the G-7 countries plus major emerging economies such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Turkey. The European Union, whose combined GDP makes it the world’s third-largest economy, was admitted as a single member.

With its existing membership, the G-20 represents 65 percent of the world’s population, 85 percent of the world’s GDP, and 75 percent of global trade. Moreover, including the 27 countries of the EU alongside the G-20’s other 19 members, the group represents almost a quarter of the countries in the United Nations. Throughout its existence, the G-20 has proven effective in shaping long-term economic policies. Among the group’s contributions are the Global Infrastructure Hub, created in 2014 to implement infrastructure initiatives in collaboration with governments, the private sector, development banks, and international organizations; and the 2020 Global Initiative on Reducing Land Degradation, which aims to reduce desertification, deforestation, and other forms of destruction of usable land by 50 percent by 2040. Since 2015, the G-20 has also coordinated and pushed for international action to achieve the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, including by developing concrete measures and targets for the G-20 to implement in alignment with those goals.

Alongside these long-term economic initiatives, the G-20 has a strong record of responding to global emergencies. During the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the group implemented financial reforms and agreed to spend more than $4 trillion to revive their economies in the wake of the crisis. More recently, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the group provided crucial support in mobilizing funding for developing countries through the Coronavirus Global Response Pledging Conference, the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator, and the launch of the Pandemic Fund to accelerate research and development of vaccines and treatments and prepare for future pandemics. Despite the lack of formal African representation, many African countries have been directly affected by these G-20 policy initiatives.

EARTH, WIND, AND ECONOMIC FIRE

Africa’s near absence from the G-20 is at odds with the continent’s central importance to many G-20 concerns. Although South Africa has helped advance African priorities such as securing finance for infrastructure development and combating illicit financial flows to the continent, the country cannot stand in for a continent of 55 countries with a combined population of some 1.3 billion people. This gap in the G-20’s representation will only become more apparent as the African economy grows: Africa’s current combined GDP is $3.1 trillion, larger than India’s; if Africa were a country, it would be the world’s fifth-largest economy, and its share is projected to grow. In addition, by 2050, the continent is expected to be home to about a quarter of the world’s population.

Beyond population and economic growth, African countries have unique strengths that will be increasingly critical to achieving G-20 goals. Especially important is Africa’s role in the global response to climate change. African countries hold a disproportionate share of the global supply of cobalt, manganese, and platinum, which are essential inputs for batteries and clean hydrogen technologies. Solar power is already the cheapest source of electricity in many African countries, and the continent is estimated to have 60 percent of the world’s potential solar resources because of its high sunshine duration. Many African countries also have enormous untapped wind resources.

Moreover, although Africa contributes a mere four percent of global carbon emissions, some African countries are becoming world leaders in sustainable energy. Morocco has one of the world’s largest solar power plants, which provides 24-hour energy to more than one million homes. Despite being one of the highest emitting countries in the world, South Africa now has lower solar and wind prices compared with national utility or new coal plants, showing great promise for the clean energy transition.

Africa’s combined GDP is larger than India’s.

As the consequences of climate change become more severe, Africa is likely to bear disproportionate costs. Eight of the ten countries most vulnerable to climate change are African, and according to one November 2022 study, if current policies continue, Africa could lose as much as 64 percent of its GDP from climate change impacts by 2100. The new Loss and Damage Fund, established at COP27 (UN Conference of the Parties) in November 2022 to provide hundreds of millions of dollars to countries that bear the brunt of climate change effects, will add desperately needed climate finance resources to African nations. But African leadership, including in international forums such as the G-20, will be crucial to ensuring that these funds have the greatest impact on the countries that need them most.

Africa has also led the way in another G-20 policy priority: expanding digital payment infrastructure in the global economy. Kenya, for example, was the first country to launch contactless domestic payments (M-Pesa), in 2007, and the African Union and the African Export-Import Bank (a pan-African multilateral financial institution) are developing an advanced cross-border payment system that will boost intra-African trade by reducing the cost, duration, and liquidity requirements of cross-border payments across Africa, which could save the continent more than $5 billion annually.

Finally, the G-20 itself has initiatives that affect many African countries. For example, the G-20 Compact with Africa, launched in 2017 during Germany’s G-20 presidency, is a joint program supported by the International Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank, and the World Bank with the goal of enhancing private sector finance. It is led by the Africa Advisory Group, co-chaired by Germany and South Africa, which monitors progress made by the compact countries and works together with the G-20 and its partners to improve the investment environment. But as with the G-20’s climate and digital finance goals, full implementation of these African initiatives would be far more successful with African policymakers directly involved in decision making. Macky Sall, the president of Senegal and the current chair of the African Union, highlighted the problem well: “The most pressing issues—climate change, pandemics, security and debt—are ones that both affect Africa and on which Africa is in a position to contribute to solutions. Such a gap in African representation can weaken the G-20’s credibility, traction, and representativeness.”

55 PARTNERS IN ONE

The African Union is particularly well placed to fill the G-20’s gap on Africa. For one thing, making it a permanent member would make the G-20 dramatically more representative of the global population—from 65 percent to 80 percent. The AU also has a track record of effective leadership on the African continent. Among its many accomplishments are the creation of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention in 2017, which has played a crucial part in the African response to the COVID-19 pandemic; the African Continental Free Trade Area in 2018, which has become one of the largest free-trade areas in the world; and the African Union Development Agency, which coordinates and executes regional and continental development goals, supported by contributions from member states. Through its ambitious Agenda 2063 Plan—a 50-year plan to coordinate and accelerate advanced economic development on the continent—the AU has strengthened its negotiating power and ability to make decisions that reflect its members’ priorities. Such strengths will translate well to representing the continent and its priorities as part of the G-20.

Current G-20 members have also recognized the benefits of having the AU as a member. At the last G-20 summit meeting—in Bali in 2022—China, France, Indonesia, and South Africa publicly gave their support for AU membership. And the United States voiced its support at the U.S.-Africa Summit in December 2022. Russia has stated that it is not against the AU’s admission, and the Japanese government declared its backing at the end of 2022. These public statements signal political will by many leading G-20 members, making the coming round of G-20 meetings in September an opportune time to act.

Although AU membership was not on the G-20’s agenda at the 2022 summit, it could and should be put on the 2023 agenda. An added impetus is that the G-20 presidency over the next three years will be held by countries from the global South: India’s current presidency will be followed by Brazil in 2024 and South Africa in 2025. If AU membership is approved during India’s tenure, it would provide an immediate catalyst for more G-20 initiatives aimed at middle-income countries and regions over the following two years, during the Brazilian and South African presidencies.

The G-20 will need to harness Africa to achieve its climate goals.

Amid major rifts between the great powers, including rising tensions between the United States and China, and between G-20 countries after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the effectiveness of multilateral bodies has come under threat. Yet despite the polarization of the international order, the AU has succeeded in working multilaterally on a wide variety of economic and security goals, including pandemic response and building more resilient food systems to withstand the shocks of the war in Ukraine. In doing so, it has become a valuable asset to the G-20, which itself has been a crucial source of international cohesion on core economic issues.

The African Union’s path to G-20 membership is not yet clear. A proposal for membership would likely need to be formally introduced at a G-20 meeting by a G-20 member and would then need to receive unanimous support. Although there is no codified criteria for membership, membership is meant to be regionally balanced. Thus, although Switzerland’s nominal GDP ranks it 20th in the world, its bid to join the G-20 was unsuccessful because of concerns that it would make the group too Euro-centric. In contrast, as an important global economic player that would significantly increase the balance of representation, the AU’s bid is strong, especially now that several G-20 members have come out in support. Much like the European Union’s inclusion in the G-20 as a single member, adding the African Union as a member would be an appealing way to significantly increase representation without adding too many seats to a group that was intended to be kept small enough to make decisions efficiently.

India and its fellow G-20 members should capitalize upon the strong political will and push for the AU’s accession to the group. Already, India has shown leadership in expanding representation, with seven out of the nine guest countries being from the global South, including Egypt, Nigeria, and Mauritius. A formal proposal for AU membership would consummate this effort. In taking this move, the G-20 can help unleash Africa’s extraordinary economic potential and harness Africa’s contributions to solving the crucial global challenges of our time. African representation in the body is long overdue, especially given the world’s growing divisions and endangered multilateral institutions. An African Union seat in the G-20 would be a huge step forward in securing the future of this vital global forum.

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  • LANDRY SIGNÉ is a Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution and Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for African Studies.
  • BRAHIMA SANGAFOWA COULIBALY is Vice President and Director of Global Economy and Development and the Edward M. Bernstein Scholar at the Brookings Institution.
  • More By Landry Signé
  • More By Brahima Sangafowa Coulibaly